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THEMES AND ARGUMENTS OF ANTI-ISLAMIC PROPAGANDA
DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD
Fanny Elisabeth Bryan, Ph.D.
Department of History
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D. Koenker, Advisor
The Soviet Union was the first great power to make extensive and
continuing use of propaganda as a means of achieving social revolution and
maintaining social control. The study identifies and analyzes the changing
strategies, themes, arguments and styles of propaganda attacks on Islam and
Muslim beUevers during the Soviet period of Russian history. For purposes
of die study, "propaganda" is viewed as an organized, or concerted, group
effort to promote a specific body of thought, doctrine, ideas, or information.
An early and major imperative facing the successful Marxist
revolutionaries was to prepare the way in human terms for the long-term
success of the new society. They were dedicated to the creation of Soviet
Man. As an aspect of that preparation, it was important to clear away the
remnants of bourgeoise society, including reUgion. Islam was but one of the
religions subjected to substantial attack.
The study included a substantial review of major primary Soviet
sources, and includes an annotated Appendix of articles relating to Islam in
the journal Bezbozhnik. Although the study is centered on anti-Islamic
propaganda during the Soviet period, the Soviets were not the first to
colonize the Muslim lands on the periphery of what came to be the USSR.
Nor were the Soviets the first to engage in active propaganda directed
against Islam. Accordingly, the study includes a substantial review and
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analysis of the anti-Islamic literature that emerged from the nineteenth
century Russian Orthodox missionaries.
A chief conclusion of the study is that the propaganda themes and
arguments of the Soviet propagandists were httle changed from those used
by the Orthodox missionaries. Related to this conclusion is the observation
that the results of the two sets of propagandists were not markedly different.
Both ended in failure.
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Chapter I: Introduction
The main purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the changing
strategies, themes, arguments and styles of propaganda attacks on Islam and
Muslim believers during the Soviet period of Russian history. The Soviet Union
was the first great power to make extensive and continuing use of propaganda as
a means of achieving social revolution and maintaining social control.! In
coUoquial usage the word "propaganda" often carries a strong pejorative
overtone. That need not be the case, and the word is not used in that sense in this
study. Instead, "propaganda" as used herein retains its formal meaning: an
organized, or concerted, group effort to promote a specific body of thought,
doctrine, ideas, or information. In this context, it is possible to view as
propaganda a wide variety of media and materials containing varying levels of
intellectual content ~ from scholarly studies to slogans to leaflets.
For decades, the study of numerous aspects of life within the Soviet Union
was effectively denied to Western scholars. For periods when such limitations
were operative, the study of propaganda offered one means of drawing inferences
about unseen phenomena. It is reasonable to believe that the themes and
arguments bemg used by the propagandists were responsive to concerns or threats
perceived by the state. In tum, in the absence of wild paranoia it is plausible to
believe that the concems or threats perceived by the state were responsive to
objective events. That is, they were responsive to something that was, in fact,
going on. Alternatively, there may not have been changes in external events or
conditions, but there may have been shifts in policy toward those events or
1 Among studies of Soviet propaganda see: Hopkins; Hollander, Powell, Anti-religious
Propaganda; Kenez; and Benn.

2conditions. Hence, the interpretation of propaganda changes must be approached
with caution.
The study of propaganda can be of substantial value even if other avenues
of investigation are open. An historical analysis of propaganda is important in
those social systems in which propaganda has been an important instrument of
control. The identification of propaganda shifts may provide additional insights
into factors motivating policy changes. Propaganda changes, or their absence,
may reinforce our understanding of policy changes that have been inferred from
other data, or even those that have been officially announced. For example,
expanding on this latter point, an attitude of skepticism may be appropriate for an
announced change in poUcy that is not accompanied by a corresponding shift in
propaganda.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for the dissertation.
Its initial focus is to show how anti-Islamic propaganda fit into the overall
purposes of the Soviet state.
Soviet Man and Anti-Islamic Propaganda
An early and major imperative facing the successful Marxist
revolutionaries was to prepare the way in human terms for the long-term success
of the new society. A dominant theme of the Marxist Revolution consisted of the
promise to alter the relationship between the production process and the
distribution of income. In the words of Marx "from each according to his
abihties, to each according to his needs." Such an arrangement had not been an
aspect of the Tsarist system, nor has it been an aspect of any large system known
to modem society.
Even before Marx, the desire to create heaven on earth had been man's
dream for centuries. The Utopias of Plato, Thomas More, Campanella, Muntzer,

3Babeuf, Winstanley, Fourier, Owen, Saint-Simon had attracted many followers.
In virtually each case, the Utopia consisted of a golden age brought about by
renewed and purified men. For centuries the dream of the new man remained
inseparable from the idea of God. Renewal was made possible by God's grace.
In the nineteenth century the dream was changing. Rather than to bring himself
into conformity with his idea of God, man sought to achieve perfection through
the use of the laws of Science and History. Lenin viewed Marxism as "the science
of sciences," a philosophy encompassing the laws that would enable its adepts to
transform the world and the human genre. In October 1917, Lenin and his co-
thinkers seized power with the proclaimed goal of creating an ideal order.
Soviet ideologists were right when they proclaimed that the October
Revolution had marked the dawn of a new era. It was not the first time in history
that a group of men had made a revolution with the purpose of seizing power.
But, notwithstanding similarities to the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks went
further than the French in their announced intention to create a different
political, economic, and social system. The coup d'etat represented the first step
in the accomplishment of the project. Its full realization necessitated the creation
of a new man, commonly referred to as Soviet man. Moreover, the idea of
Soviet man was not ancillary or transient. Seventy years later, the nominal goal
remained the same and each leader had proclaimed its importance.^ Thus, as late
as 1983 Konstantin Chemenko asserted that "the formation of the new man is not
only an essential goal to reach, but a vital condition for the building of
Conmiunism."3
2 For the pronouncements about the new man by Soviet leaders see for example KPSS o
Formirovanii
.
3 Pravda, 15 June 1983.

4In the course of Soviet history the model of Soviet man changed somewhat.
From the "pure revolutionary" of the twenties there emerged the "scientific and
industrialized" man from whom fidehty, initiative, and energy were demanded.
In 1961, Khrushchev predicted that 1981 would mark the birth of the new Soviet
man. This new man was supposed to "combine harmoniously a high ideological
conscience, a vast culture, moral purity, and physical perfection."^ But whatever
the variations of the model, the underlying purposes for its creation remained the
same: to bring about uniformity of minds and souls as defined by the leaders; and
to develop in each individual the sense of belonging to the state, of being a lowly
fraction of the machine, of being a member of the collective who would obey
without question the leaders of the state.5
Never before in history had there been an attempt to create a new man on
"a strictly scientific basis." Having seized power, Lenin's party had only a vague
idea of the actions it would undertake. The transformation of man, however,
unplied, first of all, the destruction of the old social, economic, and state system.
Society was the first recipient of what contemporaries of the Revolution have
described as disorganized and chaotic actions. The social tissue of human
relations became an early target. At length, religion, the family, history, and
languages were to come under attack. The old terms of reference for the
individual were to be destroyed, to be replaced by a set of terms estabhshed and
approved by the state. Conditions were to be created wherein man would cease to
behave, think, or feel as he had before the Revolution. For seventy years, the
thought processes of the individual in the Soviet state were subjected to more or
Pravda, 18 October 1961.
5 For a study of the system of formation of the new Soviet man see for example: Heller,
Ro'i; Powell, "Rearing New Soviet Man"; and Bauer.

5less intensive efforts to create Soviet man. The rationale had been that each
successive Soviet generation was supposed to increase progressively its reserve of
sociahst feelings and to begin to see nonnaUty in the new order.
The formation of an atheist was an important aspect of the creation of
Soviet man. "Communism begins at the outset ... with atheism," wrote Karl
Marx, and Lenin fully adopted the premise. Although Lenin's chief source of
inspiration was undoubtedly the thought of Marx and Engels, he was also
influenced by the nineteenth century Russian tradition of poUtical atheism of
Belinsky, Herzen, Pisarev, Bakunin, etc.^ Lenin's writings on religion are rather
limited.^ Even so, as Bociurkiw pointed out "it would be far from correct to
minimize either the importance of atheism in Leninist theory or the poUtical
significance ascribed by him to the role of religion in Russian society.''^ Indeed,
Bochenski argued that Lenin's rejection of religion, became "one of the logical
bases of his philosophy ~ perhaps the most important one."9
Lenin upgraded the importance of the active struggle against reUgious
ideology to such an extent that it became a means, if not indeed a condition, of a
successful struggle against political and economic oppression. 10 Some argue that
the virulence of Lenin's opposition to religion reflects the poUtical atheism of the
6 For studies of the Russian background to Marxism see: Berdyaev; Berlin; Billington;
Bochenski, Dialectical Materialism; Kline; Thrower; and WaUcki. See also the invaluable work of
Venturi.
' Lenin, Ateisticheskie Proizvedeniia.
8 Bociurkiw, "Lenin and ReUgion," 107-8.
9 Bochenski, Dialectical Materialism, 3 1
.
10 Bociurkiw, "Lenin and Religion," 109.

6Russian radical tradition, an atheism that sprang from the rejection of the
interdependence between the autocracy and the Orthodox church. 1
1
Marxism as a complete Weltanschauung was a Leninist contribution to
original Marxist thought. 12 For Lenin, Marxism was a complete and harmonious
worid view, "all powerful because true." As such, it was the correct alternative
to any and all rehgious understandings of man and the world. 13 Because there
was room for nothing else, the philosophical and political, even personal, atheism
of Lenin provided die context for his further dealings with religion in the Soviet
Union.
Lenin's principle of the materiahty of all existence was a principle that
excluded the supernatural in toto. Thus, he rejected all reUgions and all
"churches." The Soviet anti-religious campaigns were directed against all
religions. 14 However, the focus of the dissertation is narrowed to the
consideration of one religion, Islam. And as we shall see, the dissertation is
narrowed further to one aspect of anti-Islamic activities, propaganda.
Soviet Activities Within a Broadened Perspective
Having motivated the study by viewing anti-Islamic propaganda as flowing
from Marxist efforts to create Soviet Man, it is appropriate to consider the
subject matter withm a broadened perspective. For, after all, the expansion of
1
1
Bociurkiw, "Lenin and Religion," 109; and Thrower, 1 13.
12 Lenin built upon Engels' attempts to formulate a Marxist world view. See Anti-Duhring
written in 1877.
13 Thrower, 120-1.
14 Surveys of church-state relationship can be found in: Timasheff; Anderson; Curtiss,
Russian Church; Kolarz, Religion; Struve; Conquest; Fletcher, Simon; and Pospielovsky, Russian
Church.

7north European caucasions into territories occupied by others, including those of
Mushm faith, is anything but exceptional. The Russians themselves had attempted
to gain access to year-round ports for more than a century. As we shall see in
Chapter 11, the tsars had had their own reasons to engage in active anti-Islamic
propaganda.
In short, it is plausible to view the Soviet experience in Muslim lands as an
aspect of colonialism. Thus regarded, it could be asserted that the Soviets were
little different from the French, English, Dutch, Belgians, Germans, Italians,
Portugese, Americans, and anyone else who pushed themselves into the lands and
peoples of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, south and central America and
elsewhere. Within this context, attempts to spread atheism in an effort to create
Soviet Man can be regarded as substantially similar to attempts to spread
Christianity and westem culture.
Why Study Anti-Islamic Propaganda?
The choice of Islam as a case study is based on a number of considerations.
Among the religions of the Soviet Union, Islam possesses characteristics that have
made it particularly intractable to outside influences. In their attempts to destroy
Islam, the Bolsheviks encountered a series of problems, not only religious but
also cultural and political. The Bolsheviks had not encountered these problems
with Orthodoxy, and they were ill prepared to deal with them.
It is well known that Islam is both a faith and a socio-cultural system. The
prescriptions of Islam, probably more tlian in any other religion, permeate aU
aspects of everyday hfe. Islam transcends the purely spiritual domain and, by
regulating many aspects of personal and collective social discourse, becomes for
its adherents a way of Ufe. The Muslims of the Russian Empire, molded by
centuries of Islam, possessed certain spiritual, social and psychological attitudes

8conditions. Hence, the interpretation of propaganda changes must be approached
with caution.
The study of propaganda can be of substantial value even if other avenues
of investigation are open. An historical analysis of propaganda is important in
those social systems in which propaganda has been an important instrument of
control. The identification of propaganda shifts may provide additional insights
into factors motivating policy changes. Propaganda changes, or their absence,
may reinforce our understanding of policy changes that have been inferred from
other data, or even those that have been officially announced. For example,
expanding on this latter point, an attitude of skepticism may be appropriate for an
announced change in poUcy that is not accompanied by a corresponding shift in
propaganda.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for the dissertation.
Its initial focus is to show how anti-Islamic propaganda fit into the overall
purposes of the Soviet state.
Soviet Man and Anti-Islamic Propaganda
An early and major imperative facing the successful Marxist
revolutionaries was to prepare the way in human terms for the long-term success
of the new society. A dominant theme of the Marxist Revolution consisted of the
promise to alter the relationship between the production process and the
distribution of income. In the words of Marx "from each according to his
abilities, to each according to his needs." Such an arrangement had not been an
aspect of the Tsarist system, nor has it been an aspect of any large system known
to modem society.
Even before Marx, the desire to create heaven on earth had been man's
dream for centuries. The Utopias of Plato, Thomas More, Campanella, Muntzer,

9the propaganda arena. And they have neglected the arguments and mechanisms
used by the Soviet state in an effort to shape the rehgious behefs of its Muslim
population.
Plan of the Study
The study consists of five additional chapters and a conclusion. Chapter II
discusses the tsarist experience with Islam. The eariy Bolsheviks inherited a large
Marxist anti-rehgious literature, and a long anti-clerical tradition from the
nineteenth century Russian socialists and revolutionaries. But among this vast
heritage were only very Hmited references to Islam. Thus, the Bolsheviks could
not find much among the pronouncements of their ideological ancestors to guide
them in a practical way against Islam. In contrast, the Tsarist experience with its
Muslim population was an important source of reference to the Bolsheviks. A
large anti-Islamic missionary literature had developed in the second half of the
nineteenth century. The Soviet authorities copied some of the tsarist tactics and
used the rich legacy of the anti-Islamic missionary literature.
Chapter in traces the major policy shifts of the Soviet period vis a vis
Islam. These shifts formed the background against and within which anti-Islamic
propaganda was conceived. The discussion begins with the period of uncertainty
toward Islam immediately following the October Revolution and continuing
through much of the decade of the 1920s. Major anti-Islamic pohcy initiatives
were mounted during the Cultural Revolution and continued for the remainder of
the 1930s. After a period of rehgious detente during World War n and Stalin's
last years, Khrushchev retumed to an aggressive anti-Islamic stance, but within
the context of a new ideological approach. In a somewhat less aggressive tone,
the new ideological approach was maintained throughout the remainder of the
Soviet period.
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The Soviet Union's propaganda approaches and aspects of its apparatus are
described in Chapter IV. The Soviet commitment to a long-term educational
effort was worked out during the course of a decade-long debate during the
1920s. As it turns out, however, the educational approach was not implemented
until the debate was renewed during the Khrushchev period.
Chapters V and VI analyze the major themes and arguments of Soviet anti-
Islamic propaganda. The word "themes" refers to the elements of Islam coming
under attack; the word "arguments" refers to the theses used by the propagandists
to undermine those elements. Chapter V deals with changing themes and
arguments during the NEP and the Stahn era, and Chapter VI considers these
same factors during the remainder of the Soviet period.
The main target of propaganda in the 1920s and 1930s was the religious
estabUshment. The Soviet authorities believed that by destroying the church -
the mosques and the Muslim clerics ~ they would seriously weaken the power of
Islam over the population. The aspects of Islam coming under propaganda attack
during that period were the outwardly identifiable elements. There were
practically no attacks on the specific behefs of the Islamic faith.
The post-Khrushchev period was characterized by a relatively more liberal
treatment of Islam. The strategy was based on the premise that Islam could be
destroyed ideologically; the chief practical tactic involved co-opting the Muslim
elite. Anti-Islamic propaganda in the late sixties and seventies used an eclectic
approach. The themes and the arguments were vastly increased in comparison to
the earher periods and were more subtle. There was an effort to oppose
Marxism to Islam at every possible level: spiritual, moral, philosophical, cultural,
artistic, scientific, and political.
In the late 1970s Soviet sources began to talk of Islamic revival. Soviet
propagandists began to question the efficacy of the ideological strategy against
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Islam. They had come to the view that the strength of the religion was not
wholly in the ideology; instead, its strength was found in its social traditions. By
the 1980s, the strategy of the Brezhnev period had been abandoned, and a
systematic campaign was pursued to destroy Islam at the grass-roots level. The
themes of the propaganda were directed mainly toward the way of life, customs,
rites, and traditions of Islam. In the late 1980s, anti-Islamic propaganda again
shifted. The traditional arguments against Islam were retained, but they were
advanced in a subdued manner. In their place, a massive pro-intemationalist
campaign was undertaken in the Muslim republics.
Conclusions and suggestions for future research are presented in Chapter
VII.
Sources and Limitations
The primary sources for this study are printed missionary anti-Islamic
literature and printed Soviet anti-Islamic Uterature, both periodical and non-
periodical. In the context of our definition of propaganda, the sources range
from scholarly studies of Soviet Islamists to primitive attacks on Islam by low-
level propagandists.
An exhaustive coverage of anti-Islamic literature could not be achieved.
The chief problem relates to the uneven availability of sources in the West. For
example, prior to 1941 a number of journals speciaUzing in anti-religious
propaganda were pubUshed in Turkic languages in various Muslim republics.
Those journals are not generally available in the West. However, they were
pubUshed by the Society of Militant Godless which also published, at the same
intellectual level, the journal Bezbozhnik (The Godless). Bezbozhnik, discussed
more fully in Chapter IV and the Appendix, is available in the West. It is
reasonable to assume that the themes and arguments against Islam printed in
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Bezbozhnik are the same as those printed in Turkic journals. An annotated
bibliography of articles appearing in Bezbozhnik during its period of publication
forms an Appendix to this study.
Another problem preventing complete coverage is that Soviet non-
periodical local publications on Islam are typically published in limited editions,
usually between five hundred and three thousand copies. They are aimed at
domestic consumption rather than foreign observers. Hence, it is not easy to find
them abroad, and only a few Westem institutions have gathered such material. In
contrast, publications issued in Moscow are often printed in large quantities and
are for foreign consumption. These can be found in most well-stocked libraries
in the West, but they are likely to be much less instructive regarding the life of
Muslims in the Soviet Union.
Finally, an exhaustive coverage of anti-Islamic propaganda is difficult
because of the tremendous increase of the material since the 1950s. Information
relating to Islam is disseminated throughout the Soviet press. Atheistic hterature
against Islam can be found in such unexpected joumals as Sovetskaia Industriia
(Soviet Industry). An analysis of everything that has become available would
require the work of a team.
It is unlikely, however, that anything new would be forthcoming in the
material to which we have not had access. Anti-religious hterature in general,
and the anti-Islamic propaganda in particular, is extremely repetitive ~ at all
levels, from the scholarly to the crude. Therefore, the already enormous amount
of available literature is more than sufficient to give a well-defined picture of the
themes and arguments of the anti-Islamic propaganda.
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Chapter 11: Islam and Its Adversaries in Pre-Revolutionary Russia
As tsarist Russia expanded toward empire after the mid-sixteenth century it
encountered a series of peoples that were culturally and reUgiously different
from the Orthodox Russians. It encountered animists, Buddhists, and Muslims,
along with Jews and other non-Orthodox Christians. As an aspect of poUtical
expansion, the tsars had entrusted the Russian Orthodox Church with the mission
of spiritual expansion.! Only with a successful conversion of these disparate
populations to Orthodoxy could there be a complete assimilation of these peoples
into the Russian Empire. As Mozharovskii, a pre-Revolutionary historian, put it:
"To win a decisive victory ... the Russians had yet to conquer the heterodox
populations morally, by the spiritual sword, by the word of God, to conquer
them by the Christian Orthodox faith. Only then could the infidels become loyal
subjects of the Russian Christian State."2 The task of the Church continued with
varied success until the Revolution.
This chapter discusses the activities of the Russian Orthodox missionaries in
the second half of the nineteenth century and presents an analysis of their
literature. The interest in presenting a review of the missionary literature in this
dissertation is that the Soviet anti-Islamic hterature repeated and expanded upon
the same arguments. In the process of discussing the Orthodox missionaries, the
chapter lays the groundwork for understanding the condition of Islam to be faced
by the Bolsheviks following their successful Revolution. The chapter proceeds as
follows: First, there is a discussion of the spread of Islam in tsarist Russia as
viewed from the perspective of the missionaries. This discussion provides a
1 Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les Missions Orthodoxes," 369 and 375.
^ Mozharovskii, 2.
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picture of the vitality of the religion in the daily hfe of the Muslim population of
Russia. Next, there is a broad review of the chief contours of the Russian
Orthodox literature, its general character and its intended audiences. Finally, the
chapter moves to an analysis of the messages and themes of missionary literature.
The Setting
Practicing Russian Orthodox often boast that they have not needed to
devote resources toward missionary work. That assertion is not entirely
accurate. It is true that the Russian Orthodox Church's missionary activities
abroad have been quite limited. The Orthodox Church's main efforts have been
carried on within the borders of the empire, among animists, Muslims, Buddhists,
Jews, and non-Orthodox Christians.
The low visibility of the Russian Orthodox Church in missionary activities
resulted chiefly from the fact that for centuries the Church has come under close
supervision by the state. As a consequence of its subordination to the tsarist
Russian state, the missionary activities of the Orthodox Church in conquered
territories were limited both in terms of geography and in time. In Muslim
territories, missionary activities were undertaken only in regions where and at
times when the tsarist state wanted to pursue a policy of assimilation of the non-
Russian populations. Such was the case at three different periods in the
territories of the Middle-Volga, Ural, and Western Siberia. The first surge of
missionary activity occurred in the second half of the sixteenth century; then,
about a century later, between 1710 and 1765, missionary activities were
renewed; finally, missionary activities were pressed between 1865 and 1905, the
only period that produced a rich anti-Islamic hterature.
Missionary work was also undertaken where desirable outcomes were most
likely, such as territories where the influence of Islam was considered to be

15
superficial. For example, missionary activities were pursued in the Kazakh
steppes and in some regions of the Caucasus during the nineteenth century. In
territories where Islam was strongly implanted or where there was no desire to
assimilate the populations, missionary work was discouraged or specifically
prohibited (e.g., the Crimea, parts of the Caucasus, and Turkestan).^
The historical setting is organized around four topics. First, there is an
overview of the advance of Islam in the nineteenth century. Second, there is a
discussion of the reactions of the Russian missionaries to the renaissance of Islam.
Among the missionaries, that renaissance created alarm and paved the way for
anti-Islamic initiatives, the next topic to be discussed. The final part of this
section describes the tenuous position of the missionaries after 1905.
The Advance of Islam
The Tatars of the Middle-Volga had been subjected to strong pressure for
conversion to Orthodoxy prior to the reign of Catherine H. Following her
Decree of Toleration of Faith in 1773, the Volga Tatars quickly reasserted their
Muslim identity. In the following century, the proselytizing activities of the
Volga Tatars in eastern Russia resulted in steady conversions to Islam. First and
foremost, Islam was spread among Christian Tatars, including both
starokreshchenye (old converts) and novokreshchenye (recent converts). The
starokreshchenye had been converted to Christianity in the sixteenth century,
during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. They lived in communities, separated
3 A history of Orthodox missions in eastern Russia remains to be written. Studies, other
than by Russian missionaries, include: Grigor'ev; Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Missions Orthodoxes,"
369-403; Mozharovskii; Kreindler, Educational Policies; and Saussay, "Il'minskij." Also see the
bibliographical work by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Musulmans et Missions."
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from their Muslim brethren or intermixed with Russians.^ They were
considered authentic and firmly Orthodox and, at least until 1866, were not
affected by the periodic mass apostasies that plagued the novokreshchenye. The
novokreshchenye had been converted in the eighteenth century, mostly through
coercion, and were only nominally Christian. They often continued to live
intermixed with the Muslim Tatars, and were under constant pressure to revert to
Islam.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, apostasies and reversions to
Islam of novokreshchenye remained a continual problem for the Orthodox
Church. There were two major movements of apostasy in the Kazan guberniia
(province), one in 1827 and another in 1866. In 1866, for the first time whole
communities of Tatar starokreshchenye petitioned the Tsar to allow them to
retum to Islam.5 In the same Volga-Ural region, Islam also gained adepts among
those who had never been Muslims, among the animist and Christian Turkic or
Finnic tribes, the Chuvash, the Cheremiss (Marii), and the Votiak (Udmurt).
Always proselytized by the Volga-Tatars, Islam was also growing deeper roots
among the poorly Islamized Kazakh masses.
An intensified concern about the spread of Islam in eastern Russia led to a
renewal of missionary activity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The
scale of the apostasies had shaken not only the Orthodox Church but also the
Russian administration. In the government's view, defection from Orthodoxy
4 Lemercier-Quelqujay, "Missions Orthodoxes," 379; and Saussay, "Apostasie," 24-5. The
order to separate the baptized Tatars jfrom their Muslim brethren was given by Tsar Fedor to the
voevodas of Kazan on June 18, 1593. See "Spisok s Gosudarevy Gramoty o
Novokreshchennykh Tatarakh. Ot Otvedenii Dlia Nikh Osobykh Pashen i Istreblenii Mecheti, 18
liuUa 1503," reproduced in Istoriia Tatarii v Dokumentakh, 147-150.
^ For the reasons and consequences of the 1866 apostasy movement see Saussay,
"Apostasie."
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was akin to treason.^ However, in the atmosphere of relative Uberalism of the
1860s, openly coercive methods of conversion were no longer possible. As an
altemative, the Middle-Volga-Ural and the Kazakh steppe witnessed a renewal of
missionary activities. The missionaries recognized that they faced a formidable
force, but they were confident, at least in the mid-nineteenth century, that they
could be successful. In particular, in view of the Kazakhs' lukewarm attitude
toward Islam, the missionaries believed that the Kazakhs were strong candidates
to be won over to Russian Orthodoxy.^ But by the end of the nineteenth century
the confidence of the missionaries had begun to fade.
It was with a certain admiration and envy that the missionaries viewed the
MusUm Tatars' community spirit, religious convictions, and moral behavior. To
the missionaries, the Tatar communities appeared to be closely knitted
communities, striving to maintain their faith, their religious traditions and the
customs inherited from their ancestors. The Tatars sought to keep their
communities as hermetically closed from Russian influence as possible. In this
closed environment there reigned a powerful religious and community spirit.
Each member considered the defense of the interests of his community to be his
duty. The smallest Tatar community was a "parish." Each parish represented a
miniature state with its laws, rules, and customs, all drawing their strength from
Islamic tradition. Each parish had its own school and its own mosque which were
endowed by the parish.8 Wherever destiny had spread them, a few Muslim
6 Kreindler, Educational Policies, 74.
7 Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsarin," 104; and id.. Educational Policies, 164-9.
^ n'minskii, a prominent missionary, claimed that Muslims had more more funds for
education than the Orthodox, and he envied their customary practice of endowing schools rather
than churches, icons, or bells as was the case among Russians. See Il'minskii, "Shkola," 91,
cited by Kreindler, Educational Policies, 102.

families immediately grouped themselves around a mosque and a school.
Furthemiore, they immediately estabhshed contacts with the closest madrasah^
Such small Muslim communities were spread in numerous regions of Russia. In
spite of the fact that the Tatar communities had been embedded among Russians
for centuries, they had not lost their Tatar-Muslim character. 10
In contrast, the missionaries drew attention to the frequent disorder of
Russian colonization. In Siberia and in the Altai in particular, Russian settlers
often lived for years without churches or schools.! 1 In those areas it was not
unusual for non-MusUm natives and even Russians to send their children to the
Mushm Tatar village schools (maktab). Russian disorder was viewed by the
missionaries as an obstacle to the spread of Orthodoxy among animists, even
among those who had sympathy for it such as the Votiaks (Udmurts). "We like
your Russian faith," said the Votiaks, "we Uke your reUgious ceremonies, but you
have no order and that is why we stay in our own faith." 12 in contrast, the
assimilative power of the Tatar was such that not only did non-Muslim natives
become Tatarized, but, to the great horror of the missionaries, so did a great
number of Russians. 13
9 Madrasah is a Muslim higher educational establishment The madrasah(s) were not all
located m urban areas. In the Volga-Ural a number of them were in the countryside. Il'minskii
mentioned the role of madrasah(s) in the spread of Islam among non-Muslims hving in their
vicinity. In particular, he complained about the influence of the madrasah of Sterlibash, in the Ufa
province, upon surrounding Christian Chuvash communities, cited by Saussay, "D'minskij," 409.
10 The description of this typical Tatar "parish" can be found in Mashanov, "Sovremennoe
Sostoianie," 242-3.
1
1
Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 22 1 -2.
12 Cited by M. Platonov, 378.
13 Mkop'iQw, O Polozhenii, 292-3.
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In their proselytizing activities, the Tatars had an advantage over Russian
missionaries. Whereas the conversion to Orthodoxy always involved the
acceptance of a certain degree of assimilation to the alien Russian cultural
pattern, 14 the conversion to Islam represented no such cultural change. The
missionaries often talked of the "Tatarization" of the Volga natives who adopted
Islam. However, Finnic and Turkic tribes and even Kazakhs were not very
different from the Tatars by their languages, general way of life, customs, habits,
dress, and diet. It is true that those who adopted Islam adopted some
characteristics of the Tatars. However, those were often secondary tokens of
Islam, such as the wearing of beards and turbans, or a diet without pork or wine.
To become a Muslim, therefore, did not really mean a break with the traditional
way of life. The missionaries were perfectly conscious of the problem, nowhere
more so than among the Kazakhs. As a missionary among the Kazakhs explained.
Pressed by governmental considerations on the necessity to Russify the
Kirghiz (Kazakh), the mission had decided for practical reasons, to
transform converted Kirghiz, who were nomads, into sedentary people. It
had attempted, not only to introduce among the Kirghiz a "Christian" faith
but also a "Russian" faith. For the poorly educated Kirghiz the new faith
had become more "Russian" than Christian. To accept the Holy Baptism
meant to become Russian, by the mode of life, the physical appearance ...15
The Kazakhs who had accepted Christianity were, in that act, ahenated from their
own people. Henceforth, "they were persecuted by their relatives and peers as
'apostates,' and were deprived of tribal protection." 1^ As a consequence, the
14 The Orthodox Church insisted that baptized natives must change their way of life. See for
example Malov, "Ocherk Religioznago," 138-9.
15 Kiprian, 450.
1" Theodorite, 467. In the same vein D'minskii reported that in some regions Muslim Tatars
were so secure in their positions that they exercised reprisals against their converted brethren,
Pis'ma, 9.
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missionaries were most successful in attracting those who were akeady outcasts
from their own society.
The Orthodox missionary himself was an ahen by his way of life, even if
he were not a Russian. He lived a sedentary life, a life different from the Kazakh
nomad. He was dressed differently and ate different food. By comparison, a
Tatar or a Kazakh mullah lived with the Kazakh nomads, ate their food, dressed
like them and spoke their language. 17 Their effectiveness as missionaries over
the Russian Orthodox was evident. As representatives of the Russian culture, the
missionaries could not easily afford to compromise certain cultural positions. If
missionaries in the field were inclined to make such compromises, they were
rapidly checked by the church boards. The Russian church in the nineteenth
century did not want its priests to live the Hfe of the masses. As a result, the
Orthodox "priests did not mix with the native masses. They were neither
welcomed, nor respected or loved. The Christian Tatars, Chuvashs, and others,
were not eager to pay for the maintenance of their churches and reUgious
services." 18
The behavior of the Orthodox priest contrasted strikingly with the
behavior of the Tatar mullah. In every Tatar village there was a mullah, and his
role was central in the community.
In every parish, the mullah is simultaneously a spiritual leader full of
authority, a judge, a teacher and a moralist. ... The mullah is using every
opportunity to reinforce and expand Islam. He is constantly talking about
and teaching reUgion. When he is visiting the sick, he reads the Qur'an and
talks about religion. If he is invited to a wedding, he talks about religion.
To a traveller he talks of God. And for all that he enjoys consideration and
respect. He is loved and listened to. He is obeyed. People go to him for
17 Kiprian, 461; and Theodorite, 466.
18 M. Platonov, 377.
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advice and spiritual help. People bring children to be taught religion and
religious law. And such mullahs are numerous, in fact, innumerable. ...
The mullah is everywhere, in the mosque, at the school, at meetings, in the
family, in court, and everywhere his authority is absolute because
everywhere he acts according to the Qur'an in the name of God and for
God.l9
Proselytizing was not the work of the mullah alone. All Tatars, together
or separately, whatever their means or trade, rich or poor, man or woman, even
scoundrels (prokhodimtsy), diligently propagated their faith. Women in
particular were zealous missionaries among the non-Muslim native feminine
population. The wife of the mullah was always the teacher in schools for girls,
which also existed in every village. Not infrequently, non-MusUm natives sent
their girls to the Muslim girl maktab.^^
Included among the major instruments in the propagation of Islam were the
itinerant Tatar merchant who went from village to village, and the Tatar who
hired himself and all his family to a non-Muslim master.21 Mixed marriages
with Christian women or even animists were another channel for the propagation
of Islam.22 Working places, fairs, village markets, and chaikhanes (inns) were
all choice places for Tatar proselytism. The missionaries often pointed to the
19 M. Platonov, 376.
20 Ermolaeva, 384.
21 n'minskii, Pis'ma, 397; and Mashanov, "Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 257.
22 The Orthodox Church did not accept marriages between Christian and non-Christian, and
was, therefore, deprived of the possibility to convert the infidel partner to Christianity. It insisted
on baptism prior to the marriage. Marriages of Christian or animist women to Muslims did occur
often enough to attract the attention of missionaries. Such women accepted in Muslim famihes
were immediately converted to Islam. Their conversion, however, was generally not registered
with the authorities. See: Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 302-6; M. Platonov, 377; and Mashanov,
"Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 261-2.
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creation of Muslim industrial and commercial establishments in the Kazan region
as a reason for the conversion of entire native villages to Islam.23
Muslim proselytizers made a point of explaining their doctrine, rituals and
law, always comparing them to the Christian doctrine, rituals and customs. The
conscientiousness with which Muslims performed their rituals ~ the fasting, the
five daily prayers at specific hours performed in public if possible, and the
periodic ablutions - played an important role in gaining additional adepts.24 in
contrast, except for schismatics {raskoVniki) and old believers, Russians rarely
talked about their own rehgion.25 Orthodox missionaries blamed their lack of
success in spreading Christianity on the poor example set by Russian colonists.26
Because of the deceit, dmnkenness, sexual perversion, conscious or
unconscious neglect of the external and internal requirements of religion
by the Russians, they (the natives) are suspicious of the Russian reUgion.
Rather than accept your faith, says the animist, I would become a Muslim.
If I have to change rehgion, I will choose the one which pleases my heart.
Your faith, in spite of everything you can tell me is, repulsive. A good
religion must have good followers. I know the adepts of your faith since
my childhood and I can say only bad things about them. They do not
respect their parents, nor their elders, they are false witnesses, and they eat
horse flesh though reUgion forbids it. As for the Tatars, I can say nothing
but good. They respect their parents, venerate their elders and observe
strictly their religion.27
23 Mashanov, "Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 257-8.
24 Mashanov, "Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 257. The cleanliness of the Muslims seemed to
have particularly impressed many natives.
25 Mashanov, "Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 258.
26 It is understandable, therefore, that Russian missionaries had mixed feelings regarding the
settling of non-Russian lands by Russians. If the missionaries generally favored the expansion of
Russian influence, they had serious reservations about Russian colonization, since they viewed
Russian settlers as a bad element.
27 M. Platonov, 378-9. For the same arguments also see: Bryzgalov, 419-420; and
Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 220, 222.
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Islam a Political Menace
The missionaries were the first to raise the specter of pan-Islamism and
pan-Turkism. In the second half of the nineteenth century there was an important
Islamic reformist movement (Jadidism) in Russia. The missionaries were in
violent opposition to the reformist movement and advocated its suppression.28
As VaUdov, a Tatar historian, pointed out, the reform movement in its early
phase was almost completely ignored by the authorities, with the exception of
"Orthodox missionaries with Il'minskii at the head, who, sensing a Muslim
renaissance, had become uneasy."29 A progressive, reformed Islam, ready to
accept the achievements of western civilization, and stressing a modem system of
education for its schools, was in their view a much more potent threat to
Orthodoxy and Russia than the conservative Islam which had changed Uttle since
the late Middle-Ages.30 The missionaries also sensed within the reformist
movement a heightened national consciousness and an awareness of bonds among
the Muslims of Russia and beyond.
In 1882 the missionaries warned the authorities that the Tatar intelligentsia
was "beginning to adopt a national-political viewpoint under the disguise of
enUghtened progress."31 They repeatedly drew attention to the activity of
Muslim reformers, whose aim they viewed as bemg "to unite the millions of
Muslim Russian citizens under the banner of rational Islam, perfected by a
European civilization and filtered through the prism of Turkish
2^ For detailed analysis of the Islamic reformist movement in Russia see: Abdullin; Devlet;
Rorlich, Volga Tatars; Validov; and Zenkovsky.
29 Validov, 50.
30 Soviet historians generally concurred with the missionaries that a reformed Islam was a
greater danger than traditional Islam. See Istoriia Tatarskoi ASSR, 389.
31 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 2.
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Constantinople."32 The idea that a reformed Islam could correspond to basic
Russian interests was incomprehensible to the missionaries.
The dream of some Muslim reformers, such as Ismail Gasprinskii, was to
form a covenant between Russia and Russian Islam for the greater glory of both
and of the eastern world. Ismail Gasprinskii, the theoretician of the Jadid
movement, believed that Russia's interests lay in the east, specifically the Muslim
east. In his view, cooperation between Russians and Russian Muslims could only
enhance Russia's interests in the east. "I believe," wrote Gasprinskii,
that, sooner or later, Russian Islam, nurtured by Russia, will be the
vanguard of the intellectual development of the Islamic world. ... If eastern
civiUzation had been renewed in the west by Romans and Arabs, then
maybe Providence has earmarked Russians and Tatars to lead the
renaissance of westem civilization in the east.33
This dream was rejected by the missionaries as useless, objectionable, offensive,
and even dangerous.34
Anti-Islamic Initiatives
The Russian missionaries viewed Orthodoxy as the only possible force that
could block the strong cultural and rehgious influence of Islam in eastem Russia.
However, they understood that only firm, inspired adherents of the Russian
Orthodox Church could be capable of resisting Muslim attraction. In these views
they were supported by K.P. Pobedonostsev and D.A. Tolstoi, influential figures
in government circles. Pobedonostsev had been the tutor of Alexander HI and
32 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 63-4; and id., 321-2.
33 Gasprinskii expressed his ideas in two studies: Russkoe Musul'manstvo (from which this
quote is taken), 30-1; and Russko-Vostochnoe. Gasprinski's ideas were later developed by
Muslim communists such as Sultan Galiev.
34 Miropiev, Polozhenii, 7 and 50-1. Also see Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali"; and Lazzerini.
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Nicholas H, and was to be Procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880 to 1905.
Tolstoi was Minister of Education from 1866 to 1880 and Procurator of the Holy
Synod until 1880. Starting in the 1860s the missionaries in eastem Russia began
to deploy an important educational activity among nominally Christian natives,
animists and even the lukewarm Muslim Kazakh.35
Christian Natives. Animists. and Non-Committed Muslims . The major and
most radical ingredient of the missionary educational activity was the use of
native languages as the medium for conveying the Orthodox message. The
missionaries were convinced that genuine Orthodoxy could only take root, and
take root rapidly, in one's mother tongue.36 The educational activities of the
missionaries were multi-faceted. They set up networks of schools. For the first
time, they translated and published church services, reUgious texts and
explanations of these texts in local languages.37 Many native languages were
only spoken. In many instances written languages were created by the
missionaries, who devised alphabets in Russian script. In addition, they
formulated grammars, compiled dictionaries, and wrote textbooks.38
The missionaries hoped that the native Christians could hold their ground
against the Muslims, and could eventually attract their Muslim brethren to
35 For the best account of the missionaries' educational activities see the work of Kreindler,
Educational Policies; and id., "Nikolai D'minskii."
36 Kreindler, "Nikolai Il'minskii," 11; and id., Educational Policies, 10.
37 The Russian missionaries' approach of teaching in native languages contrasts with most
European missionary activities of the time. European missionaries relied essentially on European
languages in churches and schools. See Kreindler, "Nikolai D'minskii," 21.
38 In 1870 the Ministry of Education adopted the missionaries' (H'minskii's) system of
education in native languages for all eastem nationalities. The ministry became convinced that it
was the best system of russification. In theory, it remained the only official tsarist system of
"native education" until the end of the regime.
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Christianity. Their educational activities were devised "to instill universal values
and Russian sympathies," and "to produce people with a peaceful, friendly
attitude toward the Russians. "39 Ultimately, the missionaries hoped that with the
attainment of a higher cultural level the animists and uncommitted Muslims
would voluntarily drop their superstitions and convert to Russian Orthodoxy.
Such converts could then, in turn, become missionaries among their tribesmen.40
The main purpose of the educational activities of the missionaries in eastem
Russia was to develop an effective conveyor belt to bring Orthodoxy into non-
Russian communities. Contrary to those who accused them of promotmg
nationalism among natives, the missionaries fimily believed that Russification
would be a by-product of Orthodoxy.
If from fear of separate nationalities we do not allow the non-Russians to
use their language in schools and churches on a sufficient scale to ensure a
solid, complete, convinced adoption of the Christian faith, then all non-
Russians will be fused into a smgle race by language and by faith — the
Tatar and Mohammedan. But if we allow the non-Russian languages, then,
even if their individual nationalities are thus maintained, these will be
diverse, small, ill-disposed to the Tatars, and united with the Russian
people by the unity of their faith. ... I believe that such diverse nationaUties
cannot have any solid existence, and in the end the very historical
movement of life will cause them to fuse with the Russian people.41
As it turns out, wherever the system of education in native languages was
systematically applied, it served to slow the spread of Islam among the Orthodox
natives. However, it stimulated the development of national cultures, native
39 Il'minskii, Vospominanii, 167-8, cited by Kreindler, Educational Policies, 127.
40 Il'minskii, "Religioznoe," 140, cited by Kreindler, Educational Policies, 111.
41 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 398-9.
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intelligentsias, and national self-consciousness. In these respects, the practice
worked directly against Russification.42
Committed Muslims . Among committed Muslims the activities of the
missionaries were somewhat different. Among committed Muslims, the Russian
Orthodox missionaries engaged in active proselytizing and anti-Islamic polemic.
Furthermore, they did everything in their power to thwart and oppress the
Muslims culturally and pontically.43
The influence of the missionaries in government circles was considerable,
at least until the late nineteenth century. Il'minskii, the prominent missionary
who devised the system of education in native languages, was a defacto consultant
to such powerful men as K.P. Pobedonostsev and D.A. Tolstoi. As active
consultants to these men, Il'minskii and his followers exercised substantial
influence in the area of Russian nationality policies in the east.
Missionary influence extended over a substantial variety of actions and
poUcies. Missionaries were responsible for what the Muslims regarded as poor
choices for the headship of the Muslim ReUgious Administration.44 They saw
any recognition or any honor bestowed on the Muslim community as an affront
to Orthodoxy. The missionaries contributed greatly to Muslim difficulties with
42 Kreindler, Educational Policies, 181-9 and 199-210.
43 See Kreindler, Educational Policies, 102-12; and Saussay, "Il'minskij," 414-21.
44 The missionaries were critical of Catherine II's creation of the Muslim Religious
Administration. They would have liked to see it abolished. Short of that, they wanted it rendered
impotent by appointing as its head the most ineffective man possible. See Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 64,
174-5, 175-6, and 176-7. Also see Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 375-6.
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censorship,45 to the Umitation of Muslim participation in the institutions of local
self-government (zemstva),'^^ and to repressive policies against Mushm
proselytizers and apostates.47 The missionaries opposed any kind of
government-sponsored schools for Muslims. They objected that if the State were
to become involved with Muslim schools "it would have to concern itself with
their blossoming." And what the missionaries feared most was a combination of
Muslhn dynamism and European culture. They wamed that such a combination
would fail to achieve Russification and could become "a weapon against the
Russian people and the Russian State. "48 On balance, even for the nominally
Muslim Kazakhs the missionaries opposed secondary and higher education.49
Their emphasis on native language for Kazakh government-sponsored schools had
only one purpose ~ to block the strong MusUm influence coming via the Tatars
so as to preserve the Kazakhs as potential converts.^O in short, the Russian
missionaries were vocal critics of virtually all liberal poUcies of the government
toward the Muslims.51 As a consequence, they did much to destroy the
45 The missionaries proposed and obtained the nomination of professor V.D. Smimov who
"harbors no love for Islam" as censor of the Muslim press. Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 320-1 and 338-9.
Also see Pobedonostsev, 147, cited by Kreindler, Educational Policies, 109.
46 In particular, the missionaries opposed the election of Muslims to school boards, township
courts, and as elders. In 1888 the missionaries won their point when all non-Christians were
barred from school boards. See Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 9, 218-20, and 247-50.
47 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 213-4 and 396-7.
48 Il'minskii's letter to N.P. Ostroumov, 29 September 1877, quoted in "Dva Prilozheniia,"
6. Also see Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 238-9.
49 Il'minskii, Vospominaii, 187, cited by Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsarin," 1 12.
50 Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsarin," 112,
5
1
See for example Ostroumov, "Kolebaniia.
"
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atmosphere of cordial relations between the tsarist state and its Muslim subjects
that had come into existence with Catherine's policies.52
Tenuous Position of the Missionaries
The position of the Russian Orthodox missionaries had become extremely
tenuous by the turn of the century. Their missionary activities had been
unsuccessful. Beyond that, increasingly diey were poUtically vulnerable both
within Russian government circles and within the Orthodox Church itself. As
Il'minskii had written prophetically to Pobedonostsev:
For a long time, the Muslim rehgion and the Tatar nationality have been
swallowing all Volga native nationalities, not only the animists but also the
Christian converts. This process is still going on today irresistibly
(jieuderzhimo). ... Today, the Tatar Muslim population of the Kazan
guberniia has a strong mixture of Chuvash, Cheremiss and Votiak. And
now, before our very eyes, entire villages of animist and Christian
Cheremiss, Votiak and Chuvash of the Perm, Ufa and other guberniias are
becoming Tatarized. ... If no obstacle is placed on its path, fifty or a
hundred years from now, it may bring a complete conversion of all our
native tribes, Chuvash, Cheremiss and Votiak and their transformation into
Muslim Tatars.53
A report of the Kazakh Orthodox mission in 1899 read as follows:
It is sad to see that Islam gets stronger by the day among the Kirghiz
(Kazakh) and that their conversion to Orthodoxy becomes more difficult
every year. One missionary serves several tens or thousands of inhabitants
dispersed over an immense territory, when there are Kirghiz mullahs in
every aul. ... Rehgious fanaticism is increasing among the Kirghiz nomads.
Five or ten years ago, Islam in the steppes was still weak. Today, tiie
propaganda of Islam is done by hundreds of mullahs and Hajjis who roam
the steppes as teachers or merchants. ... Kirghiz who Usten to missionaries,
if only tiirough simple curiosity, are admonished by mullahs who put them
on guard against such conversations. Recently, mullahs from Bukhara,
52 Kreindler, Educational Policies, 104.
53 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 397-8.

30
Arabia and Kazan have appeared in the steppes. These preachers reinforce
the fidehty of the Kirghiz toward the false doctrine of Mohammed.
Because of the numeric inequahty of the preachers of Islam and that of the
doctrine of Christ, we (the missionaries) can hope only in help from
Heaven.54
The Orthodox missionaries also found themselves increasingly in an
ambiguous position within the political spectrum in Russia and in the Orthodox
Church. Their educational activities had gone counter to the rising tide of Great-
Russian nationaUsm, with its stress on the unity of the Russian Empire and its
emphasis on the Russian language. Strong opposition to their activities from the
right had always existed in Russia and within the Church itself. The right argued
that Orthodoxy outside of Russian culture was an impossibility.
By the turn of the century, outright Russification of natives was becoming
the principal aim of the government's nationality policies. Many of the
missionaries who had formerly advocated the use of native languages in church
services and schools were coming to the view that Russification was the most
formidable obstacle to the spread of Islam. As one missionary explained, only
the "merging (sliianie), assimilation and Russification of culturally inferior,
primitive natives" could maintain peaceful coexistence within the empire. As for
Russian Muslims, "because they are imbued with a spirit of religious
exclusiveness, and religious fanaticism ... the first and foremost principle of
education must be Russification."^^ Russification, which had been viewed earUer
as merely a by-product of Orthodoxy, had become the goal.
But on the left of the pohtical spectrum, missionary activities were opposed
by an increasingly vocal liberal intelligentsia. Within western European
54 Cited by Kiprian, 461-2.
55 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 73-4.
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intellectual thought, ideas relating to pluralism were gaining in popularity. It was
increasingly less fashionable to argue the superiority of one culture, one ethnic
group, or one reUgious community over another, hi Russia proper, there was a
liberal, even radical trend advocating the relaxation of the rigid monolithic
Russian-Orthodox course.56 These hberals were advocating a pantheon m which
"all gods could abide."
The issue at hand related to which way Russia should go. Should it
continue the monolithic Russian-Orthodox course or turn toward a pluralistic
society? It was at the heart of this rich controversy that the missionaries found
themselves.
The ultimate failure of the missionaries was sealed by the Proclamation of
the Freedom of Faith. The decree, one of the consequences of the Revolution of
1905, provided that any person could leave the Orthodox Church and join
another religious establishment. Soon thereafter, some fifty thousand Tatars left
the Orthodox Church, and "there were probably many more who did not want to
register their change of faith with the police."57 Conversion to Orthodoxy could
no longer be considered a reahstic goal. The cement for holding the empire
together could only be the Russian language and the Russian culture.
Missionary Literature
Missionary activity in the second half of the nineteenth century generated a
rich and varied anti-Islamic literature, but its period of bloom was relatively
brief. Although missionary activities had accelerated a decade earlier, anti-
56 See the study of the Soviet historian Batunsky, 4. Freedom of conscience and the equality
of all churches before the law was also the position of Social-Democrats as expressed by Lenin in
his 1903 article "To the Village Poor," Collected Works, V. 7, 173.
57 McCarthy, 309. Also see Curtiss, Church and State, 228.

32
Islamic literature was quite sparse prior to the 1870s. Thereafter, the literature
grew in importance, maintaining an impressive pace until its decUne following
the 1905 Proclamation of Freedom of Faith. Most of the anti-Islamic literature
was published in the cities of the Middle-Volga-Ural, especially Kazan. Outside
of the Tatar country, anti-Islamic literature was published in St. Petersburg or in
Moscow, and infrequently in Turkestan.
An understanding of the missionary literature itself may be furthered by a
review of the combination of organizations and people from which it emerged.
In addition, it may be useful to discuss the perspectives from which the hterature
was written and to identify the functions and audiences toward which it was
directed.
Societies and Brotherhoods
The growth of anti-Islamic hterature was spurred by the creation of a
number of societies and brotherhoods dedicated to the spread of Orthodoxy, such
as the Orthodox Missionary Society {Pravoslavnoe Missionerskoe Obshchestvo) in
Moscow and the Brotherhood (Bratstvo) of Saint-Gurii in Kazan. The Moscow
Society for Assistance in the Propagation of Christianity Among Animists
{Moskovskoe Obshchestvo Sodeistviia Rasprostraneniiu Khristianstva Mezhdu
lazychnikami) was created in 1865. It was renamed the Orthodox Missionary
Society in 1870. Placed under the patronage of the Empress, the organization
centralized all missionary activities within the empire. In dioceses with
heterodox populations, the Society was represented by diocesan committees. By
1894, forty-four such committees were in existence withm the empire. Of these,
sixteen were engaged in anti-Islamic work.58
^° For studies concerning the society see: Nikol'skii; and E.K, Smimov.
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In 1867, the Saint-Gurii Brotherhood was founded by D'minskii under the
supervision of the Archbishopric of Kazan. It served as a model for the creation
of other brotherhoods in the dioceses of the Middle-Volga-Ural region. The
brotherhoods directed their efforts toward enlightening the nominally Christian
natives, animists, sectarians, and Muslims. The defense of nominally Christian
natives against Muslim influences and anti-Islamic apologetic were among their
major preoccupations.59
The Writers
For the most part, the authors of the anti-Islamic literature were clerics or
lay missionaries. Many had been students of the Anti-Islamic Section of the
Theological Academy of Kazan.60 Among the authors were a few high
dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church. Many belonged to various
brotherhoods for the spread of Orthodoxy: Saint Gurii in Kazan, Saint Basil in
Riazan, Saints Cyril and Methodius in Astrakhan or Saint Michael-Archangel in
Orenburg. Some were well known scholars in the field of Orientalism.
Outstanding work was produced in the fields of philology, ethnography,
pedagogy, history and even archeology, by missionaries such as Il'minskii,
Ostroumov, Sablukov, Malov, or Katanov.
Almost all the specialists in polemics against Islam were Islamists, well-
versed in Muslim theology. They possessed an excellent knowledge of Turkic
languages, Arabic and even Persian. They were well acquainted with the social.
59 Studies concerning the brotherhoods are rare. See Mashanov, Obzor Deiatel'nosti.
"0 In 1723 a Theological Seminary (Dukhovnaia Seminariia) was created under the
supervision of the Archbishopric of Kazan. It was later elevated to the rank of Theological
Academy (Dukhovnaia Akademiia). Its task was to train missionaries. In 1854, an Anti-Muslim
and Anti-Animist Missionary Section {Missionerskii Protivomusul'manskii i Protivoiazycheskii
Otdet) was organized within the Academy. For studies devoted to the anti-Islamic section of the
Academy see: Malov, "O Missionerskom"; and Ostroumov, "Vospominaniia."
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intellectual, and political life of the Turkic populations of eastern Russia. Yet,
notwithstanding their backgrounds and training, their anti-Islamic writings are
surprisingly shallow.
General Perspectives of the Literature
Russian Orthodox missionary literature is distinguished from other
Christian missionary hterature chiefly by the violence of its tone. Orthodox
missionary literature on abstract Islam does not present much novelty. A similar
treatment of Islam may be found in other missionary literature of the nineteenth
century, both CathoHc and Protestant. Anti-Islamic arguments also may be found
in a substantial portion of nineteenth century secular literature on Islam, both
Russian and Westem.61
The missionaries viewed Russian Muslims as enemies to be unmasked,
although Russian Muslims were generally loyal subjects of the tsars. Islam was a
cancer, an alien religious phenomenon within the empire. While Islam's spiritual
center was in Istanbul, it was a rehgious force in Russia. Because Islam was so
widespread, the missionaries recognized that it was not possible to expel its adepts
from the empire. Instead, Islam was an adversary in place that needed to be
destroyed.
The writings of the Russian missionaries were cast within the framework
of Slavophile culture. Of course, they viewed Russian culture as Orthodoxy in a
broad sense. Looking beyond the Slavic world, however, they emphasized that
the interests of all Christians ~ Orthodox, Cathohcs, and Protestants ~ were
placed in jeopardy by an awakening of the MusUm world. Thus, the fight of the
missionaries against Islam was not only in defense of traditional Orthodox-
6
1 For the treatment of Islam in the Russian secular literature of the 19th century see
Batunsky, "Islam."

35
Russian values; it was in defense of Christianity in general, and, perhaps, the
whole of western civilization.
The Russians and the Russian clergy were often contemptuous of all
natives, be they Christians or not. Russian missionary literature echoed that
contempt for eastern people, carrying strong racist overtones.62 Later, the
missionaries admitted that such an attitude contributed to their lack of success in
converting both Muslims and animists.63
Functions and Audience
Missionary hterature ranged from scholarly work to writing of a
pedestrian character. Surprisingly, the arguments used against Islam in the
scholarly criticism were the same as those reUed upon in the low level attacks.
The arguments were only more elaborated, more subtle, and not as outwardly
violent as in the crude attacks.
One category of Russian missionary literature relating to Islam was of a
distinctively scholarly character. That hterature, directed primarily toward the
missionaries themselves, consisted of workmanlike studies of the life of the
Prophet and of thorough research relating to the Qur'an and the Shari'ah.
However, it is quite clear that Islam was evaluated from a missionary orientation.
There was no genuine effort to tap the spirit of Islam. There was no suspension
of disbehef for purpose of critical evaluation. And the polemical character of
that literature was pronounced.
62 McCarthy, 323 and 331-2.
"3 See for example Mashanov, "Sovremennoe Sostoianie," 294. The fundamental Russian
nationalism of tiie Orthodox Church may partly explain the small representation of the native
clergy. The Russian Orthodox church was never successful in attracting and training native clergy.
In 1904, only sixty-eight of the 743 Orthodox priests of the Kazan province were natives. Thus,
natives represented only nine percent of the priestiiood in a province where forty-five percent of the
Orthodox population was native. See Bobrovnikov, 177-8.
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While missionary writings may be regarded as scholarly and even
authoritative, even then they were not held in universally high esteem. They
were strongly criticized on ideological and methodological grounds by members
of the St. Petersburg Oriental Faculty and the Lazarev histitute of Oriental
Languages. In turn, the missionaries criticized the members of the St. Petersburg
Oriental Faculty and Lazarev histitute for their "lack of patriotic and missionary
orientation," and for the fact that "they study the literature, history and
ethnography of the Asian people objectively (stressed in the text) and feel
sympathy for them."64
Another category of Russian missionary literature, perhaps the most
important, had a directly Christian apologetic character. The function of this
type of literature was to demonstrate that Orthodoxy was the truth, and Islam the
error. It was directed primarily toward the nominally Christian natives.
Comparing Christianity to Islam, it sought to prove the truth of Christian dogmas
(Divinity of Christ, Holy Trinity, etc.), and the superiority of Christian rituals
and customs over those of the Muslims. It is within that category of writings that
we fmd the most vitriolic attacks on Islam.
Some missionary writings had an internal function. They were written to
acquaint other missionaries with Islam. In particular, such was the case of
writings in the serial publication Missionerskii ProtivomusuVmanskii Sbornik,
pubhshed by the Theological Academy of Kazan. Other missionary writings,
those with a directly Christian apologetic character, were directed primarily to
the communities of kreshchenye (converts), mostly to Tatar converts, whose
Christian faith was vacillating. But, the majority of missionary literature appears
to have been addressed to the larger, intellectual, mostly Russian, public. Aside
64 Il'minskii, /'/^'wa, 77 and 117.
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from its role in familiarizing the Russian public with Islam, its main purpose was
to emphasize the political danger of a militant Islam to Russia. In general, the
literature did not appear to address directly the Muslim communities. However,
one exception was the direct polemic with Muslim reformers, who were
attempting to present in print their version of Islam to the Russian public.
Messages and Themes of the Literature
The writings of the Russian Orthodox missionaries can be organized
around three main themes. One theme was an outright condemnation of Islam as
a legitimate religion. A second theme emphasized Islam's incompatibility with
science and progress. The third theme drew attention to Islam's divisive political
character within the empire. The analysis of the Russian missionary literature on
Islam, which follows, is organized around these themes.
Islam Not a Legitimate Religion
The central message of the Russian Orthodox missionaries was that Islam
did not constitute a pure, legitimate, vahd, spiritual body of religious thought.
Of course, its inadequacies could not be proved directly. Consequently, the
Russian missionaries were forced to attack Islam around its fringes. They used
arguments against the Qur'an, attacks on Muhammad, questions relating to the
sources of Islamic precepts, and complaints regarding the inadequacies of Islamic
morality and the paucity of its spiritual character.
Arguments Against the Qur'an
. A series of arguments advanced by the
missionaries to deny the revealed nature of Islam had emphasized the physical
characteristics of the Holy Book. They argued that the chaotic organization of
the Qur'an, its many contradictions, and its nonsenses and incongruities
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concerning God, man, faith, and morality are incompatible with behef in a direct
Divine message.
In missionary writings such as that by M.A. Miropiev, the Qur'an was
described as "a chaotic combination of the most diverse sayings, admonitions and
resolutions. It does not have any reasonable order, neither systematic nor
chronological. ... The Qur'an contains many useless or meaningless words and
expressions, and much idle talk. .. It is fuU of repetition which makes reading
tedious."65 With many citations from the Qur'an, the missionaries emphasized
what they caUed its "lies" and "contradictions." Some counted as many as 140
"contradictions."66 Specifically, they pointed to the mansukh and nasikh verses,
arguing that the whole Theory of Abrogation is incompatible with "the
understanding of God's being the Pure Truth" as, "a God who changes his
commands each day cannot be a God."67 Therefore, the Qur'anic God is not "a
representation of God as a spiritual Being," but only an anthropomorphic
vision.68
The lack of an apparent systematic logic of the Qur'an was ascribed by the
missionaries to Muhammed himself. As a creative work of Muhammad, the
Qur'an was written in response to the changing needs of his religious community.
Muhammad, claimed the missionaries, came forth originally only to preach
65 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 130. Virtually all missionary works say the same things about the
Qur'an. For more detailed studies see: Ostroumov, Islamovedenie, V. 2; and Sablukov, Svedeniia
o Korane.
66 See, for example, Vinogradov, 70 and 78.
67 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 136. In establishing the chronological order of the Qur'anic text,
Muslim scholars and jurists, rather than attempting to explain away the inconsistencies in passages
giving regulations for the community, came to acknowledge the differences, while arguing that the
latest verse on any subject "abrogated" all earlier verses that contradicted it Eventually, lists of
abrogating {nasikh) and abrogated {mansukh) verses were drawn up.
68 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 157; and Vasil'ev, 94-8.
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monotheism. All other aspects of Muhammad's teaching were added to his
original "program" in response "to events of the day, or to questions arising in
market places, streets, bath-houses, harems, justice, battles, at occasions of acts of
charity or plunder, in reveries and dreams."69
Attacks Against Muhammad . The portraits of Muhammad given by Russian
missionaries ranged from that of a charlatan to that of a man "who was spiritually
gifted, who possessed a healthy intelligence, capable of grasping the intriguing,
and possessing unusual creativity. He was a gifted maker of the sublime and the
grandiose. He possessed a vast memory, a fervid imagmation, a rich fantasy, and
a talent for poetry."'70 For some missionaries he was "a religious genius" or a
"religious maniac." For most he was "an unintentional prophet, sincerely
convinced of his call at the beginning of his preaching but later turning into a
deceiver ... in whose hands religion became a political instrument ... an
instrument of coercion and violence."71
The missionaries claimed that the life and teaching of Muhammad did not
conform to the ideal Biblical models of a prophet. If Muhammad were to be
considered a prophet, they argued, then so should "Confucius, Buddha, and all
our Avvakums, Sil'vanovs, and other wild rehgious agitators, because each one ...
was seized by a religious idea, devoted himself to it, and mistook it for Divine
"9 Cherevanskii, 279. Also see, a study devoted exclusively to demonstrate that
Muhammad's teaching was a series of responses to the changing environment, F.A. Smimov,
"Zavisimost'."
70 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 87. The life of the Prophet was, of course, a choice subject for
the missionaries. Among the studies devoted exclusively to Muhammad see: V. Solov'ev; S.A.S.
F.A. Smimov, "Mukhammed"; and Tsvetkov.
71 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 91, 93, and 109; andVasil'ev, 87.
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revelation."72 Furthermore, if Muhammad may be called a reformer, he
certainly was not a religious revolutionary. He only manipulated pre-existing sets
of religious ideas and symbols.
Denial of Divine Sources . Another means of undermining belief in Islam's
claim to a divine source was to point out, or argue, that it contains nothing new.
If everything in Islam could be traced to pre-existing religious doctrines, it might
be easier to beheve that Islam had merely copied bits and pieces of those
doctrines, and only adapted them to a specific Arab milieu.
In this vein, most anti-Islamic studies argued the point that "Muhammad
had not brought into the world a single new idea," that "Islam was not some kind
of new religion, created upon some kind of new principles," that it only
combined and perverted beliefs borrowed from Judaism, Christianity and Arab
paganism.^B Specific aspects of Islamic practices ~ the Hajj (pilgrimage to
Mecca), the fasting of the month of Ramadan, the popular veneration of the
saints, the Qur'anic names of God, even the Shahada (proclamation of faith) and
the Sadaqa (ahns giving) - were traced to pre-Islamic origins.74 Among the less
virulent works, there was a tendency to see Islam as, in one way or other, a
truncated version of Christian truth. All or virtually all the truth to be found in
Islam was to be found in Christianity. But, the missionaries argued, Christianity
^^ Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 97-8.
73 Most anti-Islamic works mentioned at least briefly the Judeo-Christian or pre-Islamic Arab
origins of Islamic beliefs. For detailed studies see: Bogoliubskii; Malov, Moiseevo', Razumov; and
Zabrovskii.
74 On the origin of the Hajj see Miropiev, "Religioznoe." On the origin of the Ramadan
fasting see Ostroumov, "Mukhammedanskii." On the veneration of saints see lablokov, "O
Pochitanie." On the names of God see Sablukov, Slichenie. On the Shahada and Sadaqa see
Kudeevskii.
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led beyond that truth to a crowning truth that had eluded Islam's grasp. As one
writer put it, Muhammad "realized the emptiness of paganism, and was not
satisfied by the chimeras of late Judaism, but he did not comprehend the
mysteries of Christianity. "75 A view of Islam as a Christianity manque was, of
course, not specific to Russian Orthodox missionaries.
Particular attention was paid by the Russian missionaries to the idea of God
in the Qur'an. The image of God in the early Meccan suras was viewed by the
missionaries as keeping within the Christian idea of God. However, in later
Medinan suras they claimed that Muhammad broke his ties with Judaism and
Christianity. The idea of God changed from that of a merciful and redemptive
God to that of an "oriental despot." Correspondingly, man's free wiU in the
religious act was abandoned in favor of total predestination.76
In their discussion of the rise of Islam, most missionaries subscribed to the
widely held Semitic theory. They argued that Islam could have arisen only in a
purely Semitic environment. Narrowing it down, only an Arab historical,
intellectual, psychological, and geographical substratum could have given birth to
Islam, which therefore reflects its Arabic characteristics.^^ Muhammad was a
man of his time, and the Qur'an, the creative work of Muhammad, was a book of
its time.78 Islam, a religion designed for Arabs, was viewed as unsuited for non-
Arab people.79 Consequently, Orthodox missionaries explained the spread of
75 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 88-9; and Iablokov,"0 Sushchnosti," 82.
76 Vasil'ev, 98-120; and Voronets, 38-9. Also see Razumov.
'
' See for example: Mashanov, "Ocherk Byta Arabov"; and Ostroumov, Araviia.
78 It was a widely held view, including that of the revolutionary-democrat N.A. Dobroliubov,
"Zhizn' Magometa," Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, Moscow, 1936, V. EQ, 334-9.
79 A common view among missionaries was that the Qur'an, written in Arabic, was
incomprehensible to non-Arabs. See for example: lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 101; and Bagin, 4.
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Islam by the fact that it was imposed by the sword.^O Not all Orthodox
missionaries admitted the theory of an Arab determinism, which had a strong
racial component. Some missionaries working among Muslims were themselves
from Turkic or Finnic ethnic groups. As such they were less inclined to share
racial theories than their Russian colleagues.
Inadequacies of Islamic Morality . The missionaries argued that moral
standards in Islam were lower and fewer because the demand for moral behavior
is not based in divine revelation. Instead, Islam's moral precepts were based on
human moral behavior and customs of Muhammad's time. Russian missionaries
did not deny the presence of "good aspects" in Islam, of moral precepts and
humanism. Otherwise, "Islam would not have been a religion but some kind of
monstrous teaching."81 However, they argued that "the Qur'an does not disclose
many moral acts. Consequently, it does not teach man to raise himself to moral
perfection."82 instead, the missionaries suggested that the Qur'an "may permit
the Prophet and otiier believers to engage in activities that, strictly speaking, are
criminal. ... It allows and sanctifies vindictiveness, perjury, and other vices to
which Muhammad was subject. On the whole. Islamic morality resembles Jewish
morality after it had turned pharisaic."83
The missionaries claimed that Islam makes fewer moral demands on new
converts, thereby accounting for its continued success among anunist or
nominally Christian populations of the Russian Empire. They suggested that the
80 See for example S.A.S., 187-8.
81 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 125.
82 Petrov, 129.
83 A. Volkov, "Islam," 220-1.
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simplicity of Islamic doctrine makes it readily understandable to untutored minds.
Because Islam stands on a lower intellectual level than Christianity, it is less
removed from primitive people.84 it can be argued, however, that the Muslim
doctrine of God is not obviously well-suited to primitive people. The Muslim
doctrine of God is characterized by an abstract, stark simplicity. Such a God
does not offer an ease of access for people accustomed to the intimately involved
cults and myths of most animist tribes.
A series of arguments against Islamic morality advanced by missionaries
concentrated upon attitudes fostered by Islam among its adherents. The fear of
God, unquestioned obedience to His wishes, and the absence of free-will have
developed among MusUms a sense of fatahsm, and submissiveness.85 Many
missionaries saw m this "gloomy fatahsm" one of the main destructive forces in
Islam, responsible for the decadence of Muslim societies.86
Similarly, Islam was viewed as teaching its adepts intolerance, impatience,
mistrust, and xenophobia toward unbehevers.87 Sharing a view with Karl Marx,
the missionaries insisted that the teaching of the Qur'an "divided the world into
two antagonistic parts, the World of Islam {Dar ul-Islam) and the World of War
{Dar ul-Harb)."^^ It preached hatred of mankind and fanatical antagonism to
non-Musluns. Because it was an obstacle to the drawing together of the people of
84 See for example: Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 278; Glagolev, 58 and 195; Tsvetkov, 413; and
V. Solov'ev, 15.
o^ See for example: lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 85; Vinogradov, 10; and A. Volkov,
"Islam," 235.
86 See for example Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 164-5.
87 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 217; Petrov, 136; "Dzhikhad Ili Gazavat," 103-4; and Ostroumov,
"Istoricheskii," 654-5. For more detailed studies see: Agronomov; Mashanov, "Evropeislde"; and
Voronets.
88 Russkii Khristianin, 251.
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the empire, the missionaries insisted that Islam was a source of pohtical sedition
and disturbance in the Russian-Muslim worid.89
The position of women in Islam was always advanced by missionaries as an
example of the "cynicism" of the Qur'an and of its "amoral" teaching. "Even in
the animal kingdom, the behavior of males toward females may be more decent
than among MusUms."90 The Russian Orthodox missionaries advanced a series
of arguments concerning the situation of women in Islamic societies. Many of
these arguments have become associated with twentieth century thinking about
women's hberation. The missionaries asserted that the institutions of polygamy,
the harem, and the veil were bestowed upon Muslims only because of
Muhammad's "passion for women."91 They argued that within Islam women
were slaves, were deprived of their rights, and were inferior to men even in a
spiritual sense.92 To this, the missionaries contrasted the position of free women
in Christian societies.93 Some missionaries believed that it could be advantageous
to direct their energies toward the conversion of Muslim women. If the
missionaries were able to ally themselves with women, the conversion of MusUm
men would be facilitated.94
89 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 238. Also see Cherevanskii.
90 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 174.
91 Russkii Khristianin, 242-3; and S.A.S., 168.
92 One of the arguments of the missionaries was that in Islamic societies women were
deprived of education. Evidence given by the same missionaries, however, indicated that "in the
territory {krai) of Kazan, among the Russian population, the proportion of educated women was 1
in 55; among Muslims the proportion was 1 in 12. Furthermore, proportionally more Muslim girls
received an education than Russian boys." See Ermolaeva, 384.
93 Most anti-Islamic missionary works at least mentioned the "inferior" position of women.
For works devoted entirely to women see: Mashanov, "Mukhmmedanskii"; and Viktorin.
94 See for example Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 376-1.
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The missionaries claimed that the moral code in Islam was not fully
mature. In an effort to make up for its inadequacies, the missionaries argued that
Islam had developed a code of rituals. The rituals encompassed to the smallest
details all aspects of spiritual and secular life.95 Pushing further, some said that
"the Muslim faith is nothing more than the outward manifestation of belonging to
Islam."96
Paucity of Islam's Spiritual Character. Muslim worship, theorized the
missionaries, was entirely attached to exterior appearances. Acts of worship
consisted "primarily and exclusively of important exterior ritualistic acts,
severely and to the smallest details dictated by the law."97 The missionaries
argued that the attachment of Islam to the minute details of ritual constituted an
effort to hide the spiritual emptiness of their worship.98 For example, the ritual
of ablution prior to prayers was "nothing but an exterior act of purification."99
Indeed, the prayer itself "is an empty repetition of the same rak'at."^^^
According to the missionaries, Muslim holy days were without deep spiritual
meaning. Uraza-bairam, the holy day marking the end oi Ramadan, for example,
was described as only a manifestation of human enjoyment at the end of a
95 Vinogradov, 11; and lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 85.
96 lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 84. Also see M.G. Ivanov.
97 lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 87.
98 Petrov, 132.
99 Bagin, 4; lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 97; and Petrov, 135.
10^ lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 101. Also see Tikhov-Aleksandrovskii. A rak'at is a
complete act of worship with the prescribed postures and the unit of the namaz (prayer).
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difficult fast. 101 Ramadan itself was described as an exterior act of abstention
from food or drink, without deep impression upon the mind or feelings of the
person fasting. The missionaries pointed to the fact that at nightfall, when the
fast was broken, all "pleasures" were permitted, including sexual relations with
women. 102 The Hajj was criticized on the grounds that it developed and
encouraged rehgious fanaticism. The same was said of the Ashura, the
commemoration for the Shi'is of the death of Imam Husayn.103
Other attacks on the Hajj consisted in explaining that it was unhealthy and
dangerous. Missionaries pointed out the organizers of the Hajj were making
excessive profits and that rich people could pay someone to do the Hajj for them.
They accused the Hajjis of being quacks using their reputation to deceive and
cheat.
Sufism, as an aspect of Muslim worship, found a place in missionary
writings. As is the case with many mystical movements. Islamic mysticism has
two faces. It has a spiritual face, relating to the individual quest for God, and a
temporal face, the collective rigorous discipline of the holy war. Most pre-
Revolutionary anti-5w/z writings concentrated on the temporal aspect, the holy
war, and its danger for Russia. There were, however, a few missionary studies
attempting to present a synthesis of Sufi teaching.
The missionaries described Sufism as an heterodox body of teaching,
having incorporated ideas and beUefs from many different origins. They
emphasized the shamanistic borrowings, but also borrowings from Buddhism,
101 lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 99-100.
102 lablokov, "O Sushchnosti," 98; and Ostroumov, "Mukhammedanskii," 271 and 275.
103 larovyi-Ravskii, 149-52; Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 368-71; and Miropiev, "Religioznoe," 190-1.
For a description of the Ashura (or Shakhsei-Vakhsei) see Berezin, Puteshestvie po Vostoku.
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Zoroastrianism, and Neoplatonism.104 Therefore, the missionaries claimed,
Sufism was a pantheistic teaching totally contrary to the spirit of the Qur'an and
the Shari'ah.^^^ They tended to play down the spiritual aspect of Sufism,
reducing it to ritual magic. The zikr ceremonies were described as "mentally
unhealthy collective hypnoses/'l^^ According to the missionaries, the zikr
destroyed the psychological equihbrium of the Sufi, leaving him in a state of
"semi-imbecility" or "melancholic insanity." Thus depersonalized, the Sufi adepts
became instruments of fanatic actions in the hands of their leaders. 107
Sufis were accused of intolerant fanaticism, intellectual obscurantism and
social backwardness. They were said to poison the mind of the populations with
superstition. 108 They were viewed as charlatans, scoundrels or quacks, unfit for
normal activities. Sufis led a parasitic way of life, taking advantage of the
uneducated masses. 109 Their moral behavior was often described as not
conforming to Islamic rehgious law.HO Among specific accusations against the
Sufis were such behavior as using wine or narcotics, engaging in sexual
perversions, and displaying a passion for vagrancy.
104 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 16; Kazanskii, 35-46; and E.T. Smimov, 51. Also see the work
of Pozdneev.
10^ lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 15-6; and Kazanskii, 47.
106 The zikr is the principal ceremony of the Sufi brotherhood. It consists of recitation of
Utanies founded on Qur'anic verses, fixed phrases repeated in the mind or aloud in ritual order
accompanied by a complicated technique of posture, breath control, and in some cases rhythmical
movements. Nearly all Soviet speciaUsts who have witnessed a zikr comment about its exceptional
emotional and aesthetic quality. By comparison, the missionaries did not acknowledge that aspect.
107 See for example the descriptions of the zikr by: Kazanskii, 7 1-100; and Mallitskii, 90-3.
108 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 61 and 73; and E.T. Smimov, 70-1.
109 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 17; and Mallitskii, 95-6.
110 See for example lablokov, "0 Pochitanii," 17; and Kazanskii, 101-20. Also see Berezin,
Puteshestvii po Dagestanu.
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The cult of saints, probably the most important element of popular Islam,
was the target of special attacks. The missionaries pointed out that the veneration
of saints was contrary to the teaching of Orthodox Islam. 1 1 1 Muslim saints, they
believed, did not display the spiritual characteristics of Christian saints.H^ por
the most part, the Muslim saints were barely disguised pre-Islamic deities.l 13
Furthemiore, the cult of saints was a nursery for anti-Russian feelings, as the
venerated saints were often associated with resistance to the Russians. Thus, for
example, some of the venerated saints dated to the conquest of Kazan in 1552.1 14
Islamic IncompatibiUty with Science and Progress
The most surprising aspect of the Russian Orthodox missionary literature
was its appeal to reason and science in its attack on Islam. In the name of reason
and science, Islamic dogmas were judged as primitive, superficial, absurd, and
irrational. In the name of progress, Islam's conservatism and social
traditionalism were attacked. It is with a measure of astonishment that we see
Orthodox missionaries refer to the authority of rationalist philosophers, such as
the French philosopher Ernest Renan, as a source of arguments against the
religion of the Prophet.115
1 1
1
lablokov, "O Pochitanii , 37; and ET. Smimov, 62. Also see Pochitanie MusuVmanami.
1 12 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 37, 43, 47, and 52-3. Also see a more detailed study, M.
Ivanov.
1 13 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 22; and ET. Smimov, 63.
1 14 lablokov, "O Pochitanii," 29 and 32-4.
115 See for example: A.K. Volkov; and Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 264-8. Ernest Renan (1823-
1892), French philosopher, historian, and scholar of religion was a leader of the school of critical
philosophy. The text of his lecture "L'Islamism et la Science," may be found in Oeuvres
Completes, Kenan's attacks on Islam in the name of reason and science drew a strong response
from the Russian Muslim reformers, in particular from the St Petersburg's ahmd Baiazitov
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Islam, argued the missionaries, was alien to rational thinking. By denying
free-will and disapproving of science, Islam denied its followers the use of
reasoning to interpret rehgion and the world.H^ it barred the pursuit of science
as useless, frivolous, impious, and competitive with God. With unrecognized
irony, the missionaries argued that Islam was opposed to any form of progress
because it advocated the view that theology should govem society.! 17
Furthermore, the behef in the unalterability and infallibility of the Qur'an made
changes impossible. By teaching that faith cannot be acquired and truth cannot be
explained, Islam forced its adherents to renounce the use of reasoning in all
matters, and persecuted anyone who dared to use his mind to understand his faith
or the world around him.l 18
The missionaries acknowledged that there had been substantial growth of
science, philosophy, and industry in early Islamic history. However, according to
the missionaries, that growth occurred in spite of Islam. The vast movement of
Muslim scholarship had been a carryover from Greek and Persian civilizations.
Indeed, the most important scholarship was the work of Christians, Jews,
Ismailis, or Muslims in revolt.H^ In any event, the missionaries asserted that
Islam had been Uberal in its early history only because of its weakness.
The missionaries claimed that the world of Islam condemned itself to
complete political and cultural inferiority by opposing the pursuit of science.
They generally viewed the world of Islam as having been frozen in the form it
(Vozrazhenie). Renan's text and Baiazitov's response were widely circulated among the Volga
Tatars, cited by Saussay, "Il'minskij," 413.
1 16 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 2; and A. Volkov, "Islam," 223. Also see Ostroumov, Koran.
117 A.K. Volkov, 313.
118 petrov, 135-6.
119 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 267-8; and A. Volkov, "Islam," 231-2.
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had acquired in the Middle Ages. In particular, they argued that the Law
{Shari'ah) elaborated by the twelfth century excluded any further development; it
therefore represented a dead body. 1^0 The missionaries suggested that the
Muslim world had since fallen into laziness, narrow-mindedness, imprecision and
chaos. Having the most profound contempt for European education, the Muslim
world was unable and unwilling to open itself to new ideas.
However, in the second half of the nineteenth century the Orthodox
missionaries were confronted with a Muslim reformist movement at home. The
reform (Jadid) movement touched upon all aspects of life: reUgious, cultural and,
in its later phase, pohtical (post 1905). The Orthodox missionaries tried to argue
that the Jadid movement was an artificial phenomenon because it contained inner
contradictions. According to the missionaries, a reformist movement that
touched upon the rehgious, moral, political or civil order would lose its Muslim
character. 121
Islam a Pohtical Danger
Russian missionaries greatly feared the potential combination of Muslim
reformers with the Russian intelligentsia. They believed that the Russian
intelligentsia "was not unsympathetic to the blossoming of Mushm culture." 1^2
The inteUigentsia certainly advocated a reasonable liberalization and access of
natives to education, but without its Orthodox orientation. The missionaries
warned that "the rising Tatar intelligentsia is now offering its venomous poison in
the form of gilded pills in a hterary and urbane manner that enchants our near-
120 Glagolev, 58; and Miropiev, "Religioznoe," 383-4. Also see Ostroumov, Islamovedenie,
V. 4.
121 Miropiev, Polozhenii, 51-2; and Tsvetkov, 412-3.
122 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 53.
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sighted intelligentsia. This is much more dangerous than fanaticism ... especially
since our ruling circles do not possess any zeal for Orthodoxy, nor any basic
religious or political convictions." 1^3
The missionaries approached the question of Islam and politics in a number
of ways. Some of their writings simply consisted of descriptions of the type of
governments Islam had produced. Their unvarying conclusion in those writings
was that the absence of separation between the temporal and spiritual in Islam led
to oppressive forms of government m Muslim societies. "The form of absolute
despotism of Muslim rule arose under the influence of Islam and not because of
some Asiatic characteristics of the people." 1^4 fhe Qur'an and the SharVah were
the instruments with which coercion, oppression and tyranny were imposed. 1^5
Other missionary writings were targeted to explain to the Russian public
why Islam was a potential danger to the empire. Because Muslims recognized
only one authority combining the spiritual and the temporal, they could be truly
obedient only to a Muslim ruler. "A Muslim who remains true to his religion
cannot recognize the supreme power of a non-Muslim state. In such states,
Muslims and Christians cannot form one organic body ... Muslims cannot be
active participants in such governments. ... Therefore, Muslims in non-Muslim
states represent an alien part, which only creates problems and obstacles for the
state."126 Moreover, true believers represented a danger in a non-Muslim state
because they were bound to lead sl jihad (holy war) against the unbehevers.127
123 Il'minskii, Pis'ma, 63. Also see Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 30.
124 Mashanov, "Verkhovnaia," 231.
125 Ostroumov, Islamovedenie, V. 4, 2.
126 Mashanov, "Verkhovnaia," 237.
127 Miropiev, Polozhenii, 217; and "Dzhikhad," 1 14 and 120-1.
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The missionaries viewed every Muslim as a potential enemy of the Russian
state. 128 In particular, they mistrusted the clerics, especially the educated
clerics. The missionaries accused the clerics of being responsible for reUgious
fanaticism, backwardness, and stagnation. Furthermore, the clerics were
"antagonistic to Russian power which they regarded as a competitor for the
clerics' influence over the masses." 1^9
But first and foremost, the missionaries mistrusted the Sufis and their
teaching. Said Miropiev in 1901:
What frightful danger for us (Russians) is concealed in that teaching! We
have already experienced that danger with the Caucasian murids led by
Shamil, and with the Andijan uprising in 1898 under the leadership of
ishan Muhanmiad Ah Khalfi.130 ... The main ideas, zealously propagated
by the ishans, are the spread of Islam and the rise of its adherents,
resentment over the existing (Russian) order and the overthrow of that
order ... For us Russians, Sufism constitutes an obstacle to our influence in
the (MusUm) areas, and the utmost pohtical danger to our rule. Sufism,
with its ishans and murids, never can be our ally. It can only be our
enemy, always and in everything. It is unforgivable and even criminal on
our part to let it exist.^^l
Conclusions
The legacy of the Russian Orthodox missionaries' actions and writings was
heavy. Missionary activities served to worsen relations between Russians and
1^^ See Cherevanskii. To support their point, the missionaries often brought up the "divided
loyalty" of the Russian Muslims in Russia's wars with the Ottoman Empire. See for example
Mashanov, "Verkhovnaia," 238.
129 Miropiev, O Polozhenii, 370. Most missionary writings have at least some remarks
regarding Muslim clerics. For a study devoted solely to clerics see Koblov.
130 Miropiev, Polozhenii, 220. Muhammad Ali Ishan of Mintube (or Madali Ishan), who
led the revolt of Andijan in 1898, was a Sufi Naqshbandi. He was hanged by the Russian
authorities.
131 Miropiev, Polozhenii, 386-8. Also see: Ippolitov; and Mallitskii, 99.
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Muslims and were largely responsible for the hostility of the Muslims of eastem
Russia toward the tsarist regime. The activities of the Russian missionaries
contributed to the political hardening, even radicalization, of Tatar nationalism.
After the Revolution, the Muslim Communist leadership was strongly
opposed to anti-Islamic propaganda.
In spreading anti-religious propaganda among the Muslims we risk
comparison with the recent "adversaries of Islam," the Russian missionaries
who spent millions of public funds for this "battle." It was not long ago
that these inveterate reactionaries swarmed over aU the Muslim regions of
Russia and spread throughout them the nauseating odor of missionary
corruption. Recently still, these territories were covered with a dense
network of "scholarly establishments" ~ seminaries and religious
academies destined to train "specialists" in the combat against
"Mohammedism." Inept anti-rehgious propaganda runs the risk of evoking
this recent past in the Muslim mind and would only have very negative
results. ... We must proclaim loudly that we are fighting no religion as
such, but wish only to propagate our atheistic convictions, as is our natural
right. This kind of approach alone can ensure that we wiU not be confused
with the retrograde Russian missionaries. We must make the Muslims
understand that in spreading anti-rehgious propaganda we are not
continuing the work of the Pobedonostsevs and the Il'minskiis, but rather
that of their own intellectuals, who recently had been working in this same
direction. 132
At the same time, the Bolsheviks learned from the legacy of the
missionaries. From the perspective of this study, the most important aspect of the
missionaries' legacy is their anti-Islamic hterature. Themes and arguments from
this literature were continued throughout the Soviet period. But other aspects of
the legacy were of value. The Soviets' nationality program ~ "National in Form
and Socialist in Content" ~ continued the emphasis on the teaching of native
languages. In Lenin's view, the national language formed the essence of the
nationality policy, the "National in Form" being primarily equated with the
132 Sultan Galiev, "Metody," 46 and 48.
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national language. In this connection, the change of the alphabet from Arabic to
Cyrillic had akeady been adopted by the missionaries. 133
The basic problems conceming the relations between the Russian state and
its Muslim subjects had not been resolved when the February Revolution brought
the end of the Romanovs' monarchy. None of the tsarist policies, from the most
hberal policies of Catherine n to the most repressive policies of General
Kaufman in Central Asia, had produced satisfactory results. Rehgious or cultural
assimilation, practiced intermittently from the sixteenth century to the end of the
nineteenth century, had touched only a marginal minority, Li contrast, these
policies had created a heavy legacy of suspicion, rancor and hatred between the
Russian and MusUm communities. The Revolution of 1905 had brought freedom
of faith, but the hope for cooperation and power-sharing between Russians and
Muslims that the Revolution had stirred was not followed by concrete results.
Furthermore, the rise of slavophilism and Great-Russian nationalism still
aggravated the already uneasy relationship between Russians and Muslims.
On the eve of the October Revolution, neither the government in St.
Petersburg nor the Russian or Muslim political parties were able to present
solutions to the unsolvable problem of relations between the colonizers and the
colonized. The Soviet regime inherited the problem and attempted to solve it by
applying a new poHcy based on Marxism-Leninism.
133 Kreindler contends that Lenin in his youth had seen the most successful application of the
missionary system of native education among the Chuvash in his native Simbirsk. Furthermore,
Lenin's father, superintendent of schools in Simbirsk, was a supporter and a personal friend of
n'minskii who devised the system of education in native languages. See Kreindler, "Neglected."
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Chapter HI: Historical Background to
Anti-Islamic Policies of the Soviet Period
With the success of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks had acquired the bulk of
the Russian Empire. Thus, the creation of a socialist society was not to be con-
fined to a single, more-or-less homogeneous people ~ such as would have been
the case if the revolution had occurred in Germany or England. Instead, the
Bolsheviks were faced with the monumental task of creating a socialist society
over a huge land area and within a varied population. The population was
disparate in virtually every possible way: ethnically, linguistically, culturally,
socially, poUticaUy, and, the focus of this dissertation, reUgiously. The Muslim
lands were but one among many of the diverse elements with which the
Bolsheviks had to deal.
Marxist thought, a product of nineteenth century ideas, was firmly rooted
in the belief that man's environment shaped his institutions, philosophies, values,
ideals, thought pattems, and religions. The Bolsheviks, therefore, were confident
that they could, through a long-term educational process, create a Soviet society
and a Soviet man.
Islam on the Eve of the Revolution
Unquestionably, the Bolsheviks faced a difficult problem when they came
to power. The Muslims of the Russian Empire were not a homogeneous group.
They were divided geographically, ethnically and linguistically. 1 They were
separated by traditional attachments to tribe, clan, and city or village community.
1 For the ethnic diversity of Soviet Muslims see for example: Akiner; Wixman; Bennigsen
and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire.
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The various peoples ranged from nomads to sedentary people, from clans to
nations in formation. In addition, Islam had been assimilated in varying fashion
and degree by different socio-cultural units. The sophisticated Bukharan
orthodoxy of the largely sedentary Uzbeks contrasted with the varied beliefs and
practices of the nomadic Kazakhs, Kirghiz or Nogais.
Even in the communities where Islam was firmly estabhshed there was
substantial diversity in the conception of reUgious law. Conceptions of the law
varied from the system emerging among the advanced and liberal bourgeoisie ~
in Kazan for example ~ who were trying to adapt Islam to modem progress, to
the interpretations of the peasants of the Chechen country who were fiercely and
unyieldingly conservative. However, like all Islamic communities isolated among
foreigners, Russian Muslims were profoundly conscious of their reUgious
affiUations, and all the more so as the pressure of the infidels became more
severe.
Thus, on the eve of the Revolution, various traditional identities co-existed
simultaneously among the Muslim masses of the Tsarist Empire. These identities
varied from familial, kinship, regional, linguistic, and tribal, to the ummah, the
community of believers.^ The great Russian orientalist Vladimir Bartol'd
defined the national identity of the popular masses of Turkestan before the
Revolution in the following way: "When you ask a Turkestani what is his identity,
he will answer that he is, first a Muslim, then an inhabitant of such city or
village, ... or if he is a nomad, a member of such or such tribe."3 Hence, the
first and by far most important identity was the reUgious identity. Other
2 For a discussion of the various levels of consciousness in tsarist Russia and the Soviet
Union see: Bennigsen, "Several Nations"; and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Tribe to Umma."
3 Bartol'd, Istoriia Kul'turnoi.

57
traditional forms of identity were defined and maintained within the larger
context of an Islamic moral order.
Before the Revolution, membership in the ummah — the community of
believers - was understood by all the Muslims of the Russian Empire. Until the
Revolution, nobody, not even the few dedicated Marxists, would dare proclaim
their opposition to Islam and their desire to look for another basis of identity. To
leave the ummah was still an unthinkable act. By abandoning Islam a Muslim
becomes a traitor, even worse than a Russian kafir.
For the masses the religious identity had no political meaning. The ummah
was not a nation in the modem sense of the word. Rehgious identity represented
a kind of primal awareness, differentiatmg a Muslim from Christians, Jews, and
others. In contrast, for intellectuals and city dwellers in some areas of the
Russian Empire, Islam was becoming a kind of surrogate political national
identity. That shift in thought evolved from the Tatar Jadid (reformist)
movement of the late nineteenth century. At the tum of the century, a pan-
Islamic doctrine appeared for the first time in the writings of Tatar political
philosophers .4 Pan-Islamic doctrine proclaimed the pohtical - not only rehgious
and cultural ~ unity of aU the Muslims of the Russian Empire. Thus, the ummah
was, at least for some, in the process of becoming a political, not only a spiritual,
estabhshment.
Mushm intellectuals had another kind of awareness, an ethnic awareness,
also deeply rooted in the history of Islam. They defined themselves generically
as "Turks." Only a few intellectuals among a sub-set of Turks had begun to
differentiate themselves ~ as was the case among some Tatars, Kazakhs, and
4 The pan-Islamic doctrine was first expressed by the Tatar reformist A. Ibragimov in
Chulpan Yildizi.
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Azeris. The Turk or Tatar ethnic identity did not replace, supersede, or destroy
the religious identity. Rather, the religious identity remained the most important.
In 1918, Klevleev, delegate of Kazan to the first Congress of the Communist
Party of Turkestan, defined himself as follows: "I am first a Muslim, then a
Tatar, and only then a communist. "^
On the eve of the Revolution, the Muslim poHtical ehte was convinced pan-
Islamists and pan-Turkists. Despite sub-ethnic differences, they formed one
nation, belonged to one culture, and were united by a common religion and
historical tradition. This unity was a practical and vital necessity, not a political-
philosophical exercise as it had been in the Ottoman Empire..
The Tsarist administration had shown little concern for the self-perception
of its Muslim subjects, and had made only spasmodic efforts to influence their
identity. In contrast, for obvious ideological reasons, the Bolsheviks viewed the
traditional identities, especially reUgious and tribal, as incompatible with the new
society they wanted to build.
The First Ten Years
Among the Muslims of Russia, Marxist influence had been virtually non-
existent. Prior to 1917, Russian Muslims had been far more influenced by the
thmking of liberals and of Socialist Revolutionaries than by Marxists.6 For all
practical purposes, in November 1917 the Soviet government had no basis for
poUtical action in the Muslim borderlands of the Russian Empire. Submerged in
revolution and civil war and facing the immediate task of establishing their
Cited by Monteil, 58.
6 For the impact of socialist ideas on Muslim intellectuals before 1917 see Bennigsen and
Wimbush, Muslim National, 7-13.
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authority in newly reconquered territories, the Bolsheviks seemed unsure of the
direction their rule should take among the non-Russians. Lenin and his regime
were willing to go to some lengths to win the political support of the Muslim
people in Russia. The desire to gain the support of Russian Muslims was
illustrated by the appeal issued by the Soviet government over the signatures of
Lenin and Stalin dated 19 December 1917:
Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts
of Siberia and of Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens
and Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and all you whose mosques and
prayer houses have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been
trampled upon by the tsars and oppressors of Russia: Your beliefs and
usages, your national and cultural institutions are forever free and
inviolable. Organize your national life in complete freedom. This is your
right. Know that your rights, like those of all iie people of Russia are
under the mighty protection of the Revolution and its organs, the Soviets
of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants ... J
Notwithstanding such appeals, the Civil War had created an environment in
which there were abuses directed against religious establishments. Mosques were
closed and clerics were executed. Such excesses had led to two important anti-
Soviet uprisings in the Muslim borderlands. Li the Ferghana valley in Central
Asia, a revolt by the Basmachi erupted in 1918. In 1920 there was an uprising in
North Daghestan and Chechnia led by religious leaders {Sufi Naqshbandis).^
Uprisings such as these, bearing a reUgious (in the North Caucasus) or partially
reUgious character (in Central Asia), led the Russian Bolsheviks to avoid further
direct confrontation with the Islamic reUgious establishment. Such confrontations
' Reproduced in Castagn6, 7-9.
8 In Soviet historiography the Basmachi revolt lasted from 1818 to 1928. In some areas of
southern Uzbekistan and the Turkmen steppe, however, the fighting continued until the mid-
1930s. The revolt in the North Caucasus was crushed in 1921. Fighting broke out in 1929 in
Chechnia, and again in 1940.
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might have endangered further the shaky existence of Soviet power in Muslim
territories. In order to strengthen their foothold in the Mushm borderlands
following the Civil War, sensitive areas of Muslim consciousness, such as
religious orthodoxy, pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, and national autonomy were
played upon by the Bolsheviks.9
The cautious attitude toward Islam in the early period of the Soviet regime
stemmed also from foreign considerations, both in the short run and in the long
run. In the short run, Bolshevik leaders were interested in preventing hostile
powers from using the Muslim communities within die Soviet Union against their
new regime. Furthermore, for several reasons Lenin was cautiously interested in
using possible turmoil, or threats of political turmoil, in peripheral MusUm
countries. One aim was to pressure westem powers to break the "capitahst
encirclement" on the southem border of Soviet Russia and to ease the economic
pressure exerted by capitalist Europe against the new revolutionary regime. The
threat of unleashing a Jihad (holy war) led by Soviet Muslims was indeed raised
several times agamst Europe by the Bolsheviks. 10 In the long run, Lenin was
sensitive to the potential impact of Soviet treatment of nationalities, especially
Muslims, on the miUions of Asians who might be recruited to the cause of world
revolution. Such considerations led Lenin to advise a cautious course. 1
1
9 Pipes, 155.
10 The threat of a Jihad was brandished by Zinoviev at the First Congress of the Toilers of the
East in Baku in September 1920, cited by Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 138.
1
1
See Lenin's note on "Nationalities and Autonomy," dated 31 December 1922, Collected
Works.
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The Civil War
For a variety of motives, many Muslims sided with the Bolsheviks during
the Civil War and their role had been vital. 1^ But for most Muslims who joined
the Bolsheviks, the Revolution had been a hberation. It had brought an end to
domination by the Russian tsars and their surrogates, the Whites. The decision by
the Muslim elite to side with the Bolsheviks was in large part a reflection of their
distaste for the Whites, whose goals were known and understood. By
comparison, the goals of the Bolsheviks were less well known to the Muslim
leadership. And, despite their excesses during the Civil War, the Bolsheviks were
looked upon by the Muslims as the lesser of two evils. 13
As the Muslim Communists saw it, one of the important tenets of Marxism
was that a socialist state cannot be imperialist. As Hanafi Muzaffar, an important
Muslim Communist theoretician, noted: "It would be a great mistake for us
people oppressed by Europe to fail to recognize that Marxism is fighting
imperialism. As the Conmiunist Party is fighting this same imperialism in Russia
and abroad, we must accept Soviet power." 14 Beyond that, the Muslim
leadership was able to rationalize its support of the Bolsheviks by arguing that
communism and Islam were compatible. Notwithstanding evidence of the anti-
religious character of the Bolsheviks, some among the Muslim leadership were
convinced that Marxism was an ideology that could be adapted to Islam. It was
suggested that the Muslim traditional way of Ufe was already close to
communism. Similarities between Marxism and Islam were identified: like
12 See Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Muslim Minorities."
1
3
See for example Baitursunov.
14 Muzaffar, Din ve Millet Meseleri (Religious and National Problems), Kazan 1 922,
unpublished but used by most national communists. Large sections of Muzaffar's work are quoted
in Arsharuni and Gabidullin, 146. Also see Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 97-8.
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communism, Islam rejects narrow nationalism; like communism, Islam is
intemational, recognizing only the brotherhood and unity of aU nations. 15
The Period of the New Economic PoHcy
The period of the NEP (New Economic Policy) began with an attempt by
the Bolsheviks to treat their Muslim comrades as equal partners. Until 1927
Muslim Communists enjoyed substantial power of decision-making in the Party
and Soviet apparatuses in their respective republics. In Moscow, Muslim
Communists served as Stalin's colleagues in the Commissariat of Nationalities
{Narkomnats). It is not an exaggeration to say that nationahst intellectuals
dominated the political and cultural life in the Muslim republics of the Middle
Volga, the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the first years of the new regime
the term Muslim was officially used as an ethnic denomination. There was a
Muslim Red Army, a Muslim Commissariat, and even a Muslim Communist
Party for a while.
In part, the Bolshevik attitude toward their Muslim colleagues stemmed
from Lenin's long-term interests in preserving the prestige of the Marxist
revolutionaries in promoting world revolution. Lenin advocated forbearance in
attempts to achieve central control over the Muslim borderlands in a note on
nationalities and autonomy dated 12 December 1922.
The misfortune that could result for our state from the lack of control over
the national apparatuses by the Russian apparatus would be considerably
less than the misfortune that would result from an excess of centralism ~
not only for us, but for the whole Intemational, for the hundreds of
millions of Asians who, marching in our footsteps, will soon appear on the
scene of history. It would be inexcusable neghgence if on the eve of the
1^ See for example: Muzzafar, 147; and Baitursunov in Narodnoe Khoziaistvo Kazakhstana,
Alma-Ata, 1930, 26.
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flight of the Orient, at the dawn of its awakening, we ruin our prestige in
the eyes of the Asians ~ even by the smallest brutality, the smallest
violence against our minorities. 16
Another important consideration promoting forbearance turned on Lenin's
views of the sources of culture and cultural power. Lenin believed that cultural
power, unhke political power, could not be seized by revolutionary action.
Instead, it must be patiently acquired and assimilated. These views prompted him
to encourage his communist comrades to be open to the knowledge and insights of
bourgeois specialists, despite their identification with a pre-revolutionary social
class. 17
Most Muslim Communist leaders had been former militants of the pan-
Islamic/pan-Turkic movements. The Revolution did not stop the development of
pan-Islamic/pan-Turkic conceptions. On the contrary it gave them a new
impulse. The early contact of many Muslims with the Bolsheviks during the
revolution and the Civil War had convinced them that Marxism was an ideology
that could be adapted to their own national demands. Muslims who joined the
Bolsheviks accepted hterally the Marxist-Leninist lexicon: national autonomy,
anti-imperialism, and internationalism. 18 Some had even come to view a sociaUst
regime as the only regime that could, in one blow and in one generation, destroy
imperialism and thereby lay the foundation for true national liberation. Muslim
Communists therefore had come to Marxism with a program of national
16 Lenin, "Nationalities." Also see Lewin, 105-16.
17 Fitzpatrick, 8.
18 See Narbutabekov. Narbutabekov's report was given at the First Congress of the Toilers
of the East in Baku in September 1920. Also see Pipes, 255 and 260.
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liberation, thereby standing in stark contrast to the Marxist-Leninist principle that
developing socialism would end the national question for all time.
The Mushm Communists brought several types of adaptations to
communism. On the one hand, by stressing the desirability of adapting socialism
to their own economic, historical and social conditions, they sought to distinguish
clearly between the Russian way and their own national road to communism.
Within this context, the Muslim Communists offered their own interpretation of
the class struggle as it applied to the Muslim societies; in addition, they set forth
their own views of the way the religious question should be approached in the
Muslim lands. On the second hand, there were adaptations that were tempered by
the Muslims' natural suspicion - flowing from a history of Russian domination ~
that the dynamic Russian Bolsheviks might attempt to perpetuate the imperial
policies of tsarist times. To prevent Russian domination, the Muslim Communists
were concemed with achieving parity within the Soviet State and within the
communist movement. The Muslim solidarity implied by the preservation of the
ummah was an important means by which Muslim Communists could seek to
offset the numerical superiority of the Great Russians. In addition, by advocating
the export of the revolution to the east (Eastern Strategy) the Muslim
Communists sought to leverage their position within the communist movement. 1^
The Class Struggle
. Observing that they had not yet developed a
proletariat within their own societies, Muslim Communists argued that conditions
were not ripe for the emergence of a class struggle. Therefore, they advocated
the postponement of efforts to facilitate the class struggle within their societies.
19 On the theories of Muslim national communists see: Rubinshtein; von Mende; Bennigsen
and Quelquejay; Pipes; Rodinson; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National; Rorlich, Volga,
125-156; andTengour.
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Perhaps more to the point, they pressed for delay until their own national
liberation had been fully achieved.20
To buttress their efforts to postpone the class struggle within their own
societies, the Muslim theoreticians pointed out that the process of economic and
political development was substantially different across various areas of the
world. Relying heavily on Lenin's analysis of the role of imperialism in dividing
the world into nations of "haves" and nations of "have-nots," into nations of
"oppressors" and nations of "oppressed," it was but a small step to apply the
analysis of classes, which was normally focused on the analysis of society within a
given nation or a homogeneous set of nations, to the analysis of differences
among nations.^l Muslim theoreticians argued that the oppressed nations, the
victims of capitalist oppressor nations, could be viewed as proletarian. In short,
Muslim Communists articulated the innovative concept that the class struggle |
could be acted out among nations. Within this concept, their own national
liberation was an aspect of the class struggle.22 Because they regarded the
Muslim nations as having been among the most oppressed in the tsarist empire,
|
they qualified as "proletarian nations."
Attitudes Toward Rehgion
. Muslim Communists recognized that a frontal
assault on Islam, advocated by Russian Bolsheviks and even tried during the Civil
20 See for example: the report of Faskhuddinov at the 4th Tatar obkom of the RCP(b) on 15
1 September 1927, quoted in Rubinshtein, 24; the declaration of R. Validov, People's Commissar
for Agriculture of the Tatar Republic, quoted by Rubinshtein, 80; and the Crimean Tatar, A.
Ozenbashly, quoted by Bochagov, 83-4, Also see Bennigsen.and Quelquejay, 101-5.
2
1
Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National, 4 1 -2.
22 The theory of proleterian nations and national versus class struggle was developed by
Sultan Galiev as early as 1918 in an article in Znamia Revoliutsii, 8 March 1918, N. 44, quoted by
Arsharuni and Gabidullin, 142.
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War, would surely spell disaster for Marxism. They believed that the successful
promotion of Marxism in their societies would require the integration of Marxist
teachings with those of Islam. Muslim Communists suggested a carefully
tailored approach to Islam. Sultan Galiev ~ member of the Little Collegium of
the Narkomnats, editor of Zhizn' Natsional'nostei, the organ of the Narkomnats,
and the theoretician of Muslim national communism -- argued that the
relationship of the Communist Party to Islam should be one of opposing
fanaticism and obscurantism in particular quarters of the Islamic community.23
By such an approach, the Communist Party could align itself with moderate
elements within the Islamic estabUshment in opposition to extremists. In this
way, the Party could be viewed as continuing the work of the Jadid reformers of
the nineteenth century.24 Sultan Galiev noted that pre-revolutionary theologian
reformers such as Musa JaruUah Bigi, Ziya KemaU, and Abdullah Bubi had been
particularly effective in their attempt to adapt Islam to modem conditions. Sultan
Galiev suggested that their work should serve as a model for subsequent
propagandizing.25 The gist of Sultan Galiev's arguments was therefore that
Islam should be secularized, not destroyed.26
MusUm Communists attempted to institutionalize their moderate line
toward Islam. For example, a special SharVat commission was created in 1922
by the national Conmiunists who controlled the Tatar Republic. This
23 Sultan Galiev, "Metody.
24 Rubinshtein rightly stated that for Sultan Galiev and other Muslim communists the October
Revolution was only liie continuation of the reformist movement of the Tatar Jadids. See
Rubinshtein, 35.
25 Sultan Galiev, "Metody," 55-9.
26 For similar arguments see the writing of the first secretary of the Daghestani obkom
Samurskii (Efendiev), 137.
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commission, created within the Commissariat of Justice, was entrusted with the
task of reconciling and coordinating Soviet and Qur'anic laws.^^ A similar
conmiission was created in Daghestan in 1921.28
The liberal treatment of religion advocated by the Muslim Communists
contrasted sharply with the bitter and sustained attacks mounted during the same
period by Russian Bolsheviks against the Orthodox Church 29 Reflecting the
influence of Muslim Communists, systematic attacks on Islam did not begin m the
Muslim republics until 1928. Aside from the Zhenotdel assault in Central Asia
on the veiling of women and the campaign against self-flatellation processions of
the Muharram in Azerbaijan, there was very little organized anti-religious
activity.30 Issues relating to the equahty of women question along with the
abolition of self-flatellation processions of the Muharram had been on the agenda
of pre-revolutionary MusUm reformers.31
Later, Soviet authors accused the Muslim Communists of being true
religious believers and therefore of being unacceptable socialists.32 Such
accusations were questionable. There is little doubt that the Muslim Communists
27 Izvestiia Tattsika, 26 April 1923, N. 911, cited by Klimovich, "Marks," 73; mentioned
also by Kasymov, Ocherki Po Religioznomu, 27.
28 Kolarz, Russia. 198-9.
29 See for example Pospielovsky, Russian Church, V. 1, 93-1 12.
30 For a detailed study of the activities of the Zhenotdel in Central Asia see the study of
Massell.
•^ ^ See the resolutions on the woman question passed at the First and Second All-Russian
Muslim Congresses held respectively in Moscow in May of 1917 and in Kazan in July of 1917.
The various resolutions of the congresses are reprinted in Programmnye Dokumenty, 15-20 and
43-4. Campaigns against the practice of self-flagellation had been undertaken in the pre-
revolutionary journals Ekinci and Molla Nasreddin. See Khadzhibeili, 22-3.
32 See for example: Kobetskii, "Sultan-Galievshchina"; Arsharuni, "Ideologiia"; Kasymov,
Pantiurkistskaia, 87-8; and Khairov. Also see: Ukhanov; and the material gathered in Protiv
Sultangalievshchiny.
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were sincere Marxists, at least within the context of their interpretation of
Marxism. Muslim Communists were certainly secularists. It is plausible to
believe that they were essentially indifferent to religion, maybe even hostile to it.
Their interest was in the preservation of Islamic society and culture, not the
Islamic religion.
The Preservation of the Ummah , An important aspect of the Muslim
communists' struggle for parity with the Russians was the maintenance of Muslim
lands as one nation. Some Muslims advocated the creation of one MusUm nation,
the "Republic of Turan."33 if division were necessary, the Muslims argued for a
small number of states: a Tatar-Bashku- repubhc in the Volga-Urals (an old idea
relating to a state called Idel-Ural borrowed by the Muslim Communists from the
pre-revolutionary Tatar national bourgeois organizations); a Turkestan republic;
a North Caucasian republic; the republic of Azerbaijan; and the republic of the
Crimea.34 Islam, secularized and purged of its most outdated aspects, but
preserving all its moral, cultural and social values, was to remain the basis of the
unity. In this way the ummah would be preserved.
But the unity of the Muslim ummah was a potential ideological and political
danger to the Russian Bolsheviks. Against the wishes of Muslim Communists, the
i
Bolshevik leadership opted for a substantial subdivision of the Muslim territories,
based on a set of criteria proposed by Stalin. Stalin's criteria for nationality
"^•^ The Republic of Turan was a project of Sultan Galiev elaborated after his expulsion from
the Party in 1923. See Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 180-1.
34 On the desirability of a single Tatar-Bashkir State see Said Galiev (not to be confused with
Sultan Galiev). On the efforts of the Tatar Communists to create a Tatar-Bashkir State see
Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 119-23 and 141-3. On the Idel-Ural State see Iskhaki. For a unified
Turkestan see the program of the ERK Party (Will), an underground Muslim socialist organization
created in 1919/20 to strive to establish an independent, sovereign, and undivided Turkestan. The
program of the ERK Party has been reproduced in Programmnye Dokumenty, 105-27.
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consisted of considerations relating to territory, language, economic life and
psychological makeup.^^ xhe Muslim Communists rejected these criteria. While
ethnic and linguistic differences were real, they were regarded as a less
significant basis of identity than the existing identity based on cultural, historic,
and religious loyalties. Gajaz Maksudov, a prominent Muslim Communist,
expressed a widely-held view of Turkic intellectuals when he asserted that "... we
cannot separate the culture of the Tatar people from the cultures of other Turko-
Tatar people, as all Turko-Tatar people are closely tied together. "3
6
Starting in 1919, Soviet leaders moved to break up the ummah by dividing \
the Muslim community of the Middle Volga into Tatar and Bashkir states, by
\
enforcing razmezhevanie (the demarcation of the Muslim communities of Central
Asia), and by creating a number of small states in the North Caucasus. The
breaking up of the ummah was designed to accomplish two goals. Its purpose
was to replace the clanic and tribal sub-national awareness with larger loyalties,
and to replace the Islamic and pan-Turkic supra-national consciousness with more
restricted allegiances to modem Soviet nations.
In retrospect, it is plausible to believe that the Bolshevik leadership had
opted for the extensive division of Muslim lands in order to prevent the
emergence of vibrant political forces based on a viable Muslim identity.
Consistent with Russian tradition and sound pohcy of conquerors of any political
persuasion, the Bolsheviks had merely attempted to divide and rule. Muslim
Communists certainly viewed the division of the Turkic people as an attempt to
35 Stalin's concept of a nation was first spelled out in an essay on the national question written
in 1912. Lenin had entrusted Stalin with the writing of the essay. "Marksizm i Natsional'nyi
Vopros." The essay was originally published in Prosveshchenie. See Stalin, 296.
36 Cited by Rubinshtein, 28.
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divide and rule, as the re-establishment of the "Russia one and indivisible," and as
a return to "pure Russian imperialism."37
The break-up of the Muslim lands may have been responsive to motives
even more far-reaching than those related merely to the exigencies of political
govemance. The Bolsheviks knew that the success of the revolution rested upon!
their ability to create a homogeneous Soviet socialist society free from class '
distinctions. Members of that society would assume a Soviet identity and would
express exclusive loyalty to Soviet ideology and to the Soviet state. It is tempting
to argue that the extensive subdivision of Muslim lands was an aspect of this long-
run, comprehensive effort to create a revolutionary sociaUst consciousness, i.e.,
to create Soviet man. Atheism was viewed as a part of the consciousness of
Soviet man. On the road toward spreading atheism, it was useful, indeed
necessary, to undermine existing rehgious loyalties.
The Eastem Strategy . Another means by which Muslim Communists
believed they could achieve parity within the communist movement was to
shepherd the strategic direction of the revolution. They argued that the colonial
east was a powder keg ready to explode, whereas the revolution in Europe was
dead. Hence, Muslim Communists advocated the export of the revolution to the
east.38 in this respect, the views of the Muslim Communists were virtually
37 See the articles by S. Atnagulov, "Soltangaliefchelken Tarikhi Tamrlary" (The Historical
Roots of Sultangalievism), 39; the report of M. Razumov, First Secretary of the Obkom of the
CP(b) of Tatarstan at the reunion of the aktiv of the CP(b) of the Kazan region, the 12 October
1929, 7; and la Chanyshev, "Soltangaliefchelken Gimerelie" (The Destruction of Sultangalievism),
51. The above mentioned articles were pubUshed in Kontrrivoliitsiyon Soltangaliefcheleke Karshy
(Against the Counter-Revolutionary Sultangalievism), Kazan, 1930, cited in Bennigsen and
Quelquejay, 178-9.
38 These views were expressed by Sultan Galiev in a series of articles entitled "Sotsial'naia,"
and in the article "K Ob'iavleniiu." Also see Narbutabekov.

71
identical to those of the Jadid reformer, Ismail Gasprinski (see Chapter H). The
MusUm Communists saw the opportunity to attract millions of MusUms into the
communist world. Clearly, they regarded themselves as best qualified to lead
such an enterprise.39 if the Muslim Communists were successful in exporting the
revolution to the east, they would be the dominant players in a political arena
outside Russian control.40 Such a power base would enable them to neutralize
the Russians in the communist movement.
The Muslim Communists were not the first to express interest in the
colonial world. Prior to 1917 Lenin had expressed himself regarding the
possible role of the Orient in the struggle for power. He believed that oppressed
people in the colonized world could play an important, if secondary, role in
world-wide revolution. It was in this vein that Lenin supported the slogan of
national self-determination.41 In the Lenin-Stalin December 1917 appeal to the
Russian Muslims, they expanded their appeal ...
To the Muslims of the Orient, Persians, Turks, Arabs, Indians, to aU who
have been exploited during the past centuries, and to all those whose goods
the plunderers of Europe wish to divide, we declare the treaties of the
tsars, conceming the seizure of Constantinople, and also those confirmed
by Kerensky, to be today annulled. The Russian RepubHc and its
government, the Council of People's Commissars, declare themselves
against the seizure of foreign countries. Constantinople must remain m the
hands of the Turks. We declare null and void the treaty conceming the
partition of Persia ... and the treaty concemmg the partition of Turkey.42
39 Such opinion was expressed by: Sultan Galiev at the Conference of Tatar Communists in
1920, cited by Rubinshtein, 26; Burundukov (a companion of S. Galiev) in an article in Znamia
Revoliutsii, 26 November 1919, N. 268, cited by Rubinshtein, 27; and Alkharizi.
^0 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National, 51-2.
41 On Lenin and the national question see: Pipes, 34-49; and Lewin, 105-16.
42 Reproduced in Castagne, 7-9.
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Although most Bolsheviks looked on the colonial world as presenting a
useful opportunity to create tempting entanglements for the European powers,
they showed no sustained interest in exporting their revolution to the east 43
They were particularly reluctant to use their own revolutionary Muslim cadre as
a vehicle for exporting the revolution to the Islamic world. Soviet Muslims were
excluded from the apparatus of the Comintern, from the People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), and from any political work in the outside
Mushm world 44 in the only attempt made by the Bolsheviks to export the
revolution to the Muslim world, MusUms had not been used 45
The Bolshevik leadership was very suspicious of the Eastern Strategy. To
eastemize the revolution in a manner consistent with the views of the Muslim
Communists meant to change entirely the basis of revolutionary support and
leadership. The Muslim Communists envisaged a purely Asian revolution. As
they saw it, the revolution would result from a permanent alliance between the
revolutionary national bourgeoisie and the Asian peasantry, an alliance led by the
Muslim Communists. In contrast, the Comintern viewed a potential revolution in
the colonized world as resulting from a Bolshevik-led aUiance between the
European proletariat and the Asian peasantry.46
43 Muslim Communists defended their thesis for the export of the revolution to the east at the
Second Congress of Communist Organizations of the People of the East in Moscow in
November/December 1919, the Second Congress of the Comintem in Moscow in July/August
1920, and the First Congress of the Toilers of the East in Baku in September 1920. Their theses
were not favorably accepted by the Bolshevik leadership. See: Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 134-
40; and Carr, 251. Also see: S"ezdNarodov; and Protokoly Kongressov.
44 Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims," 213.
45 In the spring of 1920 a division of the Red Army, composed entirely of Russians, had been
sent to Gilan (Iran) to help the Jengelis of Mirza Kuchuk Khan to fight British imperialism
46 For the Muslims' views see the report of Ryskulov at the First Congress of the Toilers of
the East in S"ezd Narodov, cited by Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 138; for the Russian Bolsheviks'
views see Carr, 251. Also see Protokoly Kongressov.
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The Stalin Era
Notwithstanding Lenin's sensitivity towards the potential resurgence of
Russian chauvinism, and notwithstanding considerations relating to the prestige of
the revolution in the eyes of the Orient, the patience of the Russian Bolsheviks
came to an end. The path charted by the Muslim Communists, especially their
heretical views relating to the class struggle, their struggle for political
autonomy, and their Eastern Strategy, ran counter to the mainline Bolshevik
views. Stalin, whose power was in clear ascendency and who had been in charge
of nationality affairs from the very beginning, had accumulated his full share of
disagreements with Muslim Communists. Although he may have needed their
cooperation earlier, no longer was that the case.
The Frontal Attack on Islam: 1927/1928-1941
The Cultural Revolution which began in 1927/1928 brought with it an
attack on the MusUm Communists, and with that a frontal attack on Islam. The
class war, the hallmark of the Cultural Revolution, ran directly counter to the
Muslim communists' efforts to postpone the class war in their societies. By the
terms of the class war, the proletariat was to mount an attack "... against
bourgeois elements which are supported by the remnants and survivals of the
influence, traditions, and customs of the old society." These bourgeois elements
had attempted " ... to increase their share, fighting for their own school, their
own art, their own theater and cinema, trying to use the state apparatus for that
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purpose."^7 The Muslim Communists were an obvious target of the Cultural
Revolution.
This is not to suggest that the MusUm Communists had had no occasion to
be concerned about their standing in the movement prior to the Cultural
Revolution. There were warnings against nationaUsm at the Tenth Congress of
the Russian Communist Party in 1921. With Stalin's criticism of Sultan Galiev in
1923, the first accusations of "national deviation" had been levelled at national
Communists.48 That same year marked the beginning of expulsions of Muslims
from the Communist Party.^9
In 1927/1928, the destruction of Islam, both as a religion and as a way of
life, began on a large scale. To facilitate industriahzation, Russians with requisite
skills were placed in positions of power within the Communist Party and the
Soviet apparatus in national repubhcs. With the removal of Muslim national
Communists from positions of leadership, the frontal assault against the Islamic
infrastructure was fully underway.50
Although the Cultural Revolution provided the occasion for the initial
assault against Islam, the more or less complete destruction of its infrastructure
became an aspect of the Great Purges. With the suppression of the Shari'at
courts, begun in the late 1920s, the judicial basis of the Islamic reUgion was
destroyed. The economic basis of Islam was undermined with the requisition of
4^ Declarations by A.L Krinitskii, head of the agitprop department of the Central Committee,
cited by Fitzpatrick, 10.
^8 The accusation was levelled by Stalin at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of
the RCP(b) with the Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923.
See Stalin, Works.
49 Sultan Galiev was arrested for the first time in May 1923 and excluded from the CP shortly
thereafter.
^^ See for example Rorlich, Volga Tatars, 155.
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the waqfs, which had insured the economic independence of Muslim clerics.51
All the 14,500 primary imaktab) and secondary {madrasah) Qur'anic schools
were closed, and neariy all the mosques on the territory of the Soviet Union were
closed or destroyed by 1940. Before the revolution there were between 25 and
30 thousand mosques (excluding Bukhara and Khiva), but by 1940 only about one
thousand remained. Having been accused of parasitism, coimter-revolutionary
sabotage, or espionage for Japan, Gemiany, or England, Muslim clerics were
arrested, then deported or executed. Fewer than three thousand of the
approximately 45 thousand clerics survived.52 All contact between Soviet
Muslims and their brethren abroad were cut; pilgrimages to holy places in Saudi
Arabia, Iran or Iraq were forbidden; and Soviet Muslim republics were closed to
foreign Muslims. The isolation from the rest of the Dar ul-Islam was further
heightened by the change of the alphabet imposed upon Soviet Muslims. Soviet
Muslims were forced to change their alphabet from Arabic script. First a Latin
script was progressively imposed starting in 192, then there was a shift to a
Cyrillic script in 1936.53 With the exception of the 1933-1936 period,
characterized by moderation throughout many aspects of Soviet society, an
intense anti-Islamic propaganda had supported the entire campaign.
Of course, Islam was not an isolated target for attack. The Cultural
Revolution also provided the occasion for an onslaught against other religions.
5
1
Tentative measures to destroy Islam's judicial and economic foundations were undertaken
in fits and starts in the mid- 1920s. See the early steps in the process of separation of church and
state in Muslim territories in Gidulianov, Otdelenie.
52 For the data see Bennigsen and Broxup, 47-8.
53 The change from Arabic to Latin alphabet was discussed and adopted at the First Congress
of Turcology in Baku in February/March 1926. The staunchest opponent of the change was G.
Ibragimov chairman of the Academic Center of tiie Narkompros of the Tatar Republic. See Pervyi
Vsesoiuznyi, 277-80. A decree issued by the Presidium of the Central Committee of Sovnarkom
on 7 August 1929 made the change into a law. See Rorlich, Volga Tatars, 151.
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Similar to the treatment of Islam in the 1920s, the Russian Christian sects had
been more-or-less immune from attack. These sects had been something of a
curiosity for the Marxist intellectuals.54 After a fashion, the Marxists and the
Christian Russian sects had shared a few ideological precepts. Also, in light of
sectarian resistance to tsarist poUcies, they were somewhat admired by the
Bolshevik revolutionaries. In contrast, the Orthodox Church had been subject to
attack throughout the NEP.55
The assault upon Muslim Communists coincided with a change in the
Comintern's policy. At the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1927, the
delegates, under Soviet pressure, adopted a "class versus class" strategy. Such a
strategy was completely impractical for appUcation in the colonized world, and
was the exact opposite of what had been advocated by the Muslim Communists.
Not until well after Stalin's death would the Soviets play their Muslim card in
foreign policy.
World War n and StaUn's Last Years
In terms of Soviet pohcy mitiatives. World War n provided the occasion
for an ideological detente between the Soviet government and what remained of
the Muslim rehgious establishment. In July 1942, a cleric of the former muftiat
in Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasulaev, took the initiative in establishing contacts with
Stalin.56 in exchange for Muslim support for the war effort, the anti-Islamic
campaign was slowed. A few mosques were allowed to reopen. Toward the end
of the war, Islam was even given an official standing with the reactivation of the
54 See for example: Stites, Revolutionary, 121-2; and Thrower, 430-8.
55 See for example Pospielovsky , Russian Church, 93- 1 12.
56 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Musulmans Oublies, 187.

77
former muftiat in Ufa and the creation of additional Muslim Spiritual Boards in
Tashkent, Baku, and Buinaksk (later to be transferred to Makhach-Kala). To
train officially registered clerics, a Qur'anic school, the madrasah Mir-i Arab,
was estabUshed in Bukhara in 1945.
The detente between the Soviet state and religion continued until Stalin's
death. Despite the Central Committee's adoption of a number of resolutions
calling for renewed anti-religious effort, little was done.57 The detente,
however, was purely tactical; religion and thus Islam remained the enemy. The
Party line concerning Islam, as reflected in the second edition of the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia issued before Stalin's death, repeated the accusations that had been
leveled agamst Islam in the darkest days of Stalin's rule:
Islam, as aU rehgions, has always played a reactionary role. It was
used by exploiting classes as an instrument of spiritual oppression of
the laboring masses, and it was used by foreign colonizers as an
instrument of exploitation of the people of the East. ... After the vic-
tory of the Great October Revolution in Russia, during the period of
foreign intervention and Civil War, Islam was used by the forces of
the counter-revolution within Russia and by foreign imperialists to
fight the Soviet government. ... During the period of construction of
socialism in the USSR, the remaining exploiting classes attempted to
utihze Islam to combat sociaUsm. As agents of these classes, Muslim
clerics led the struggle against Soviet legislation on family and
marriage, resisted the emancipation of women, and defended the
veiling. Acts of terrorism were committed by Muslim clerics, and
the Qur'an and the SharVah were invoked to resist industriahzation
and collectivization. In the USSR today, Islam exists only as a
survival of the ideology of the exploitmg classes. ... Anglo-American
unperialists utilize Islam to combat revolutionary movements and
movements of national liberation in Muslim countries ...58
57 See for example Powell, Antireligious Propaganda, 38.
58 "Islam," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd. ed., 1949.
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Why the detente continued after the war, its raison d'etre, had ended is an
open question. It is easy to suggest that the authorities were continuing to court
popular cooperation in the immense task of rebuilding the nation in the wake of
the war. However, at the same time that there was detente vis a vis reUgions the
Party was actively engaged in the Zhdanovshchina, a militant reaffirmation of
communist ideology and culture. What the crude facts suggest is that Stalin
himself played a critical role in mamtaining the detente. For upon his death the
Party renewed its commitment to atheism and to an active anti-reUgious
offensive.
The Post-Stalin Era
The post-Stalin period included several twists and tums in the Soviet
government's policies toward religion. The detente that had characterized World
War n and Stalin's last years was brought to a halt during the Khrushchev
period, with a marked hardening in anti-religious, including anti-Islamic,
policies. That hardening continued until late in the Khrushchev period, then
eased during the Brezhnev period. Not until the 1980s, accompanying the
invasion of Afghanistan, did the Soviets again harden their anti-Islamic poUcies.
The Khrushchev Period
The Khrushchev period can be viewed as a transitional period for anti-
rehgious policies. Khrushchev's "return to Leninism" put an end to the period of
rehgious detente. The anti-religious activities during the Khrushchev period
were two-pronged. One prong was ideological, the other practical. On the
ideological level, the Conmiunist Party, returning to Leninist purity regarding
the long-term commitment to lay the foundation for the creation of Soviet man,
for the first time began to take steps toward an all-out, multi-faceted, long-term
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educational approach to the creation of an atheistic mentality among the masses.
However, on the practical level, under Khrushchev's personal push, the attacks on
religion returned to the old ways of StaUn.59 While outright executions tended
to be eschewed, administrative and police measures were once again applied on a
large scale to hquidate religion once and for all.
Ideological Approach . It became obvious that the older style atheist
offensive must give way to an approach more in keeping with the changed times
and with a better educated society. This came to light when, startmg in 1954, the
Communist Party issued a series of decrees on atheism.60 Those decrees
emphasized an ideological approach against rehgion. The decrees suggested that
all branches of knowledge should be involved in the process of propagating,
defending, and studying atheism. It was at about this time that scientific atheism
began to differentiate itself as a fully-rounded discipline. Although there had
been serious studies of religion in the pre-war period, in response to the post-war
Party decrees the study of religion m the Soviet Union began in eamest.
Numerous new channels of inquiry developed, opposing Marxism to religion,
including Islam, at every possible level: spiritual, philosophical, moral, scientific,
political, cultural, and artistic. For the first time religion was attacked as a body
of thought.
Consistent with Lenin's over-arching goal, the new ideological approach
continued to be directed toward the creation of a new Soviet identity, a new
Soviet Man. The post-Stalin leadership had good reason to feel optimistic as to
59 Pospielovsky believes that it was Khrushchev's personal commitment to atheism that led to
religious persecutions during his tenure. See Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 2, 121.
60 For the 1954 Party's decrees on atheism see KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 8th, V. 6, 502-20.
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the favorable outcome of their efforts to create an homogeneous Soviet society
and a Soviet man. During Stalin's purges, the old Muslim national elite, carrier
of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas, had been virtually ehminated. The Muslim
community, the ummah, had been divided into nation-states. It was reasonable
for the Soviet authorities to believe that those new nations were not sufficiently
powerful, in a cultural and historical sense, to hinder the development of an
overriding Soviet identity ~ based on a common interest, a conmion culture, and,
at length, a common history.
A principal target for the ideological campaign was the native eUte.
Following Stalin's famous formula "it is cadres who decide everything," Soviet
authorities believed that by coopting the native elite to the Soviet ideology the
masses would follow. The Soviet leadership was in a position to note that a new
Muslim elite, better fitting the profile of Soviet man, was emerging. That new
elite was increasing its representation in official apparatuses, in educational
institutions, in technical and scientific occupations, and in political representation
at both the local and republican levels.61 This new native elite had been brought
up and educated within the Soviet context. Nearly all had been educated in
Russian schools and used Russian as their professional language. The majority
probably was of peasant background, as the working class was virtually
nonexistent in the 1930s and 1940s in Muslim areas (with the exception of Baku).
The ties of the native elite with the masses had not been severed. As intellectuals,
the new elite was less sophisticated, less iconoclastic, and less revolutionary than
i
61 See for example the studies by: Critchlow; Burg; Brill-Olcott, 250 and passim; and M.
Rywkin, "Power and Ethnicity: Party"; and id., "Power and Ethnicity: Regional." Also see
Rywkin, Moscow's, 125-129 dsid passim.
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its predecessors, the national Communists.62 Consequently, it was more uniform
in experience and attitudes, a pre-requisite for a homogeneous society.
The Soviet leadership could reasonably believe that Soviet Muslims were
becoming well integrated politically and economically into the Soviet system, and
that they were developing a stake in that system. The new native elite would
accept the identity that best corresponded to its interests, and those interests lay in
the Soviet system. Only education and time were necessary to eradicate survivals
of obscurantist ideologies such as Islam.
The leadership's plan for achieving homogeneity was formalized in the
Party program in 1961. Its operative slogan was, "Come Together, Merge as
One."63 in the first stage of the plan, sblizhenie, the peoples of the Soviet Union
would draw closer together; in the second stage, sliianiey they would merge as
one — culturally, spiritually, and even biologically. The dialectical overtones of
such a process are clear. But as a practical matter, there was little doubt for the
non-Russian elite as to what sliianie meant. It meant Russification.64
Practical Approach . The new anti-reUgious campaign launched by
Khrushchev in 1959 lasted until his removal from power m 1964.65 That new
drive was as brutal as Stalin's pre-World War n campaigns. All religion
62 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National, 102.
63 XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Moscow, 1961, 362 and 402.
Also see Kaltakhchian, 24 and 43.
64 The goal of sliianie ran into the hostility of non-Russian elites. See for example some
controversies, on the surface simple scientific discussions, that pitted partisans and opponents of
sliianie: Ananchenko; Tsamierian; Isaev; Drozddov; Dzhunusov; Ragochev and Sverdlin; and
"Narod: Reshaiushchaia." Also see Hodnett.
"5 There was a short anti-reUgious campaign in 1954, but the major drive did not occur until
1959. See: Delaney-Grossman; and Lowrie and Fletcher.
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suffered. Once again the anti-religious campaign was aimed primarily at the
Uquidation of the mosques and the clerics: Two-thirds of the mosques still open
at StaUn's death were closed during the Khrushchev period, leaving about four
hundred working mosques for the entire territory of the Soviet Union. The
number of registered clerics was reduced to roughly two thousand.66 Most of
the major holy places were closed. /An intensive anti-Islamic propaganda,
undertaken with the help of all the media, supported the campaign.
Quantitatively, the anti-Islamic propaganda was quite extensive. For example,
nearly a tiiousand anti-Islamic non-periodical pubhcations were issued during diat
campaign in various Muslim languages.67 Qualitatively, despite the emphasis on
ideology, the literature was a retum to incendiary propaganda, barely less vicious
and crude than during the pre-war years. Thus, for example, there was a retum
to the crude language of the class struggle and, in that context, the maligning of
Muslim clerics.
The Brezhnev Period
After Khrushchev's downfall relations between the Soviet government and
Islam moved into a modus vivendi that persisted until the invasion of Afghanistan
in late 1979. The tone of anti-Islamic propaganda was considerably softened and
direct attacks against rehgious institutions were slowed. Attacks against religious
dignitaries and officially registered clerics, judged counter-productive, were
abandoned.68 A few mosques were reopened, and a new Qur'anic school, the
66 Bennigsen and Broxup, 48.
67 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Musulmans Oublies, 188.
68 Attacks on registered clerics had already been declared to be counter-productive in the
Central Committee's decree of 10 November 1954, "Ob Oshibkakh v Provedenii Nauchno-
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madrasah Imam Ismail al-Bukhari, was created in Tashkent in 1971.69 The
Muslim Spiritual Boards were given increased freedom of action.
Accompanying the domestic improvements, Muslim religious dignitaries
and native elite were permitted limited contact with the Muslim world abroad.
These were the first authorized contacts since the late 1920s. The pro-Soviet
demeanor of Soviet Mushms abroad served the foreign poHcy interests of the
USSR in their super-power rivalry in the Middle East. It projected a picture of
the Soviet Union as a great Islamic power, and as a traditional friend of Islam.70
Notwithstanding changes in tone, the Brezhnev period continued the
ideological combat that had been renewed by Khrushchev. In particular, there
was a marked increase in the quantity of anti-Islamic literature. Even so, the
results of the totaUty of Soviet efforts to combat Islam were surprisingly
disappointing, as indicated by Soviet surveys of the level of religiosity taken
during the early 1970s.71 These results, along with other developments, resulted
in a stiffening of anti-Islamic policies in the 1980s.
Ideological Combat . The relatively more liberal treatment of Islam and
other religions during the Brezhnev period was only a change of strategy. The
fundamental anti-religious basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology remained. Indeed,
under Brezhnev's tenure many of the secret instructions aimed at suppressing
Ateisticheskoi Propagandy Sredi Naseleniia." See KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 8th, V. 6, 516-20. But
the decree had not prevented Khrushchev's violent campaign against the clerics.
69 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Mmulmans Oublies, 189.
70 In 1969 the Muslim Spiritual Board in Tashkent began the publication of a review. The
Muslims of the Soviet East. Published only in foreign languages (Arabic, Persian, French, and
English) or in Uzbek but in Arabic script it was targeted for a foreign audience. The review was a
major source of information on the activities of the Soviet Muslim dignitaries in the Muslim world
abroad.
^ 1 For a sample of surveys see chapter IV, foomotes N. 24, 100, and 111.
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religion were made into law and published. Because Soviet-style communism
could not tolerate other competiting religions, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union continued to proclaim that it could not remain indifferent or neutral to
reUgion. Religion was destined to disappear. The difference between the Lenin,
StaUn, or Khrushchev periods and the Brezhnev period was in the tactics used by
the Soviet authorities to bring about that disappearance. From 1964 to 1980, the
authorities seemed to have preferred an ideological combat, through education
and persuasion, rather than administrative pressure or poUce measures.
The Soviet authorities continued to be optimistic as to the favorable out-
come of their fight against all kinds of "obscurantist" ideologies, including Islam.
A rather large field of Islamic studies emerged in the Soviet Union during the
Brezhnev period. The literature on Islam in the 1960s and 1970s developed
numerous new channels of inquiry into the philosophy, history, and culture of
Islam. Using an eclectic approach, there was a marked increase in anti-Islamic
propaganda themes and arguments at aU levels. Conducted within an advanced
didactic-philosophical frame of reference, the propaganda became substantially
more subtle. A concentrated effort was made to involve all branches of
knowledge in the scientific refutation of Islam.
Reality Tests . The results of the 1970 census and of other sociological data
must have seriously shaken whatever illusions the Soviet leadership may have
harbored for the success of the merging of the Soviet people into one
homogeneous society.72 Not only was the demographic shift finally recognized,
but judging by language criteria and the rate of intermarriage between Muslims
72 Much has been written on demographic changes in the Soviet Union and on its Muslim
dimension. See for example: Carrere d'Encausse, Decline, 47-120; Feshbach; and Besemeres.
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and non-Muslims, Soviet Muslims demonstrated almost no inclination to
assimilate with the Russians73 Nor were the national boundaries withering
away. The Soviet leadership had expected that national boundaries would become
less significant as the processes of Sovietization led to increased contacts between
Russians and Muslims. But these expectations were not reahzed. For example,
die 1970 census revealed that less than one percent of Central Asians lived outside
of their national ethnic territories. Apparently, the Central Asians preferred to
live within territories that were largely immune from Russian pressures. At the
Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in 1976, for the first time since
1961, the speeches devoted to the nationahty poUcy saluted the "flowering" and
"friendship" of the nations but omitted the contested goal of sliianiel^
Sociological surveys dealing with rehgion had been conducted in all
Muslim territories during the 1970s. As the results of those surveys were coming
out, it became increasingly clear that the anti-Islamic campaigns were not
particularly successful and that a new phenomenon was brewing. In the late
1970s Soviet sources began to make reference to Islamic revival, not merely to
Islamic survival. Worst of all, the native ehte was showmg renewed interest in
Islam. The surveys made it quite clear that the masses were not becoming more
atheistic, but were remaining deeply attached to Islam and to then- Turkluk. To
73 See for example: Sotsial'noe i Natsional'noe, 279-302; Terent'ev, 472-3; Gadzhieva and
lankova, table 5; Saidbaev, Islam i Obshchestvo, 194; Bromlei; Kalyschev, 72-3 and 75;
"Kul'tumo-Bytovye," 32; A. Volkov, "Etnicheskie," V. 7, 16 and 20; and V. 8, 19; and Borzykh,
1 10-2. The last article gives an idea of how litde the pattern of mixed marriages has changed since
the 1930s.
74 XXV S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Moscow, 1976, 113. For an
analysis of the new terminology replacing or adding to sblizhenie and sliianie, and reflecting more
political realism in the nationality area see: Rywkin, Moscow's, 140-2; and id., "Impact," 94-5.
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the authorities' bafflement, there was a slow but steady re-Islamization of the
intellectual and bureaucratic elite75
In part, the re-Islamization may have been a consequence of the cultural
thaw set into motion by Khrushchev. Muslims and other non-Russians, with
increased access to their respective cultural patrimonies, began searching for
their pre-Marxist roots. In the search for their lost cultural heritage, Muslim
intellectuals encountered the ubiquity of Islam. So prominent was this flurry of
investigation that it has earned a special designation in Soviet literature, mirasism
(from the Arabic word miras meaning heritage).76
In the late 1970s, the Soviet authorities had begun to question the efficacy
of their ideological strategy against Islam. They came to the view that the
strength of Islam was not wholly in its ideology. Instead, its strength was to be
found in its social traditions and in its "confusion" with nationalism.
The Islamic revival in the Soviet Union was an intemal phenomenon, not
strongly influenced by similar trends in the Muslim world. Muslim society in the
Soviet Union possessed the intemal dynamism to produce its own regeneration.
Soviet anti-Islamic campaigns and Soviet social engineering had never destroyed
the Islamic religion nor the Islamic culture, leaving the bedrock for intense
beliefs as solid as ever. Clearly, later on, knowledge of events and ideas from the
Islamic Revolution in Iran and, particularly, from the Soviet engagement in
Afghanistan made their way into the Soviet Union and found resonance among
Soviet Muslims.77 But those ideas only stimulated a movement already in
progress.
75 For an analysis of these trends see Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect."
76 Gosmanov; Rorlich, "Not by History Alone"; and Bennigsen, "The Crisis."
77 Braker, "Implication," 121.
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The Decade of the 1980s
It was not until after 1980, following the invasion of Afghanistan, that the
attitude of the Soviet authorities toward Islam again hardened. The combination
of the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan War appears to have alerted the Soviet
authorities to the dynamic vigor and mobilizing power of Islam combined with
nationaUsm. The unthinkable, that Islam could be more attractive than Marxism-
Leninism, was brought home to the Soviet authorities.
The hardening in official Soviet attitudes toward Islam during the 1980s
was in evidence from top to bottom. Within party congresses of Muslim
repubUcs, First Secretaries spoke at length about Islam in their keynote speeches.
They wamed about illegal religious organizations; they expressed concem about
the rise of pan-Islamism; they told stories about the flirtation of party officials
with Islamic rites and customs; they excoriated anti-religious propagandists for
their failure to understand the political acuteness of the Islamic problem in the
USSR.78 Such official presentations were unusual in the extreme, and were in
marked contrast to the experience and practices of the preceding decades. On 25
November 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev made a personal call on the Central Asian
Communist Party leaders in Tashkent, to urge them to " ... wage a resolute and
uncompromising struggle against reUgious revivals, and to step up mass atheistic
propaganda."79
78 See for example: Bagirov's report to the CP of Azerbaijan Congress, Bakinskii RabochiU 1
February 1986; Kunaev's report to the CP of Kazakhstan Congress, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 1
February 1986; Makhkamov's report to the CP of Tajikistan Congress, Kommunist Tadzhikistana,
25 January 1986; Niiazov's report to the CP of Turkmenistan Congress, Turkmenskaia Iskra, 18
January 1986; and Usmankhodzhaev's report to the CP of Uzbekistan Congress, Pravda Vostoka,
31 January 1986.
79 See the report of the meeting in Pravda Vostoka, 25 November 1986.
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A vigorous anti-Islamic campaign was undertaken in all the Muslim
republics. It consisted of a drastic increase of attacks against Islam in all media,
and of a sharp increase in arrests, trials, and condemnations of believers and
unregistered clerics.^0 Soviet experts, perhaps having determined that Marxism-
Leninism was not winning the ideological competition, moved the struggle
between atheism and Islam into a different arena. The rehgious and social
traditions of Islam became the main targets of the anti-Islamic campaign.
Returning to a practice initiated in the early years following the Revolution, the
aim was the replacement of the traditional religious and semi-religious rites and
customs, viewed as a breeding ground of nationalism, by equivalent new Soviet
rites.
At the same time, the denunciation of "parallel Islam," especially of its
most active element, the Sufi brotherhoods, attained an unprecedented level. The
Sufi orders were attacked as carriers of obnoxious traditions and as the most
radical form of nationalism. The tone of the anti-Islamic hterature also changed.
There was a reduction in scientific discussions, or dialectical explanations. In
addition, the Soviets abandoned their polite efforts to offer the extended hand of
friendship to Muslim believers who were otherwise loyal to the Soviet system.
Instead, the aggressive and brutal tone of official publications was reminiscent of
the Stalin era.
The campaign against Islam gained in intensity and vigor until the late
1980s when it shifted course. After 1988/1989, traditional attacks against Islam
^0 Among many others see reports of arrests and trials of believers, fanatics, and unregistered
mullahs in Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 9 October 1987; Sovet Uzbekistani, 19 May 1987; Sovetlik
Kyrgyzstan, 30 May 1987; and Tadzhikiston-i Soveti, 7 September 1987. Also see the report
delivered at the Eigth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tajik CP in December 1987 by V.V.
Petkel, Chairman of the Tajik SSR KGB, revealing that dozens of trials of unofficial clerics had
been held in 1986-1987, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 30 December 30 1987.
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in the periodical press virtually disappeared. Propaganda extolling the virtues of
internationalism replaced direct anti-Islamic propaganda. Because Islam was
viewed as reinforcing national differences and promoting a sense of ethnic
exclusiveness, it was regarded as antithetical to the development of
intemationalism, a sense of oneness in the Soviet Union. Islam was again seen as
a factor undermining the political viability of the Soviet Union.
Conclusions
Seventy years after the Revolution, the problems posed by Islam to the
Soviet authorities were strangely similar to those faced by the Bolsheviks in the
1920s. Islam had survived as a religion and as a way of life. A widespread
religious revival in the 1980s manifested itself at all levels of the population,
from the popular to the intellectuals. The reUgious identity of Muslims and their
attachment to the ummah have not been destroyed. Rather, they have shown
renewed vitality.
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Chapter IV: Propaganda Issues and Apparatus
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Soviet Union's propaganda
apparatus, the configuration of people and media that carried out the State's
propaganda poUcies. That apparatus changed in response to the changing policies
of the evolving leadership. It is important to reemphasize that the word
propaganda is used here in its formal sense. It refers to an organized effort to
promote a specific body of thought. Hence, interest is not confined to the slogans
or leaflets of hands-on propagandists. Equally within the definition employed are
materials of varying levels of scholarship and sophistication, and alternative
means of communicating those materials.
The central issues at the heart of the propaganda poUcy debate are of
interest in that they hampered the application of a persistent, cohesive propaganda
policy throughout the Soviet era. It is also useful to be acquainted with the
propaganda apparatus. Just as the death of StaUn serves as a major demarcation
for the formulation of anti-religious and anti-Islamic policy, it serves to
distinguish between fundamental changes in propaganda approaches and the
propaganda apparatus. Accordingly, this chapter first examines issues and
practices relating to propaganda approaches and apparatus during the period
following the 1917 Revolution and preceding World War H, then moves to a
consideration of those same topics during the post-Stalin era.
From the Revolution to the Death of Stalin
After the successful revolution there was substantial intellectual ferment
within the Communist Party, both among their leadership and among the Party
ranks, about how to deal with religion. Part of that intellectual ferment dealt
with the design of an appropriate approach to anti-religious propaganda.
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Decisions relating to overall approach had implications for the propaganda
apparatus itself.
Approaches to Propaganda
The Bolsheviks came to the task of rebuilding society without a substitute
set of ethics or ritual that could command allegiance. During the first two
decades of the twentieth century, the Russian intelligentsia had been engaged in a
continuing debate regarding, among other related moral issues, the role of
reUgion in a culturally and economically enlightened society. The Russian
Orthodox missionaries and the Muslim reformers played a part in that debate, as
did the socialists, including the Bolsheviks. An important participant in the
debate was A.V. Lunacharsky. Although a Bolshevik and an atheist, he promoted
the view that Marxism and modem science were insufficient to create " ...
solidary ecstasy, the psychic cement of common love and struggle."! To
overcome this shortcoming it would be necessary to create a new, socialist-
oriented body of dreams, myths, sounds and rituals to accompany Marxism. By
so doing ~ that is, by constructing a new "God system" ~ socialism would come
to possess a dimension comparable to that found in traditional reUgions. Lenin
rejected Lunacharsky's thesis out of hand. He argued uncompromisingly that
"Godbuilding" was dangerously close to traditional rehgion, and would be
counterproductive to the building of sociahsm.2
After the Revolution there contmued to be confusion among the
Communists about how to deal with religion. On the one hand, reminiscent of
earher views about "Godbuildmg," there was an impulse, especially among the
1 Stites, Revolutionary, 102
^ Stites, Revolutionary, 103
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ordinary Party members, to create a communist morality to replace the moral
structure based on religious values. There was an inchoate view among the
Communist membership that bread and politics alone were not enough. For life
to be lived fully, it must be enriched by emotions. Religion must be replaced by
something. In practical terms, these impulses were manifested in more-or-less
spontaneous adaptations leading to the creation of quasi-rehgious Party
ceremonies to serve as surrogates for religious rituals.3 The religious rituals
most missed were those associated with major rites of passage ~ such as birth,
marriage, and death.
On the other hand, on a more formal platform the Marxist intellectuals
were engaged in a debate about how to conduct the anti-religious campaign. That
debate, which took place in the 1922-1926 period, focused on one chief issue.
That issue concemed the nature of the problem itself. Was the anti-religious
attack to be directed against a deeply-seated, firmly-rooted world view that would
only respond over a long period of time to an intelligently organized educational
process? Or, was the attack to be directed against a relatively superficial
phenomenon that could be destroyed quickly and directly?4 The altemative
views regarding the nature of the problem led to different prescriptions for its
resolution.
According to the first view, arguments against reUgion should be drawn
from its mythological roots and should be marshalled in a careful, analytically
respectable manner. ReUgious assertions should be contrasted with science,
progress, technology, and so forth. Anti-rehgious spokesmen should include
people from all walks of life and should not be confmed to party members. It
3 For studies of ritual building in the 1920s see the work of: Stites, Revolutionary, 101-123;
id., "Bolshevik Ritual"; and Veresaev.
4 Delaney, 1 19-20; and Stites, Revolutionary, 106.
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was argued that the propaganda itself should be presented tastefully, without
mockery or insult. Supporters of that view gathered around E. laroslavskii,
editor of the newspaper Bezbozhnik and the journal Bezbozhnik, and founder and
president of the Society of Militant Godless {Soiuz Voinstvuiushchikh
Bezbozhnikov).^
The second view, that reUgion was relatively limited and superficial, led to
a markedly different approach. Proponents of this view held that attacks on
reUgion should not come from the past. Rather, they should emphasize the
religious life of the present. More to the point, rehgious practices should be
fought as an aspect of the class struggle, directed principally against the clerics.
The propaganda should not spare crudity and strong words in order to disabuse
the readers from their beliefs. Necessarily, anti-reUgious spokesmen should
come only from the Communist Party. Advocates of that approach gathered
around M.M. Kostelovskaia, secretary of the Moscow Party Committee and
editor of the joumal Bezbozhnik u Stanka.^
There was yet another approach, the samotek or liquidationist theory, that
was somewhat outside the debate about how to deal with religion, or how anti-
reUgious propaganda should be conducted. According to that approach, nothing
need be done. ReUgion, like the state, would wither away with advances in
hteracy, increases in secularization, and rising standards of living ~ in short, as a
a by-product of the successful socialist revolution.^ Although historians have
5 For the views of laroslavskii and his group see: Krylov, 185-6; Delaney, 118-9; and
Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 1, 51-2. On laroslavskii see: Mints; Sheinman; and Savelev.
Also see laroslavskii, Protiv.
6 For the views of Kostelovskaia and her group see: Krylov, 188-9; Delaney, 1 15-9;
Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 1, 50-1; Savelev, 38-9; and laroslavskii, Protiv, V. 3, 102-21.
7 Delaney, 120; and Stites, Revolutionary, 106.
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identified the Ukrainians as the principal advocates of this view, Muslim
Communists also played a prominent role in advancing the position.8
By the time the major assault against Islam was begun, the debate had been
settled conceming how the attack against rehgion should be conducted. The
Communist Party had accepted the view that the anti-religious battle would be
fought over the long run.9 The chief proponents of this view, E.M. laroslavskii
and his Society of Militant Godless, became the de facto organizers of the anti-
rehgious battle.
Even though the laroslavskii view prevailed, the resulting propaganda did
not confine itself to tastefully presented, carefully documented, argument.
Rather, as a practical matter, anti-rehgious propaganda of both the laroslavskii
and Kostelovskaia variety was widely published. For example, it was not
uncommon to find propaganda focused on priest-baiting and mockery of religious
practices in publications committed to the long-term educational process
{Bezbozhnik). Nor was it unconmion to find propaganda dealing with religious
myths in hard-hitting, superficially oriented pubhcations {Bezbozhnik u Stanka).
In short, each side of the analytical debate used the techniques and approaches of
the other side.
It should also be recognized that, although laroslavskii had received official
Party support, his long-term approach, devoid of coercion and persecution, was
short-lived as a practical matter. Even though the anti-reUgious campaign had
8 M.S. Sultan Galiev, "Melody," 51-2.
9 The commission of the Central Committee concemed with anti-religious propaganda came
out against Bezbozhnik u Stanka m 1923. The commission requested that the Central Committee
merge the journal with the nQ'wspa.p&T Bezbozhnik. The merger of Bezbozhnik u Stanka with
Bezbozhnik did not occur until 1932. See: Delaney, 116; and Shishakov, 324-5, and 328. Also
see the resolution of the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, "O Postanovke Antirehgioznoi
Agitatsii i Propagandy," in KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 1954, 7th ed., 743-5.
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begun as an educational process in the early 1920s, when Stalin unleashed his
"Revolution from Above" the campaign turned to direct force.
Consider, for example, the anti-religious thrust against the Ashura in
Azerbaijan. For ShVah Muslims, the Ashura is the commemoration of the
martyrdom of Imam Husayn, grandson of the Prophet. The day of the Ashura
was commemorated with mouming processions accompanied by self-flagellation.
From the perspective of Bolsheviks, this practice was the height of barbarism,
superstition, and general idiocy. In addition, the practice was most common
among workers and peasants, those for whom the Bolsheviks were creating a new
world. 10 After the fall of Azerbaijan to the Soviets in 1921, the Bolsheviks took
direct action. They forbade the self-flagellation processions. Unfortunately, the
practice persisted, notwithstanding the ban. More than that, there was popular
pressure for Ufting the restriction. In 1923 the ban was removed by a special
decree, and the Bolsheviks turned toward the long-run approach.H
But the long-run educational approach was not without its difficulties. In
1924 and 1925, the Ashura was the object of ridicule in the form of caricatures
and articles in newspapers. These were pubhshed m a brief period just before the
festival was to begin. In addition, 2ca\\-Ashura lectures were presented by Party
members at special meetings. These measures resulted in essentially no
diminution of participation in the festival. In fact, there was no reduction in
participation by Party members. 12 Consequently, in 1926 the dmM-Ashura
10 Khadzhibeili, 22-3. According to Khadzhibeili, the intellectuals, editors of the pre-
Revolutionary journals Ekinci and Molla Nasreddin, had already begun a campaign against the
practice of self-flagellation.
11 On the ban and its lifting see Giduianov, Otdelenie, 64.
12 On the anh-Ashura campaign in 1924-1925 in Azerbaijan see Khadzhibeili, 23 and 27-8.
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campaign was begun 42 days before the festival. 13 The campaign was broadened
to include appeals from the Party, the Soviet of People's Commissars, the
Komsomols, and the Society of Mihtant Godless, urging the population to refuse
to fall prey to the exploiters. Workers from some factories drafted resolutions
renouncing the Ashura and calling on other factories to join their movement.
During the campaign special seminars were organized to help lecturers. Brigades
of youth, Komsomol-vatmbQis, Party atheists were sent to the rural areas to
agitate against the Ashura. Attempts were made to enhst elders, women and even
clerics to come out against the self-flagellation. Fifty-six thousand books and
pamphlets, eight thousand posters and one thousand copies of themes for lectures
were printed and distributed. 14 Films, concerts, and plays were presented and
special issues of satirical journals provided. No longer was the propaganda mere
irony. Rather, it was aggressive and insulting, with a strong class-struggle
flavor. Notwithstanding all these propaganda efforts, the celebration of the
Ashura continued with active participation of Party and Komsomol members.
The campaigns of 1927, 1928, and 1929 against the Ashura began two
months before the festival. 15 The campaigns were stepped up, particularly in the
countryside. After each festival, those who participated in the processions
notwithstanding the recommendations of the Party and the government, were
expelled from the Party, the Komsomol, and the Society of Militant Godless. In
1927, resolutions of the TsIK (Central Executive Committee) and Sovnarkom
13 On the anti-As/iMra campaign of 1926 see Khadzhibeili, 29-31.
14 Bakinskii Rabochii, 30 July 301926, cited by Khadzhibeili, 31.
15 On the anu-Ashura campaigns of 1927, 1928 and 1929 see Khadzhibeili, 32-5. The
stepping up of the anU-Ashura UteraUire in 1926 is confimied by Sattarov and Kocharli, 49 and 51.
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(Soviet of People's Commissars) of Azerbaijan forbade the processions. 16
Finally, organizers of processions in 1929 were arrested, some were executed and
others were sentenced to prison temis ranging from one to six years. 1^ The
executions had the desired effect. The pubhc processions, certainly in urban
areas, came to a halt. The massive newspaper propaganda campaigns effectively
disappeared after 1929. Even so, condemnation of the mouming (minus the
practice of self-flagellation) appeared on an irregular basis. 1^
The discussion relating to the Ashura is but one example of a pattern of
deaUng with unwanted rehgious practices. First, the practice received moderate
condemnation by the propagandists. Later, the educational process was stepped
up. Finally, during the period of the Cultural Revolution the tempo of repression
quickened.
The Propaganda Apparatus
The Soviet anti-religious propaganda apparatus had an institutional
structure, along with the people who gave those institutions hfe. The institutional
structure included organizations devoted to atheism, the print media, the
performing arts, and the visual arts. As a practical matter, this review of
propaganda is limited to the print media. Even so, the themes and arguments are
sufficiently general to apply to the overall propaganda effort.
16 Bakinskii Rabochii, 27 July 27 1927, cited by Khadzhibeili, 33. Sattarov and Kocharli,
50, gave the year 1926 for the ban on the procession.
17 Kommunist (in Azeri), 2 December 1929, cited by Khadzhibeili, 33.
1° See for example: Magerram; Ordubady; A.S. Ibragimov; and Klimovich, "Proiskhozhdenie
Shakhsei-Vakhsei." In 1968 Sattarov and Kocharli, 57, noted that the mouming of the Ashura
remained one of the most observed religious practice in Azerbaijan.
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The Society of Militant Godless (1925-1942) . One of the most important
organizations associated with the anti-religious, including anti-Islamic, effort was
the Society of Militant Godless. In 1922, laroslavski had founded a newspaper
named Bezbozhnik (The Godless), around which there formed a group of
"friends oi Bezbozhnik^ That circle of friends held a congress in April 1925,
out of which grew the Society of Militant Godless. 19
The Society of Militant Godless was controlled by a central council. The
Society had branches in the republics, each of which had a network of cells. The
earUest branch to appear in a Muslim republic was in Azerbaijan in 1926, but
such branches remained substantially inactive until the early 1930s.20 Defying
their by-laws, ignoring orders from the Moscow Council, competing with the
Komsomol and other Party organizations, it was not until the early 1930s that the
republican branches were effective in achieving their underlying anti-rehgious
purposes. Total membership in the societies was estimated at only about 123,000
just before the Cultural Revolution.^! Even such a scant membership may
overstate the societies' importance as an instrument for conducting anti-religious
activities in the 1920s. It is said that members were attracted by the festive
nature of the evening meetings, rather than by the subject-matter at hand.22
However, membership in the Society jumped sharply thereafter.
According to E. laroslavkii in an interview with an American delegation in 1932,
there were 6 million members in the Society, plus no less than 10 million Godless
!" Details concerning the Society of Militant Godless can be found in: Kiylov; and
Kanovalov.
20 Khadzhibeili, 55-6; and Sattorov and Kocharli, 52.
21 Stites, Revolutionary, 106; Curtiss, Russian Church, 206-46; and Fainsod, 430-5.
22 Khadzhibeili, 56.
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kolkhozniks.'^^ Data on membership published by the Society showed
considerable increases between the years 1930 and 1932, the period of the
Cultural Revolution. In Bashkiria, membership was said to have increased by
257 percent, from 12,000 to 43,000 members; in Tatarstan it expanded by 173
percent, from 22,000 to 60,000; in the Crimea membership increased by 181
percent, from just under 15,000 to 42,000; in Uzbekistan membership rose by
1,114 percent, from 13,000 to 160,000; and in Azerbaijan there was a 2,233
percent expansion, from 3,000 to 70,000. During a single year (1931-1932) in
Daghestan, the membership increased by 388 percent, from 10,000 to 49,000
members. Between 1929 and 1932, Kazakhstan membership rose by 583 percent,
from nearly 5,000 to 33,000.24
Militants of the Society were overwhelmingly male, and said to be almost
exclusively under the age of forty (90 percent between 14 and 45 years of age).
Membership in the Society was reported to be almost equally divided between
Party and non-Party people. Members were mostly workers and peasants, but
also petty employees, students, and soldiers. Komsomol members were
prominent in the Society.25
^^ Cited by L.D., 21. The number of 6 million members is also given by Kalinin, 351. In
1938 the number of about 2 million members was given in "V Organizatsiiakh SVB," 56.
24 Kalinin, 346. It is plausible to suggest that the sudden and marked expansion in reported
membership of the Society reflected simple exaggeration. Within an environment dominated by
sloganeering calling for overachievement during the First Five-Year Plan, the Society may have
been seduced into such behavior. According to a 1937 attack on laroslavkii published in Izvestiia
on 10 March membership statistics had been falsified. It was asserted that the Society was in total
disarray. District committees of the Society had been, or were being, liquidated ahnost totally,
even in and around Moscow. In sixteen regions, districts and republics, the organization had
never even existed in fact, although it had been reported. Shortly after, laroslavskii acknowledged
the breaking up of the Society in an article in an article in Pravda on 17 March 1937.
25 Kalinin, 350-1.

100
The anti-religious activities that had been conducted by the Society
consisted of the pubhshing of a weekly newspaper and several journals, as well as
the printing of pamphlets, posters, and monographs.. The Society also conducted
seminars and ran correspondence courses to train anti-religious propagandists; it
initiated study groups in places of work; and it organized debates designed to
highlight the power of atheism.
Membership statistics relating to ethnic background were apparently not
collected. But the term Godless was anathema to a Muslim, even if only a casual
rehgious participant. Hence, it is unUkely that exphcit and open association with
the Society could be tolerated in Muslim communities. Muslim membership, such
as it was, had often been brought about by trickery. For example, MusUms
Komsomol members were enrolled in the Society and given membership cards
written in Russian.26 in any event, whatever the impact of the Society of
Militant Godless, the anti-reUgious movement came to a halt in 1941. With
World War n, the Great Patriotic War, external fears became paramount. Stalin
tumed his attention toward rallying the Soviet people to the defense of the
Motherland. Anti-religious activities were stopped.
The Print Media: The Daily Press . The most important vehicle for attacks
against rehgious practices was the daily press. These attacks were to be found
among the other articles that made up the common fare of ordinary newspapers.
By their very nature, however, the newspaper attacks against religion were
summations. They were arguments by hurried conclusion, rather than by careful
reasoning. The articles did not often contain persuasive explanations of why a
26 Dagestanskaia Pravda, 18 January 1934, cited by Khadzhibeili, 53.
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given religious practice was undesirable. Other parts of the print media
attempted to deal more extensively with tlie religious question.
The Print Media: The Journals . Some publications were solely devoted to
anti-rehgious literature. Those joumals written in Russian that had a life span of
more than a few issues consisted of the following: Ateist (2 numbers in 1922,
1925-1930), a non-Party publication, was issued in Moscow; Bezbozhnik u Stanka
(1923-1931) was issued by the Moscow obkom. Upon their demise, each of these
joumals was taken over by the Society of Militant Godless. Joumals issued in
Moscow and pubUshed by the central committee of the Society of Militant
Godless consisted of Antireligioznik (1926-1941), Bezbozhnik (1925-1941),
Derevenskii Bezbozhnik (1928-1932), and Voinstvuiushchii Ateizm (1931), a
follow-up to Ateist. In addition, the Society issued a newspaper, also called
Bezbozhnik (1922-1934 and 1938-1941).
The repubUcan branches of the Society issued their own publications in
local languages. Hudosizlar, or Godless (1928-1933), was issued in Tashkent and
written in Uzbek. Dahri, meaning Godless, later renamed Allahyz, or Without
God (1928-1935), was issued in Ufa and written in Bashkir. Fan ham din, which
means Science and Religion, later renamed Sugyshchan Allahsyz, or Militant
Without God (1925-1937), was issued in Moscow and written in the Tatar
vemacular of Kazan. Finally, Allahsyz, or Without God (1931-1933), was issued
in Baku and written in Azeri; it replaced Molla Nasreddin (1922-1931).
Of all the specialized anti-reUgious joumals, Bezbozhnik survived the
longest and had the largest press runs. At its height (1932), Bezbozhnik printed
200,000 copies. While such a printing would have been sufficient to satisfy the
needs of other anti-religious propagandists and to enable Party faciUties and
libraries to make copies available, it would have been insufficient for mass
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distribution. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that the anti-religious publications
were not directed toward attractmg a mass readership. Rather, it is probable that
they were directed toward those propagandists who were engaged in direct
contact with the target population. These would include militants of the Godless
Society, Party cadre, Komsomol members, and educators. Such pubUcations
were useful in providing hands-on propagandists with themes and arguments for
their anti-religious work.
The various anti-reUgious publications were aimed at a variety of publics.
Bezbozhnik and the publications of the repubhcan branches of the Society of
Militant Godless were targeted toward the broadest pubUc, including both
workers and peasants. Bezbozhnik u Stanka (The Godless at the Workbench) was
aimed especially at city workers. Derevenskii Bezbozhnik (The Village Godless),
directed toward a rural audience, had been started as a counterpart to Bezbozhnik
u Stanka. The latter had been deemed too harsh for the countryside.
Antireligioznik was a methodological journal for hands-on propagandists. Its
purpose was to help propagandists to carry on their anti-religious work. For
example, it explained how to conduct anti-religious propaganda among women,
or how to organize propaganda in the countryside during the summer.
Antireligioznik contained advice on how to prepare a lecture, and provided
themes and arguments for lectures. It presented information relating to the
progress of anti-religious work in various regions. Periodically it provided
articles dealing with such specialized subjects as holy places or religious holidays.
Bezbozhnik and its republican counterparts, Bezbozhnik u Stanka,
Derevenskii Bezbozhnik, and even Antireligioznik were targeted toward a
popular readership. Ateist and its follow-up, Voinstvuiushchii Ateizm, had more
ambitious aims. Judged by the academic standing of their authors and by the
subject matter of their articles, their aim was to attract an intellectual readership.
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They were the only specialized anti-religious journals to publish articles signed
by professional scholars. For example, in 1930 Ateist presented a discussion
among well-known historians on the rise, history, and nature of Islam.
Of course, most journals did not speciahze in anti-religious propaganda.
As it turned out, however, most journals, whatever their principal aim, had
occasion to contain outright attacks on rehgion. An interesting case in point is
Novyi Vostok, (1922-1930), a journal pubhshed by the All-Union Scientific
Association for Oriental Studies attached to the TsIK SSSR (Central Executive
Committee of the USSR). It began as a scholarly pubhcation whose purpose was
to discuss the literature and the social hfe of peoples of the East, mostly the
Muslim East, both Soviet and foreign. As time passed, this journal began to
include attacks against Islam. Even so, as early as 1930 the journal was
suppressed. According to later reports, that journal had been unable to present
its material within an appropriate ideological context.^V
Other journals that most frequently contained anti-Islamic material
included: Revoliutsionnyi Vostok (1927-1937) issued in Moscow by the
Scientific-Research Association for the Study of National and Colonial Questions;
Revoliutsiia i Gorets (1928-1933) issued in Rostov-na-Donu by the North
Caucasian Territory's (Krai) Committee of the AU-Union CP(b); Revoliutsiia i
Natsional'nosti (1930-1937) issued in Moscow by the Committee for NationaUties
attached to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR; Kommunisticheskaia
Revoliutsiia (1920-1935) issued in Moscow by the Central Committee of the All-
Union CP(b); Kommunisticheskii Vostok (1931-1932) issued in Tashkent by the
Central Asian Economic Consultative Board; a joumal devoted to women,
Kommunistka (1920-1930) issued in Moscow by the Central Committee of the
27 N.A. Smimov, Ocherki, 150.
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All-Union CP(b). The journal Revoliutsiia i Tserkov' (1919-1924) was issued in
Moscow by the Eighth Division of the Commissariat of Justice, and was
concerned mostly with questions relating to the separation of church and state. In
the five years of its existence it pubUshed only five articles relating to Islam. It
ceased publication before the anti-Islamic propaganda got under way. Similarly,
Zhizn' Natsional'nostei (1919-1924), issued in Moscow by the Narkomnats
(People's Commissariat for Nationalities) and edited by Sultan Galiev, published a
number of articles on questions related to Islam. The articles of Zhizn'
Natsional'nostei, which was terminated before the anti-Islamic propaganda
campaign was fuUy underway, were a fairly objective contribution to the overall
propaganda effort.
Most of the anti-religious journals, along with others dealing with the
Muslim East, were terminated in the early 1930s. By that time, Stalin's Cultural
Revolution had come to an end. In addition, earlier social and intellectual
experiments, unleased as a consequence of the successful 1917 Revolution and
spurred during the Cultural Revolution, had either played themselves out or had
been explicitly rejected by the Party. The Soviets began groping for a more
stable society, including a relaxation of reUgious suppression. Excesses of the
Cultural Revolution such as the forcible closing of mosques or violence against
clerics were condemned.28 Even so, anti-religious propaganda and campaigns
did not stop completely. They continued in desultory fashion until the period of
the Great Purges. After the mid- 1930s, anti-religious campaigns were stepped
up, and the tempo of anti-reUgious propaganda quickened sharply.
28 Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 1, 47-8 and 64; and Khadzhibeili, 63-5 and 82-3.

105
The Writers . Roughly speaking, there were three groups of writers. One
group, emerging in the late 1920s and early 1930s, consisted of the first wave of
intellectuals who were products of the Marxist Revolution. Chiefly historians,
ethnographers, and perhaps well-educated journalists, this group of intellectuals
was substantially untouched by a bourgeois past. Prominent among the group
were M.A. Reisner, L. KUmovich, M. Tomara, S. Asfendiarov, E. Behaev, and
N. Smimov, well-regarded historians, along with S. Tolstov, B. Puretskii, and
I.N. Vinnikov, important ethnographers.29 These men brought their newly-
acquired Marxist education into the anti-reUgious arena. The writings of this
group were anti-religious, usually atheistic. Their writings were carefully
crafted within Marxist phraseology and their ideas were the outgrowth of Marxist
doctrine. Considered as a whole, their literary contributions constitute a
concerted effort to set forth a single point of view. Even so, the writers probably
did not regard themselves as propagandists. With rare exception, they did not
publish in the explicit propaganda vehicles of their times (in stark contrast to
practices during the post-Stalin era).
A second group of writers were those who published in popular anti-
rehgious pubUcations and who probably viewed themselves as propagandists.
Although their writings were signed, their credentials were not generally given.
Judging from the names of the anti-Islamic propagandists associated with
Bezbozhnik, the writers were mostly Russians, some were clearly Jewish, others
were Armenians, and a few were Muslims. It is not possible to know how many
of the names were pseudonyms. It is clear that some of the Muslim-like names
29 Some among these young Marxist intellectuals had long and successful careers.
KUmovich, Beliaev, Smimov, and Tolstov became members of the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR and remained prominent in the field of Islamic studies in the post-Stdin era. Klimovich's
last work Kniga o Korane was published in Moscow in 1986. But many others simply vanished
in the 1930s or, at least, their names disappeared from the Ust of publications. Some, such as S.
Asfendiarov for example, are known to have perished in the Great Purges. See Tillett, 33-4.
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were pseudonyms. Directed toward an uneducated readership, the writings of
these propagandists were crude anti-rehgious attacks, often consisting of gross
mockeries and derision. Notwithstanding the differences in arguments and
approach, the propaganda themes of this group of writers were substantially
identical to those of the first group.
There was a third group of writers whose work in one way or another
related to Islam. Those were the orientaUsts of international standing, members
of the Academy of Sciences, whose working Ufe generally spanned both the
Tsarist and Soviet periods. The academic perspective of these scholars had been
influenced by the brilliant school of Orientalism of tsarist Russia. Those scholars
never abased themselves to write for anti-Islamic propaganda organs. Their
work was not set forth within a Marxist framework, and they ignored much of
the Marxist writings dealing with their subject matter. In his history of Russian
Arabic studies, I.Iu. Krachkovskii, a leading Russian Arabist, dismissed in one
sentence the Marxian discussion and analysis of the rise of Islam. As mentioned
above, that Marxian analysis had dominated the pages of Ateist in the early
1930s.30 With one exception, Krachkovskii ignored the large body of work of
historians who took part in the Ateist debate. Aside from its general Western
academic orientation, the thinking of the Orientalists in this third group was not
confined to any single, unyielding intellectual framework. For that reason, they
were criticized by Marxists on ideological (not academic) grounds.31 During the
post-Stalin era, however, academicians were drawn into the propaganda
business.32
30 Krachkovskii, 225.
31 N.A. Smimov, Ocherki, 235-6.
32 The work unrelated to propaganda of Bartol'd, Krachkovskii, Gordlevskii, Krymskii,
Semenov, and others is not included in this dissertation.
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The Post-Stalin Era
During the Stalin era anti-religious campaigns had concentrated on ripping
away the pre-revolutionary social and cultural fabric. Religious institutions had
been destroyed or closed, the clerics had been mostly eliminated, the observance
of rehgious holidays had been discouraged, and anti-social rehgious practices had
been condemned. Therefore, the anti-rehgious propaganda that accompanied
those campaigns had concentrated on attacking the religious institutions, the
clerics, and the popular forms of reUgion. Even though the views of laroslavskii
had been officially adopted in the early 1920s, the anti-religious practices m the
pre-World War n period had concentrated on direct, practical attacks, rather
than on education.
The religious detente during World War n continued until Stalin's death,
despite perfunctory calls for a resumption of anti-religious activities. This is not
to say that there had been a complete absence of anti-religious propaganda.
There was, in particular in the daily press. But the volume and intensity of
atheist propaganda had diminished substantially.33 The detente was accompanied
by a widespread resurgence of reUgion. Nowhere was this more true than within
Islam. In the eyes of the post-Stalin leadership, the easy resumption of religious
practices within the daily lives of the masses constituted evidence that the roots of
the problem had not been destroyed. The Party concluded that the failure of the
pre-War anti-rehgious campaigns resulted from their neglect of the Lenin-
laroslavskii prescriptions for a long-term educational process.34
33 Powell, Antireligious Propaganda, 38-9; and Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 1, 72.
34 Lane, 236-42; and Thrower, 139-40.

108
The post-Stalin era witnessed an approach to propaganda organized around
education and scientific atheism. Thus, the apparatus of propaganda embraced
the school system from top to bottom as well as all the usual propaganda media.
Approaches to Propaganda
The continuing influence of reUgion was of substantial concern to the
Party. With the successful conclusion to the Great Patriotic War and with
Commimism on the march throughout the world, the Soviet Union regarded itself
as the model to the world for its Marxist future. But, as suggested, there
remained a substantial discrepancy between the Soviet Union's intemal practices
regarding religion and what theory would have predicted. The time had come
for the Soviets to deal with that portion of the population at home who continued
to be held in the grip of religious superstition. As Khrushchev observed.
The battle with the survivals of capitaUsm in the consciousness of the
people ... is a prolonged and not a simple matter. Survivals of the past are
a dreadful power, which, like a nightmare ... are rooted in the modes of
life and in the consciousness ... long after the economic conditions which
gave them birth have vanished. ... A well thought-out and well-
proportioned system of scientific atheist propaganda is necessary, which
will embrace all strata and groups of society ... . The interests of building
Communism require that such questions of communist education stand at
the center of the attention and activity of each Party organization, of all
communities.35
During Khrushchev's tenure the Communist Party issued a number of
decrees, directives, official and semi-official texts that made clear how it wanted
the atheistic education of the masses to proceed.36 Propaganda was to be
35 Pravda, 18 October 1962, reporting Khrushchev's speech at the XXn Party Congress
(1961), cited by Thrower, 142-3.
36 For an analysis of the decrees, and other texts issued by the CP see: Pospielovsky, Soviet
Atheism, V. 1, 72-82; and Thrower, 140-8.
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increased at all levels. The Ministry of Education was to include atheistic
education in the school and university curriculum. Trade Unions, Party and
youth organizations were to assume responsibiUty for the atheistic education of
their members. The pubhshing houses were to issue selections from the Marxist
classics on reUgion and atheism, and translations of the best works on atheism by
foreign scholars. Joumals and newspapers were to pubhsh popular materials on
atheism. Other media were to cooperate in the anti-religious work.^V
Scientific atheism underwent an extensive development beginning with the
Khrushchev period. Scientific atheism was proclaimed to be an integral
component of the Marxist-Leninist world view, and was articulated
accordingly.38 Scientific atheism was to be based on rational scientific
knowledge. The Party expected cooperation from all segments of its
inteUigentsia, including historians, philosophers, ethnographers, sociologists,
artists, and other scientists. Thus, for example, philosophers were to provide the
philosophical refutation of reUgion. Historians and ethnographers were to
undertake basic work on the varieties of reUgion and religious experience.
Sociologists were to investigate the causes of persistence of rehgion.
Psychologists were to analyze the mentahty of Soviet believers. It was necessary
for the duplicity, one-sidedness and contradictory character of religion to be
exposed by scientists, epistemologists and logicians. The "modemization" of
rehgions and their claim to be able to co-exist with modem sciences and socialism
were to be disavowed by careful study of their dogma. The emotional aspects of
religion were to be examined. Experts in ethics were to elaborate a Marxist-
37 See the Central Committee's decree of 7 July 1954, "O Krupnykh Nedostatkakh v
Nauchno-Ateisticheskoi Propagande i Merakh Eia Ulucheniia," KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 8 th, V. 6,
502-16.
^° Thrower, 135. On Soviet scientific atheism also see: Bochenski, "Three Components";
Wetter, Blakeley; Andreev; De George; Acton; and Bociurkiw and Strong, "Soviet Research."
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Leninist system of values that was superior to that of any religion. Similarly,
lawyers, pedagogues, artists and others engaged in related disciplines were
expected to add their contribution to the study of religion and atheism. At length,
scientific atheism was to consist of a
... system of views which submits religion to a critical analysis ... and
which reveals the philosophical, natural scientific and historical
implausibiUty of religion from a materialistic point of view. The
philosophical criticism of rehgion reveals the origin and nature of religious
illusions, their social and epistemological roots; scientific criticism
confirms the implausibihty of the rehgious picture of the world and
historical criticism reveals the origin and evolution of religion, shows its
reactionary role in the historical process, its transitory character, and the
certainty of its dying out. A scientific criticism of religion is possible only
on the basis of materiahstic analysis of its nature, its social base, and its
social role.39
The Communist Party wanted those engaged in propagating atheism to
present it attractively and with all its "potential richness." Popular propaganda
was expected to be more refined than in the past so as to be more in tune with the
sensitivity of beUevers. Popular anti-reUgious propaganda targeted toward
believers was to focus on religious ideology, to criticize it, and to contrast it with
scientific atheism. Although the Party was against religion, it claimed that it
could not countenance personal attacks on, and administrative discrimination
against, believers who, on the whole, were loyal Soviet citizens.^O
It is of interest to observe that, at least under Khrushchev, these poUcies of
moderation were so disregarded in practice as to cast doubt on their underlying
authenticity. As a case in point, virtually simultaneously with an announcement
of Party injunctions against personal attacks on beUevers, those injunctions were
39 Istoriia i Teoriia, 5-6, cited by Thrower, 149.
40 See the Central Committee's decree of 10 November 1954, "Ob Oshibkakh," KPSS v
Rezoliutsiiakh, 8th ed., V. 6, 516-20.
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nullified in practice by the renewed anti-religious campaign. In the realm of
propaganda there was a retum to attacks. The themes and arguments of the
propaganda, directed against clerics and believers, consisted largely of poking fun
and mockery. They were similar to those used in the 1920s and 1930s.41
The Propaganda Apparatus
In the post-Stalm era, coordination of the anti-religious struggle was
moved to a very high level within the State's educational system. There was also
a burgeoning of the organizational structure within which scientific atheism and
popular propaganda were pursued.
Scientific Atheism in Higher Education . In response to the Communist
Party's decrees, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences in 1959 created a
council for coordinating work on atheism and rehgion within the Divisions of
Economic, Philosophic, and Legal Sciences of the Academy. A faculty on
atheism was established in the Academy's Institute of Philosophy, and special
groups for the study of the history of rehgious criticism were set up in the
Academy's Institutes of History, and Ethnography, and in the Institute for the
Study of the Peoples of the East. Chairs in the History and Theory of Atheism
were estabhshed in many of the country's universities and in other institutes of
higher education. Courses on Scientific Atheism were introduced in the
curriculum of higher education and soon became compulsory.42
41 See for example the series of anti-clerical and anti-believer articles published in Nauka i
Religiia in the first year of its existence: I. Vagabov; "Po Shariatu"; "Tak Gasla Moia Vera"; Talot-
bek; Mamakaev, "Chert "; Novoselova; and Avksent'ev, Leonov, and Shamanov.
^^ Although originally voluntary, courses on scientific atheism in universities became
compulsory in 1964 due to the paucity of student response. See: Thrower, 144; Powell,
Antireligious Propaganda, 56; and "O Meropriiatiiakh, 23.
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Coordination of the anti-religious effort was centralized in 1964 when,
under its direct supervision, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
approved the creation of an Institute of Scientific Atheism within the existing
Academy of Social Sciences. The management of the new institute was
sufficiently broad to encompass elements from those engaged in research on
scientific atheism, administrators responsible for important segments of the
Soviet educational system, as well as those actively engaged in the anti-reUgious
propaganda effort. The management of the Institute was made up of
representatives from the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Higher and Special
Education, the Ideological Commission and other Party organizations, and the
Znanie Society 43
The task of the new Institute of Scientific Atheism was to oversee and to
coordinate all work in the field of scientific atheism carried on in the various
institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the institutes of the Ministry of Higher and
Special Education, and to supervise the Ministries of Culture. Coordination was
carried out across disciplines and, within disciplines, across the various republics.
The Institute of Scientific Atheism was divided into two sections, a research
section and a managerial section. The purpose of the research section was to
study the theory of scientific atheism and to investigate modem rehgious
ideologies. The managerial section was to organize education and upbringing in
atheism.44
The Znanie Society . The AU-Union Society for the Dissemination of
Pohtical and Scientific knowledge, or Znanie (or Knowledge) Society, was
43 "Aktivno Vesti Ateisticheskoe Vospitanie," Pravda, 2 March 1964; and "V Institute
Nauchnogo Ateizma," Izvestia, 19 February 1964.
^ Lopatkin.
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formed in 1947 as heir and successor to the defunct Society of Militant Godless.
After Stalin's death it became the main organizing body for anti-reUgious
propaganda. The All-Union Society had branches in each of the republics. The
governing unit of the society at the level of the republic controlled the activities
of its regional, district, city, village and large factory branches.
The activities of the Znanie Society were multifaceted.45 it managed an
important publishing activity in Moscow and in capitals of the republics; it
maintained a huge staff of paid and voluntary lecturers, both full- and part-time;
it organized congresses, seminars, and round-table discussions for active
propagandists; finally, it supervised innumerable anti-religious museums,
exhibitions, fikns, plays, radio broadcasts, and other means of popularizing
atheism. The Society cooperated hand-in-glove with Party organizations also
concerned with the training of agit-prop activists.
The Communist Party . The Communist Party sponsored speciaUzed
schools to train propagandists. There were Universities of Marxism-Leninism
(Universitety Marksisma-Leninizma) at the republican level of the Party. At the
regional levels of the Party, there were Universities of Scientific Atheism
(Universitety Nauchnogo Ateizma) providing a two-year course for the training
of anti-religious lecturers; at that same level of the Party, and for the same
general purpose, there were Schools for Anti-Rehgious Lecturers, which
provided courses of study ranging from one to two years. At the district level,
the Party sponsored an adult education program in the form of People's
Universities (Narodnye Universitety); at these universities, atheism was a major
topic in their two- or three-year curriculum. Also at the district level, the Party
^^ On the activities of the society see Fishevskii.
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ran Methodological Universities {Metodologicheskie Universitety) that analyzed
results of the anti-religious propaganda and conducted conferences explaining
useful procedures and methods for conducting anti-religious work 46 Besides
those relatively important educational institutions, the Party ran various schools,
courses, and seminars. These included Schools of Elementary Knowledge of
Marxism-Leninism, designed for semi-literate adults; Schools of Elementary
Knowledge of Nature, Society, and Man, intended mostly for house-wives; and
anti-religious seminars targeted for certain professions, mostly teachers and
doctors.47
The Print Media . As during the Stalin era, nearly all elements of the print
media were involved in presenting material relating to the anti-reUgious
propaganda effort. Both daily and weekly newspapers continued to carry
periodic pieces dealing with religion. The post-Stalin era is distinctive in that,
increasingly, anti-rehgious articles found their way into joumals unrelated to
religious issues. Thus, for example, it became increasingly common to find anti-
reUgious articles in joumals directed toward such speciaUzed subjects as Soviet
medicine, sports, or industry.48
46 Sources are not explicit about the Universities of Scientific Atheism, the People's
Universities, or the Methodological Universities. In spite of their titles, they seem to be simply
permanent seminars for the training of local speciahsts of agitation and propaganda.
47 There is no comprehensive monograph explaining the organization and mechanisms of anti-
religious propaganda. Information conceming the institutions involved, the cadre, and the training
of cadre is scattered in numerous publications. The task of finding relevent information is
comphcated by the fact that similar institutions had different names in different republics and
appeared at different times. Information conceming the training of propagandists in the Party's
educational system may be found in: Bokov, 82-93; Narodnoe Obrazovaniie, 351-2; Leshan; A.K.
Aliev, 25-7; R.P. Platonov, 180-3; Kalaganov, 48-51; Bobosadykova, 195-6; Amangel'dyeva,
206-7; and Shoev, 211-2.
48 See for example: Baltanova; V. Stavitskii and V. Khrustalev, "Ili Ustav KPSS Ili Koran:
Dvoedushie," Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia, May 1987, N. 5; or V. Khrushtalev, "Dvoedushie:
Pora Skazat' Pravdu," Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia, February 1988, N. 34.
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Several new specialized journals dealing with religion began publication
after the war. The Listitute of History of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow
initiated Voprosy Istorii Religii i Ateizma in 1950. However, there was a four-
year hiatus between the first and second issues of what turned out to be an annual
pubUcation through 1964. In 1957 the Museum of the History of Religion and
Atheism in Leningrad began publication of Ezhegodnik Muzeia Istorii Religii i
Ateizma, an annual publication that also continued through 1964. Both
pubUcations were folded into and superseded by Voprosy Nauchnoga Ateizma in
1966, published on an irregular basis, chiefly biannually, by the Institute of
Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences of the USSR.
The Znanie Society also began two new anti-reUgious releases. In
September 1959 the Society initiated a popular anti-religious joumal, Nauka i
Religiia. The joumal, published monthly, was designed to propagate scientific
atheism. Substantive articles in this joumal were written by professional
historians, scientists, ethnographers, and philosophers. A semi-popular
periodical, Nauchnyi Ateizm, was begun by the Society in 1964. Each monthly
issue dealt with a single topic on reUgion. For example, an issue might consist of
a single signed article dealing with a topic such as the origin, history and current
status of Islam. These articles, targeted for a popular audience and for the use of
propagandists, were written for the periodical by well-known scholars,
academicians, and university professors.
Anti-Islamic propaganda was most frequently found in the Party journals
of the MusUm republics. Within the Muslim repubhcs, tiie Party produced a
abundance of joumals, generally pubhshed on a monthly basis, designed
specifically for agitation and propaganda. Among such joumals were Bloknot
Ateista, and/or Propagandist. Agit-prop joumals such as these were to be found
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in each of the republics, apparently customized for each republic, and written
both in Russian and in the language of the republic.
In the non-periodical media, especially among manuscripts and books,
there was a sharp acceleration in anti-Islamic titles beginning with Khrushchev's
renewal of the anti-religious campaigns. There was a major effort to pubUsh
anti-Islamic literature in Mushm republics written in the language of the
republics.
The Writers . By the time the anti-rehgious campaigns resumed, there had
been a marked change in the composition of the Soviet intelligentsia. By then, the
bulk of the Soviet inteUigentsia had been educated within the Soviet system.
Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s it had been possible to identify groups of writers
who stood outside the anti-religious process, or whose training was essentially
westem, this was no longer the case. A scholar whose subject matter brushed
against religion no longer faced options regarding how that subject would be
treated. Soviet religious studies emerging after Stalin's death did not develop in
an environment characterized by critical challenge.49 in this vein, the
development of Islamic studies did not include a meaningful dialogue with Islam.
Because of the lack of access to westem scholarship, there was an absence of
serious criticism of Marxism-Leninism and no real intellectual opposition by non-
Marxist philosophers.
There was an increase in the number of MusUms involved in publishing
anti-Islamic monographs, books, and pamphlets. In part, this increase may
reflect a growth in the number of Muslims who had moved through the Soviet
educational process and who had come to occupy positions of importance in
49 Thrower, 118 and 136-7.
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academic fields. Also, it is plausible to believe that the expansion resulted from
an intensified Soviet effort to involve the nationahty groups in anti-religious
efforts in their republics, especially at the level of popular propaganda.
Conclusions
The early years of the Soviet period provided the occasion for an
important debate. That debate served to define the nature of the religious
problem and to cast the die for the supporting propaganda effort. As it turned
out, however, the decisions made during these early years were not converted
into action programs until after World War n and Stalin's death. Instead, anti-
religious activities consisted chiefly of direct efforts to Uquidate the rehgious
institutions, including the Islamic religious institutions.
The post-Stalin era witnessed the flowering of the Soviet anti-religious
effort, as the decisions taken during the early years of the revolution were finally
implemented. The Party apparatus moved to the vanguard of the anti-religious
struggle; scientific atheism became a fuUy-rounded academic discipline; the
Soviet educational system cooperated fuUy in the anti-religious effort; and all
media were enlisted into the campaign.
The next two chapters present analyses of the themes and arguments of
anti-Islamic propaganda during the NEP and Stalin era and the post-Stalin era.
As it turns out, these themes and arguments shifted in response to changes in
historical conditions, the evolution of Marxist thought, and advances in
educational attainments of the target audiences.
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Chapter V: Anti-Islamic Propaganda in the Stalin Era
The early 1920s found the Soviet leadership focused on the practical
problems of organizing a new state, a state based on an untried social and
economic ideology. It is not surprising that the anti-religious aspects of that
newly emerging state were directed toward practical matters, and that the range
of concems was limited to issues closely related to the establishment of Bolshevik
power and authority.
We have seen that the Bolsheviks began their period of governance without
a well-conceived set of popular thought ~ principles, notions of socialist
morality, myths, socialist rites, and the like ~ that could be substituted for
traditional reUgion. Nor did they begin governance with a blue-print for their
attack against the detritus of bourgeois society generally, or with a plan for their
attack against traditional religion specifically. Withm this milieu of disorder, it is
obvious that the Bolsheviks would have not yet have articulated a strategy for
dealing with Islam.
What is clear is that any plan, if and as it emerged, would begin within the
context of Marxism itself. Accordingly, it is of interest to review the intellectual
legacy of Marx and Engels on the subject of Islam. While Lenin wrote on the
subject of religion in general, he did not write about Islam. Following an
analysis of the remarks of Marx and Engels, the chapter turns to its chief
purpose, an analysis of the main themes used by the Bolshevik anti-Islamic
propagandists. For the most part, the themes are those that were used more-or-
less directly by the hands-on propagandists themselves, and were targeted toward
a Muslim audience. These themes relate to Islam vs. science and progress, attacks
against the Islamic reUgious establishment, and attacks against Islam in daily life.
Another type of propaganda had its origin within the ranks of scholars and
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academics, chiefly historians. Such scholarly propaganda ~ in the sense that it
resulted from an effort to present a consistent Marxist doctrine about which none
would be free to disagree - was a prerequisite to simplified presentations to the
Muslim masses. At this level, there developed an extensive Uterature relating to
the materialist origin of Islam, the existence of the Prophet, along with questions
relating to the Qur'an.
Marx and Engels on Islam
The collected writings of Marx and Engels on Islam are quite brief.
Moreover, if we confine our attention to those writings identified by the citations
of Soviet anti-reUgious speciahsts, we are reduced to a scant and disjointed set of
comments.
Two brief remarks on Islam were made by Karl Marx in dispatches to the
New York Daily Tribune conceming the Crimean War. In a dispatch entitled
"The War Question, Financial Matters, Strikes" dated October 1853 on the eve of
the war, Marx wrote:
On Friday last. The Morning Chronicle, in its fourth edition,
conmiunicated a telegraphic dispatch, according to which the Sultan had
declared war against Russia. ... The hosts of the two religions which have
long struggled for supremacy in the East, the Russo-Greek and the
Mohammedan are now fronting each other, the one summoned by the
arbitrary will of a single man — the other by the fatal force of
circumstances, according to their mutual creeds, as the Russo-Greek
Church rejects the dogma of predestination, while the Mohammedanism
centers upon fataUsm.l
In an article entitled "Declaration of War: On the History of tiie Eastern
Question" dated April 1854, Marx analyzed the origin of the question of a
1 London, 7 October 1853, printed in New York Daily Tribune, Nr. 3904, 21 October 1853,
reprinted in Marx and Engels, Pt. 12, 444.
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protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Muslim State ~ ostensibly
a question that lay at the bottom of the Crimean War. Marx began his analysis by
pointing out that:
The Koran and the Mussulman legislation emanating from it reduce
the geography and ethnography of the various people to the simple and
convenient distinction of two nations and of two countries; those of the
Faithful and of the Infidels. The Infidel is "harby," i.e. the enemy.
Islamism proscribes the nation of the Infidels, constituting a state of
permanent hostility between the Mussulman and the unbeUever. In that
sense the corsair-ships of the Berber States were the holy fleet of the
Islam.2
Rather disjointed comments on the emergence of Islam were made by Marx
and Engels in correspondence in the spring of 1853. In a first letter, Engels
commented:
(T)hat fake religion ... seems to follow from the ancient inscriptions
in the South, in which the old national-Arabian tradition of monotheism
still predominates ... and of which tradition the Hebrew constitutes only a
small part, that Mohammed's religious revolution, like every rehgious
movement, was formally a reaction, an alleged return to old, the simple.^
In his response to Engels, Marx added the following point:
With regard to the Hebrews and the Arabians your letter interested
me very much. By the way ... in Mohammed's time the trade route from
Europe to Asia had been considerably modified and the cities of Arabia,
which had taken a great part in the trade with India, etc., were in a state of
commercial decay; this in any case also lent impetus.^
In Engels' follow up letter, he agreed with Marx's views of:
2 London, 28 March 1854, printed in New York Daily Tribune, Nr. 4054, 15 April 1854,
reprinted in Marx and Engels, Pt. 13, 151-2.
3 Manchester, 24 May 1853, Karl Marx, 120.
4 London, 2 June 1853, Karl Marx, 121.
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... the destruction of the South-Arabian trade before Mohammed,
which you very rightly regard as one of the chief factors in the
Mohammedan revolution. ... I shall take up the history of Mohammed
himself in the next few days; so far, however, it seems to me to bear the
character of a Bedouin reaction against the settled but degenerating
fellaheen of the towns, who at that time had also become very decadent in
their religion, mingling a corrupt nature-cult with corrupt Judaism and
Christianity.5
In later works, Engels made two additional statements conceming Islam.
In his article "Bruno Bauer and early Christianity," written in 1882, Engels set
forth reasons why Islam was self-limiting and could not expand beyond the
Orient.
In all previous religions rituals had been the main thing. Only by
taking part in the sacrifices and processions, and in the Orient by observing
the most detailed diet and cleanliness precepts, could one show to what
rehgion one belonged. While Rome and Greece were tolerant m the last
respect, there was in the Orient a rage for religious prohibitions. ... People
of two different reUgions (Egyptians, Persians, Jews, Chaldeans) could not
eat or drink together, perform any everyday act together, or hardly speak
to each other. ... Christianity knew no distinctive ceremonies, not even the
sacrifices and processions of the classic world. By thus rejecting all
national rehgions and their common ceremonies and addressing itself to aU
peoples without distinction it became the first possible world reUgion. ...
Islam itself, on the other hand, by preserving its specifically Oriental
ritual, hmited the area of its propagation to the Orient and North Africa,
conquered and populated anew by Arab Bedouins; here it could become the
dominating religion, but not in the West.6
In his work "On the History of Early Christianity," written in 1894, Engels
compared the role of the religious mass movements of the Middle Ages with the
I
5 Manchester, 8 June 1853, Karl Marx, 125-6.
I 6 April 1882, printed in Der Sozialdemokrat, No. 19 and 20, 4 and 1 1 May 1882, reprinted
ii in Karl Marx, 203.
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role of the modem working-class movement. In this context he introduced a
footnote concerning religious movements in the Islamic world.
Islam is a rehgion adapted to Orientals, especially Arabs, i.e., on the
one hand to townsmen engaged in trade and industry, on the other to
nomadic Bedouins. Therein Ues, however, the embryo of a periodically
recurring collision. The townspeople grow rich, luxurious and lax in the
observation of the "law." The bedouins, poor and hence of strict morals,
contemplate with envy and covetousness these riches and pleasures. Then
they unite under a prophet, a Mahdi, to chastise the apostates and restore
the observation of the ritual and the true faith and to appropriate in
recompense the treasures of the renegades. In a hundred years they are
naturally in the same position as the renegades were: a new purge of the
faith is required, a new Mahdi arises and the game starts again from the
begirming. That is what happened from the conquest campaigns of the
African Almoravids and Almohads in Spain to the last Mahdi of Khartoum
who so successfully thwarted the EngUsh. It happened m the same way or
similarly with the risings in Persia and other Mohammedan countries. All
these movements are clothed in rehgion but they have their sources in
economic causes; and yet, even when they are victorious, they aUow the old
economic conditions to persist untouched. So the old situation remains
unchanged and the collision recurs periodically. In the popular risings of
the Christian West, on the contrary, the religious disguise is only a flag and
a mask for attacks on an economic order which is becoming antiquated.
This is finally overthrown, a new one arises and the world progresses.^
It is of interest to understand how, over the years, Soviet anti-Islamic
speciaUsts were able to construct a body of anti-religious comment that, in one
way or another, can be tied to the six remarks described above. We have seen the
disparate origin of the comments themselves. But, each stated in a specific
context, fit into a body of anti-Islamic thought.
Marx's statement that the Islamic creed centers upon fatahsm has been
quoted in the context of attacks upon Islamic morality. The argument runs as
follows: Marx pomted out that the central element of the Islamic faith is the beUef
in predestination, everything that happened on earth is God's wiU. According to
Printed in Die Neue Zeit, vol. 1, 1894-95, 4-13 and 36-43, reprinted in Karl Marx, 317.

123
Marx's interpretation, this belief annihilates in man any spirit of initiative and
teaches him submission, in particular submission to oppression. Furthermore, the
sense of fataUsm distracts man from his true duty, the class struggle.^
Marx's comment was never quoted in its totality or context. In fact, it was
often mis-quoted, with Marx cited as having said that the Islamic creed centers
upon "fanaticism," rather than fatahsm. When given in that way, the quotation
was generally brought up in support of arguments denouncing the anti-social
character of Islam and its anti-Communist character. In particular, the mis-
quotation was almost invariably given in works deaUng with Suflsm.^
The most frequent reference to Marx in Soviet work on Islam was Marx's
comment concerning the Qur'anic division of the world into two nations. Soviet
speciahsts used this comment in arguing the anti-social and anti-Communist
character of the Islamic faith. By prescribing a state of permanent hostihty
between Muslims and non-Muslims, the Qur'an and the Islamic law were viewed
as major obstacles to friendship among people. Therefore, they were obstacles to
the drawing together (sblizhenie) of the various nations of the Soviet Union. Less
frequently, this comment of Marx was cited by Soviet speciahsts who denounced
Islamic morality. They argued that the Qur'an and the SharVah recognize
inequality among people and, therefore, sanction injustice. 10
Marx and Engels' correspondence was cited m a number of contexts.
Engels' comment that Muhammad's rehgious revolution was formally a reaction
was referred to by virtually every propagandist seeking to explain the reactionary
^ See for example: Klimovich, Koran, 37; Mavliutov, 53; Izimbetov, 67; and N.M.
Vagabov, 8.
9 See for example Mullaev,31.
^^ See for example: Mullaev, 8-9; N.A. Smimov, Ocherki., 64; N.A. Smimov, Miuridizm,
160; Abrarov and Batunskii, 63; Klimovich, Islam (1965), 84; Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 50;
Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 32; and Akhmedov, 22.

124
character of Islam. It was also referred to by those who argued that Islam is not
particularly distinctive, as monotheism was endemic among the Arabs. Finally,
Marx and Engels' correspondence was the primary reference in work analyzing
the economic foundation of the emergence of Islam.H
Engels' reference to Islam and its rituals in his work on "Bruno Bauer and
Early Christianity" was used by anti-religious propagandists to explain that Islam
is only a reformulation of old pre-Islamic beliefs and customs. Going further,
from Engels' statement some drew the conclusion that rituals are the main
attributes of Islam, and that without the rituals it contains nothing. The quote was
also used to explam the anti-social character of Islamic rituals. They were
viewed as an obstacle to a Soviet way of life. 12
Engels' last footnote on Islam in "On the History of Early Christianity" was
cited by Soviet writers to develop an economic explanation of religious
movements in the Muslim world. Even more frequently, it was used to
emphasize that Islam is a foreign religion, adapted to Arabs and not to the Turkic
people of the Soviet Union. 13
The conmients of Marx and Engels on Islam were quite similar to the
writings of the Russian Orthodox missionaries on this same subject. In
particular, each set of writers was drawn to comment on the Islamic division of
the world into two distinct and antagonistic camps; on Islamic fatalism; and on its
1 ^ See for example: Abrarov and Batunskii, 62-3; Klimovich, "Marks," 60-3; Mullaev, 9-10
and 15-6; N.A. Smimov, Ocherki, 59-60; Ditiakin, "Marks," 81-3; S. Tolstov, "Ocherki," 31; and
Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 92.
12 See for example: Ditiakin, "Marks," 84; KUmovich, Islam (1965), 216; N.A. Smimov,
Ocherki, 62-4; N.M. Vagabov, 9; Ocherki Nauchnogo, 89-90; and Kerimov, Shariat, 31.
13 See for example: Klimovich, "Marks," 60; Ocherki Nauchnogo, 86 and 97; and Kerimov,
"Islam," 14.
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excessive emphasis on rituals. Indeed, comments about Islam such as these were
common in both secular and rehgious literature of the nineteenth century.
Themes and Arguments
The anti-Islamic propaganda discussed below focuses on several sets of
themes. An overriding theme throughout much of the anti-Islamic propaganda,
whether expUcit or as an undercurrent of presumption, was that religion wiU
disappear in the face of science and progress. A second set of themes consisted of
those attacking the observable aspects of the rehgious estabUshment. Another set
was targeted toward observable manifestations of religion in the daily life of
believers. Finally, a set of propaganda themes was generated in response to
Lenin's appeal to intellectuals to examine the materialistic origins of reUgion.
These themes, at length, were directed against the philosophical underpinnmgs of
Islam.
Islam Versus Science and Progress
Soviet propagandists emphasized the anti-scientific aspect of Islam and its
opposition to progress. They believed that Islam's opposition to science was an
obstacle to the healthy cultural and political development of the masses. 14 As
education replaced ignorance, so too superstitions of every character would fade
away. Such propositions about religion in general applied equally to Islam. The
scientific progress theme was especially prominent in hands-on propaganda.
Using such simple technology as electricity, propagandists could point with pride
14 Mochanov, 26. Islam as an obstacle to socialist construction is also the theme of
Klimovich, Sotsialisticheskoe.
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to the fact that they were man-made, not God-made. 15 They could hold out the
promise that, with the advancement of such technology, there would no longer be
the need for the mosque.
Soviet propagandists were able to insert the science and propaganda theme
into presentations of Utopian dreams of future sociahst cities. A series of
translations of "urban Utopias" had inspired the workers, intelligentsia, and
students ~ not only in Russia, but throughout the industrializing world ~ in the
decades preceding the 1917 Revolution. 16 These visions of future Utopian cities
were natural emblems to be used by Soviet propagandists in the overall
conversion process to Godlessness. Such dreams consisted of huge super-
industrial cities tied together by trains and post offices, witii radio, electricity,
hospitals, and schools for all. 17 The cities would be clean and sanitary; the
population would be healthy. All of these desirable outcomes were to stem from
science and technology, not God. These would be Godless cities. These would be
cities without mosques. Certainly, in cities such these, women would not be
forced to breath through a disease-laden veil. 18
Such socialist Utopias could supplant the traditional rehgious myth of
paradise. Beyond that, within the Utopia — made possible by advances of science
and technology ~ the masses could see at work the social relationships dominated
by desirable characteristics of Soviet man. In these social relationships, the
waiter is treated with as much courtesy as the doctor. There would be no
15 See for example: V. Mal'tsev, "Nov"'; V. Mal'tsev, "Shaitan-Arba"; "Poezd"; Ozerskii, "V
Strane"; Dorofeev; and Aristov.
16 A. Bebel, The Society of the Future (1879); E. BeUamy, Looking Backward (1889); L.
Braun, Female Labor (1891); K. Bellod, A Glimpse into the Future State (1898). Cited by Stites,
Revolutionary, 31-2.
17 Kor. No. 1 1 1; Chemysheva, "Bezbozhnyi"; Ozerskii, "Gandzha"; and Paslavlev.
18 Gershenovich.
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deference, no snobbery. The masses would be held together by discipline and by
the religion of solidarity.
The Russian Orthodox missionaries had also accused Islam of being
opposed to science and progress. To the missionaries, however, science and
progress meant something different from its meaning to the Soviets. Science and
progress to the missionaries involved the application of reason and rationality. It
was not synonymous with advancing technology. Ironically, with all their
emphasis on reason, the Soviets were diverted in their propaganda to an emphasis
on Utopia.
Attacks Against the ReUgious Establishment
The Islamic religious estabhshment was a visible representation of religion,
a vestige of the bourgeois past. Hence, it must be destroyed. Beyond that, it
represented a potential challenge to Soviet authority. Even more than was the
case with the Orthodox Church in Russian society, the religious establishment of
Islam stood as a source of authority in Muslim society. The most visible aspects
of the Islamic reUgious establishment were the mosques and the clerics.
Accordingly, those elements became the focus of attack. As we have seen,
numerous mosques were torn down, damaged, or simply closed. The clerics and
judges (qadis) of the pre-revolutionary muftiats were prime targets of Bolshevik
attacks. Also subject to attack were the ordinary village mullahs, the Sufis, and
the wandering mullahs.
Attacks on MusUm clerics formed the core of the anti-Islamic propaganda
of the Stalin era. In fact, whatever the subject of Islamic practice or custom
under attack, that practice or custom became a pretext to denounce the clerics.
Attacks upon Muslim clerics were mostly the work of hands-on propagandists,
but Soviet historians also made contributions. Initially, these attacks consisted
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largely of ridicule. Later, anti-clerical literature shifted toward more serious
accusations. Thus, there was a movement from relatively harmless
characterizations to deadly serious charges. There was a shift in propaganda
from mere ridicule to accusations that the clerics were class enemies. Later still,
they were called counter-revolutionaries, enemies of the people, and finally
enemies of the state.
Prior to 1926-1927, the ridicule heaped upon Muslim clerics centered on
universal flaws that all people attribute to servants of the cloth, be they Muslim
or Christian. Thus, for example, on a personal basis clerics were described as
pompous, gluttonous, hypocrites, cheaters, tricksters, and self-serving. 19 On a
professional basis they were depicted as obscurantists and superficial. Similar to
arguments advanced by the Russian Orthodox missionaries, the Soviet
propagandists argued that because of their lack of knowledge of the Arabic
language clerics were incapable of interpreting the Qur'an and the prescriptions
of the SharVah. They argued that clerics distinguished themselves by ignorance.
Unfamiliar with elementary scientific knowledge, they found security in routine,
fanaticism, and prejudice.20 The ignorance of the clerics was said to affect their
constituencies adversely, preventing them from taking advantage of opportunities
offered by contemporary Soviet culture. Clerics opposed virtually anything that
might bring merriment into the lives of Soviet Muslims, denouncing the theater,
plays, movies, radios, and other aspects of Soviet entertainment.
Early Soviet propaganda was not without a certain humor. Propagandists
made heavy use of the legacy of the pre-Revolutionary anti-clerical and satirical
19 See for example: Gvozdev; Gorodetskii, "Pro Samykh"; and Chemysheva, "Bereket-
Beresi." Such mockeries continued after 1927. See for example: Gorodetskii, "Allakh";
Lukovskii; Orlovets, "Svin'ia"; "Pro Mully i Osla"; and Mirer.
20 See for example K. Mal'tsev. Such attacks continued after 1927; see "Molitvy."
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literature of Muslim progressives. In particular they made extensive use of the
popular pre-Revolutionary satirical journal, Molla Nasreddin.^^ The Molla
Nasreddin had been independent of any political party, but violently anti-
conformist and revolutionary. Its attacks had been directed against all forms of
conservatism. But the chief force of their ridicule was pointed toward religious
fanaticism, denouncing it as an obstacle to progress.22 Undoubtedly, some eariy
Soviet anti-clerical pamphleteers were successors to the brilliant pleiad of
writers, poets, satirists, dramatists, and pamphleteers of the pre-Revolutionary
Molla Nasreddin. By the mastery of their prose and the gifted irony of their
attacks upon the obscurantism of mullahs, the venality of qadis, and the stupidity
of mudarris, some early Soviet pamphleteers served the anti-clerical cause better
than any Party lecturer or agitator. However, as the anti-Islamic drive was
stepped up there was a change in the tone of the anti-clerical literature. It became
vulgar, insulting, and vicious.
Starting roughly around 1926, there was an outpouring of anti-clerical
"contempt and hate-propaganda," whose purpose was to provoke the hostility of
the masses toward the clerics.23 Muslim Clerics were depicted as sexists,
alcoholics, lechers and money-grabbers. Clerics were accused of hooliganism,
sorcery, inmioral and amoral conduct, mental deviation and criminal behavior.
For individual clerics, the most personally difficult accusations were those
charging immoral or criminal behavior. Immoral charges were often sexually
21 Khadzhibeili, 40. Khadzhibeili referred to early Soviet pamphleteers of the journal
Kommunist (in Azeri) of Baku.
22 On the Molla Nasreddin see: Bennigsen, "Mollah"; and Bennigsen and Lemercier-
i
Quelquejay, La Presse
,
124-8.
I 23 "Contempt and hate-propaganda" are the terms used by D.V. Pospielovsky to describe the
I anti-religious literature published in the specialized anti-religious journals during the pre-World
' War II period. See Pospielovsky, Soviet Atheism, V. 2, 19-46.
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oriented. Thus, it was common to charge that a cleric had sexual relations, not
only with his maximum number of wives, but with numerous members of his
spiritual flock.24 Criminal charges included trading in white slavery,25
instigating the murder of unveiled women,26 and practicing abortion.^V
Anticipating later accusations that clerics were class enemies, the anti-clerical
literature of the pre-1927 period centered around the theme that clerics were
parasites, whose only efforts consisted of duping, fleecing, and in one way or
another exploiting the naivete of people, especially the poor.
Caricatures often presented clerics as donkeys, wolves, or foxes. One such
cartoon, among the less vulgar, depicted a mullah with the head of a donkey led
on a bridle by a worker. The drawing symbolized the "awakening of the
proletariat." The accompanying text proclaimed that: "Before, the mullah kept
the masses under his yoke. Today, it is the reverse!" The text insulted the
mullah as an "imbecile" and a "parasite," and invited him to retire to Khamadan
(a town best known for the quaUty and quantity of its donkey breeding) "... as
there is no stable here."28 A favorite subject of Soviet anti-Islamic caricatures
featured an old fat mullah salivating over a young fresh beauty. Another
frequently used caricature showed a mullah preparing for the ritual sacrifice of
an animal, generally a sheep, during the holy day of Kurban-bairam. Although
24 See for example Agamali-Ogly, 5. Clerics were accused of seeking sexual favors by force
or by tricks. See: Puretskii, 126-7; "Bedni Kishlaka" ; Aslanbek Shakh-Girei; Klimovich,
"ReUgioznye Perezhitki"; and Gafurov, "Usilim," 27.
25 Chemysheva, "Protiv."
26 See for example the published archival material of public trials held in 1929, Protiv
Religioznogo, 143-8. Also see: "Doklad," 136; and Lebedev.
27 This accusation was leveled against those clerics who performed circumcision. See
Tavgazov, 8.
28 CitedbyKhadzhibeiU,41.
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the text of those cartoons were varied, one often featured a sheep as observing "It
is the grease of the mutton that fattens the faith of the mullah" To that, the
mullah would be shown rubbing his belly and exclaiming "My guts are my
religion and my God. I could swallow the whole Qur'an and would not be
satisfied!" In other texts, the sheep would complain that "The savage Muslim and
his SharVah do not let us breathe in this world." Still other texts featured the
sheep as pointing out that "The legacy of the prophet is to spill blood."29
Propaganda of this nature continued throughout the Stalin era. But with
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1928 a political component was added
to anti-clerical arguments.^O Initially, clerics were denounced for encouraging
the maintenance of the old conservative order. By perpetuating old customs such
as religious marriage and burial, the observance of the rehgious Friday and other
reUgious hoHdays, and by opposing the hberation of women, clerics were
attempting to maintain their grip over the Muslim masses as a basis for continued
exploitation. The severity of the accusations increased. Clerics were accused of
breaking Soviet law. For example, they were accused of collecting the zakat
(legal alms), by then forbidden.31 Having been stripped of their political rights,
they were then accused of infiltrating local Soviet and Party apparatus.32 They
were denounced for sabotaging Soviet reforms ~ such as those relating to
education and collectivization; they were also accused of undermining the Five-
29 Cited by Hadjibeyli, 372-5.
30 Klimovich, "Religioznoe Dvizhenie"; Kobetskii, "Islam"; "Doklad," 133-8; Popov,
"Novoe"; Mashchenko; Shelikhanov; Kasymov, Ocherkipo Religioznomu, 30-34, and passim;
Ageev; Zhukovskii; and Gafurov, "Religioznye."
3
1
The media complained that the zakat was paid more regularly than govemment taxes. See
Kommunist (in Azeri), 28 July 1928, cited by Khadzhibeili, 45. Also see Kundukhov.
32 On the infiltration of Soviet and Party apparati see: "Doklad," 136; Logvinovich, 17; and
Sakhat-Muradov, 144.
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Year Plans.33 Together with kulaks, nepmen, Mensheviks, Socialist
Revolutionaries, Sultangalievists, Mussavatists, Alashordists, Milla Firkists, and
other bourgeois-nationalist elements, they were labeled class enemies.34
Later, at the time of the Great Purges, a fatal accusation was levelled at
Muslim clerics, as well as at clerics of other denominations. They were
"unmasked" as spies for the fascist powers. Mushm religious organizations,
especially the muftiat in Ufa and its head, Rizaeddin Fahreddin ogly, were accu-
sed of running information networks for Germany and Japan.35 Similar
accusations were directed at Muslim religious organizations outside the Soviet
Union.36 in Libya, for example, Muslim clerics were described as "agents of
Mussolini."37
Starting with the Cultural Revolution, the scholarly professionals ~ such as
historians and ethnographers ~ added their voices to those of the popular
propagandists. The Uterature of scholars, directed toward two interrelated
themes, was prepared for well-educated Muslims and popular propagandists.
Playmg on egalitarianism, a central symbol of the Revolution, Soviet scholars
argued that clerics were always aligned with the ruling elites, wherever and
whenever possible. In support of this position, historians marshalled evidence
drawn from tsarist times, along with current events. An mterrelated aspect.
33 K. Mal'tsev; Kremen'; Gotchikhanov and Visaev; Amosov; L'vov; "Pravda Pobedila"; and
Gil'iardi.
34 The denunciation of Muslim clerics linked to kulaks and to nationalist groups was a
constant feature of the anti-clerical propaganda of the 1930s. See for example the work of the
leading anti-religious expert E. laroslavskii, "AntireUgioznaia Propaganda Na Novom Etape,"
Pravda, 15 October 1930, reprinted in his collected works, Protiv, V. 2, 309-16.
35 See for example: "laponskie"; and "Lektsiia," 53. Rizaeddin-Oglu, considered one of the
greatest Jadid theologians, was killed in prison in 1936.
36 G. Ibragimov, "Islam."
37 Klimovich, "PodPiatoi."
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especially important to the educated Muslim public, dealt with the issue of
colonialism and imperialism. Soviet propagandists beUeved that one of the most
convincing ways to combat Islam was to show the role of Muslim religious
organizations in the service of colonial powers.
A number of studies concentrated on describing the role of Muslim
reUgious organizations in the service of tsarism. The chief arguments in such
studies were simple in concept and limited in number. According to the Soviet
historians, at every instance in which the Russian empire had extended itself into
a Muslim territory the Russian authorities were quick to coopt the most
influential among the clerics.38 Although it could be pointed out that the Muslim
experience with tsarist Russia was characterized by repression of Islam, some
historians were able to argue that such repression had been unrelated to reUgion.
These historians argued that the Russian repression was an aspect of a "poUtical
power play."39 Although the pre-Russian ruling ehte was suppressed, it was only
a coincidence that they were Muslims.
Using many anecdotal examples, historians depicted Muslim clerics as tools
of the ruling class, the landed and capitalist aristocracies. The Muslim religious
organizations were used to reinforce the power and authority of the Russian
autocracy on the periphery of the empire.^O The official Muslim organizations
prior to 1917 consisted of several Spiritual Directorates, or muftiats. One of the
muftiats was created in Orenburg in 1788 (later transferred to Ufa); another was
created in the Crimea in 1831; and two were created in Transcaucasia in 1872:
38 Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 13; and N. Smimov, "Klassovaia," 36-7.
39 L. Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 1 1-2.
40 Arsharuni and Gabidullin, Ocherki Panislamizma, 31-41; Kasymov, Ocherkipo
Religioznomu, 3-10; Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 25-56; id., "Islam v Azerbaidzhane"; and N.
Smimov, "Klassovaia," 36-40.
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one for the Shi'ah, the other for the Sunni population. Soviet historians viewed
those Spiritual Directorates as a basis of support for the tsarist regime. The
positions of the clerics were said to depend on the good will of the reactionary
tsarist leadership. The mufti, the head of the Directorate, was nominated by the
Russian Minister of the Interior, and was, therefore, nothing less than a tsarist
civil servant. Only those clerics would be nominated to the Spiritual Directorates
who were poUtically safe, loyal to the Russian authorities, and who otherwise
maintained an acceptable pohtical posture. The officials of the muftiats were
alleged to have had police connections and to have carried on spying activities on
potential revolutionary groups.41
The Soviets pointed out that there had been a quid pro quo. The tsarist
government permitted the clerics to retain their religious positions, to enjoy
relative religious tolerance, and to receive economic advantages in the form of
land and other endowments; in return, the clerics preached submission to the
existing order, to the tsar.42 The conservative muftiat in Ufa was a particular
target of attack by Soviet historians. According to them, the muftiat "never
raised its voice against the national, pohtical, economic and cultural oppression to
which the eastem people were subjected" by the tsarist regime.43
Both conservative (Qadymist) and reformist (Jadid) clerics were criticized
for perpetuating the exploitation of their people. They were said to differ only in
the methods they chose to carry on that exploitation. Conservative clerics were
described by Soviet historians as representatives of feudal elements, and dismissed
41 Arsharuni and Gabidullin, Ocherki Panislamizma, 32-3; Kasymov, Ocherki po
Religioznomu, 6; Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 48; id., "Chto Takoe Musul'manstvo"; N.
Smimov, "Musul'manskie," 164; and "Religii Byvshikh."
42 See in particular Klimovich's attacks in Islam v Tsarskoi, 57-89; and Raiskii.
43 N. Smimov, "Musul'manskie," 165.

135
as agents of the tsarist regime. Reformist clerics were described as
representatives of the Turco-Tatar bourgeoisie whose interests were also
reactionary.44 The Jadid clerics were said to have accommodated themselves
perfectly to the colonial tsarist regime, to have profited from its privileges, and
to have helped spread it. Some Soviet historians argued that the reformist clerics
may have played a progressive role in the nineteenth century. But by the time of
the October Revolution they had fulfilled that mission and had joined the ranks of
the exploiters.45 The pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideology of the Jadids had
become a tool to deflect class tensions and to postpone the class stmggle.46 Pan-
Islamism was also a way for the Jadids to increase their influence and importance.
On top of all this, Soviet historians insisted that the pan-Islamic movement was of
foreign origin, as inspired by Muslim clerics of the Ottoman Empire and India.
Soviet historians argued that the interest of Muslim clerics in preserving
the status quo can also be demonstrated by their counter-revolutionary activities.
Muslim clerics, both conservatives and reformists, sided with the tsarist
authorities in the revolution of 1905; later, they supported World War I; later
stiU, they sided with the White armies and with foreign interventionists; finally,
they associated themselves with bourgeois-nationahst parties after the
establishment of Soviet power.
Soviet historians of the 1930s particularly emphasized the central role of
Muslim clerics in counter-revolutionary movements during the Civil War. After
the proletarian revolution, both conservative and reformist Muslim clerics joined
44 See in particular: Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 171-216; Arsharuni and GabiduUin,
Ocherki Panislamizma, 31-41; and N. Smimov, "Klassovaia," 36-41. Also see "Islam (v Tsarskoi
Rossii)," by N. Smimov, Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed.
45 Shevrekei, 33.
46 N. Smimov, "Musul'manskie," 165.
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hands with the former exploiting classes to safeguard their class interests and to
combat the proletariat 47 Some Soviet historians even asserted that Muslim
religious organizations were the driving force behind the counter-revolutionary
movements throughout the oriental regions of the former empire. In support of
this view, they pointed to a series of anti-Soviet movements during the Civil War:
these included the estabhshment of an anti-Soviet government in the Crimea led
by the mufti, Chelebiev;48 the creation of the anti-Soviet Emirate of the North
Caucasus headed by imam Uzun Hajji fa Sufi Naqshbandi murshid);^^ and the
Basmachi rebellion in Turkestan, which Soviet historians claimed was inspired by
Muslim clerics.50
These anti-Soviet movements did not represent efforts of the Muslim
clerics to hberate their own people. Rather, Soviet propagandists argued that
Muslim clerics joined with the counter-revolutionary forces as a means of
continuing their exploitation of the masses. Taking one of their own justifications
for mounting an anti-Islamic campaign (that the clerics were a potential challenge
to their authority), the Soviets argued that Muslim clerics had viewed Soviet
power as a competitor for their influence over people. It is interesting to note
that the Russian Orthodox missionaries also had beUeved that Muslim clerics were
antagonistic to Russian power and to the advanced Russian civilization because
tiiey saw them as competitors for influence.
47 For example: N. Smimov, "Musul'manskie," 166-9; Mal'tsev, "Religiia"; "Oktiabr'skaia";
and Klimovich, "Musul'manskoe Dukhovenstvo." Also see Vassilevskii.
48 N. Smimov,"Klassovaia," 41.
49 See Gatuev.
50 On the role of the clerics in the Basmachi revolt see: Soloveichik; M.N.V; and Vasilevskii,
"Bazy."
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An interesting side-show in the development of anti-clerical Uterature was
provided by the Soviet problems in coming to grips with a consistent
interpretation of Sufi-led anti-tsarist Uberation movements. Despite the fact that
by the eariy 1930s reUgious authorities as a generic group were uniformly
condemned as reactionaries, historians were still ambivalent in their
interpretation of specific national Uberation movements under the banner of
Islam in tsarist times. In particular, they were uncertain in their interpretations
of the Caucasian Wars under the leadership of Shamil (a Sufi Naqshbandi leader),
and of the Andizhan revolt in 1898 under the leadership of Madali Ishan of Min-
Tube (another Naqshbandi leader).
The ambivalence of historians was due to the lingering influence on the
history profession of M.N. Pokrovskii, the leading pre-revolutionary Bolshevik
historian. Russian colonialism had been Pokrovskii's scapegoat. He could think
of no better historical example of the manifold evils of coloniaUsm than the story
of Russian expansion. Unlike Russian historians before or after him, he saw no
mitigating circumstances or positive by-products of Russian colonialism.51 His
views were essentially in agreement with the early Bolshevik interpretation.
Indeed, he more than anyone had estabhshed the finer points of that
interpretation.
In contrast to his low opinion of the Russian conquerors, Pokrovskii had
great admiration for the leaders of resistance movements. His admiration for
Shamil, for example, was unbounded. He regarded Shamil as a hero and a
capable leader against an overwhelming power. Shamil's movement he viewed as
democratic, although it was tied to a religious cause.52 Under Pokrovskii's spell,
^ ^ For an analysis of successive re-interpretations of Russian colonialism in Soviet
historiography see the work of Tillett
52 M.N. Pokrovskii, 211-29.
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early Soviet historians had generally placed a progressive interpretation on
national Uberation movements under the flag of Islam, ignoring or rationalizing
religious elements of the struggle.53
In the mid- 1930s, Pokrovskii's interpretations of Russian history were
condemned as non-Marxist. Because Russian colonization of non-Russian lands
set the stage for the first successful proletarian revolution, it began to be re-
interpreted as a lesser eviL54 Even so, the heroic imagery of individual patriotic
reUgious leaders such as Shamil or Madah ishan lingered on, notwithstanding
scattered attacks.55 After all, Karl Marx had been a great admirer of Shamil,
whose wars with Russia he had followed with keen interest.^^
In parallel fashion, the mid-1930s witnessed a reinterpretation of national
liberation movements in the Muslim colonized world. Earlier Soviet historians
often had seen a progressive side to Islam and its reUgious organizations. They
had acknowledged the progressive role of Islam and its clerics in various national
liberation movements against imperialist colonizers.57 in the 1930s, however,
Soviet historians did an about face. They turned their attention to explaining how
Islam, its religious organizations, and its "slogans" had been used to serve the
53 On the Andizhan revolt see Galuzo, 63-72. On muridism in the North Caucasus see
Oshaev.
54 Tillett, 45-9 and pa55//7i.
55 For an attack on Shamil and his murids see Klimovich, Islam v Tsarskoi, 25-30. For
praise of Shamil written during the same period see: N.l. Pokrovskii; Bushuev,
"Gosudarstvennaia"; id., Bor'ba ; and Magomedov. Not until the early 1950s did Shamil and
Madali ishan officially join the group of reactionary oppressors. See the post-World War II
reinterpretation of Caucasian Wars and of the Andizhan revolt in Tillett, 133-46, 174-6, and
passim.
56 See Henze, 6 and passim.
57 See for example I. Reisner on the 19th century movement of Indian Muslims under the lead
of Said Ahmed; and Muguev. The Shi'i clergy of Persia was viewed as democratic in its rivalry
with the feudal monarchy see for example: V.O.; and Sultan-Zade.
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colonial interests of imperialist states. Muslim religious organizations were
depicted as agents of the old native feudal aristocracies or of the new native
bourgeoisies that had come to prominence under the colonial regimes. Soviet
historians argued that the introduction of colonial power brought with it class
tensions between a proletariat and the bourgeoisie ~ even though, in the absence
of coloniaUsm, those classes would not yet have come into existence. To hold
their class positions, the native bourgeoisies and their spokesmen, the religious
authorities, sold out their national interests to the interests of the colonial
interlopers.5 8
Attacks Against Islam in Daily Life
An early focus of Bolshevik interest was the Muslim family. In vutually
every society, the family serves as the repository of traditional values. The
Muslim families, patriarchal in character — with polygamy, veiled women,
harems, and the marriage of young girls ~ were viewed by the Bolsheviks as
remnants of the dark ages. It is not surprising that the Bolsheviks would regard
the role of woman in Islam as an inviting target for attack. Other aspects of
Islam, readily observable in daily life, are its major holidays, and its rites of
passage.
Muslim Women . The Soviets directed an important and early part of their
anti-Islamic hterature to the status of women in the Muslim family and social
structure. In part, the Soviet interest in the role of women was dictated by long-
term strategic considerations. By gaining the support of the long-suffering,
underprivileged, but numerous and strategically well-placed women, the
58 See for example the work of: Zoeva; Kamov; Frantsevich; and Klimovich, "Musul'manskii
Vostok. Also see "Islam (v Epokhu Kapitalizma)," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed.
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Bolsheviks hoped to gain a foothold in male-dominated Muslim society. Women
played the role of a "surrogate proletariat. "^9
But that was not the whole story. Anti-Islamic propaganda directed toward
the role of women was a cleverly placed, far-reaching, insidious attack against the
very fabric of Islam, a point recognized earlier by the Orthodox missionaries.
By redefining the role of woman, endowing her with civil rights protected by a
secular political system, the Soviets could undermine the SharVah and the adat
(customary law).60 Also, to question the sacred institutions governing the
minutiae of daily life was tantamount to questioning the authorities who maintain
those institutions — the local religious, tribal, and communal elites.61 It was not
enough for the Soviets simply to legislate change in the secular arena. The
Soviets recognized that an improved education was necessary in order to achieve
a rapid breakthrough in the emancipation of MusUm women. It was important to
convince women of the negative role of Islam in their life. This task was placed
m the hands of anti-Islamic propagandists.
The propaganda dealing with the role of women in Islam was not launched
from a scholarly perspective. There was Uttle, if any, analysis of the Qur'an, the
Shari'ah, or other formal repositories of Islamic theology, law, or customs. Nor
would scholarly propaganda have been particularly effective.62 After all,
Muslim women were not generally well-educated, nor were they well-schooled in
Islamic theology. Propagandists concentrated upon some of the most visible
59 For an analysis of Soviet goals and strategies with regard to women see the work of
Massell.
60 Kobetskii, "K 10-Letiiu," 74.
61 See Dimanshtein. Also see Massell, 156-60.
"^ For instruction on how to conduct anti-religious work among Muslim women see G.
Ibragimov, "Antireligioznaia."
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Islamic practices in the lives of women. In dramatic public displays in Central
Asia, propagandists organized group unveiling of Muslim women. The dropping
of the veil was to symbolize the passing of rehgion.
Written propaganda was designed to be of a rather pedestrian character. It
consisted essentially of a catalogue of examples of women's inferiority in Muslim
societies.63 The purpose of such literature was two-sided. First, it was
intended to make women aware of their oppressed status ~ an awareness that
needed to be cultivated. Second, it was intended to make women understand that
their inferior position resulted from a male-oriented set of religious behefs. Of
course, Soviet propagandists mounted a variety of arguments. But attention here
is focused on those arguments that related to Islam, either directly or by virtue of
the propagandists' imagination.
Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists claimed that Islam had legaUzed,
consoUdated and sanctified the serfdom of woman and the mastery of man. It had
condemned women to arbitrary rule and humiliation. The propagandists pointed
out that the strongest defenders of the inferior status of women were religious
fanatics. They asserted that women's inferior status as a consequence of Islamic
teaching was obvious in all aspects of life: in the legal realm, in social
participation, in spiritual life, in economic activities, in education, as well as in
family life.
In the legal realm, for example, propagandists pointed out that the Shari'ah
courts regarded women as second-rate witnesses.^^ in validity and strength,
their testimony as witnesses was expUcitly equal to only one-half that of the
testimony of a man. If a woman's case were to stand any chance at all, for every
63 For a detailed analysis of Soviet activists' perceptions of Muslim women's inferior status
see Massell, 96-120.
64 Nukhrat, 21.
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male witness two women were required. Propagandists pointed out that women's
inheritance rights and their right to divorce were limited in favor of men.65
The social participation of women was virtually nonexistent. Public
meetings were off Umits, as were most meetings where men were present. The
Muslim reUgion and local customs stood squarely against activities of women
outside the home, regarding some activities as outright sin.66
It was difficult for a woman to get an education. The propagandists
acknowledged that the Shari'ah did not prohibit a woman's education. However,
the Shari'ah's prescriptions concerning women's seclusion cut drastically into
their freedom of movement. Furthermore, according to traditional MusUm
attitudes and customs, a woman had neidier the mind nor the need for
knowledge.67 The agitation of clerics and religious fanatics against Soviet
schools for girls were generally cited as proof of such attitudes.68
Soviet propagandists brought the theme of sexual discrimination into the
spiritual realm. Such a theme had, of course, been prominent in the writings of
Orthodox missionaries. The mosque was primarily for men. Women were
segregated, if permitted in the mosque at all. Women were not required to fast,
pray, or perform other religious obligations as often as required from men.
They could not lead a conmiunity in prayer. Such leniency did not reflect
consideration of tiieir weaker sex, argued the propagandists. Rather, they were
considered religiously impure, at least at times of menstruation and childbearing.
The propagandists also argued that Islam considered women to be creatures with
65 Zaturanskaia, 72; and Gidulianov, "Brak," 19.
66 Liubimova, 56; Prishchepchik, 63; and Nukhrat, 20-1.
67 Nukhrat, 31-2.
68 Among others see: Adam; Shur; F. Popov, 14; and Gafurov, "Usilim," 27.
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only a partial soul.69 Even the Muslim paradise was segregated, and its
"pleasures" were reserved only for menJO
In a variation on this theme, one of the complaints of anti-Islamic
propagandists in the 1930s was that clerics were admitting women into the
mosques and, in general, allowing them increased participation in religious
ceremoniesJl The propagandists accused the clerics of modemizing in an effort
to retain their influence over women.
Notwithstanding the alleged mistreatment of women by Islamic religious
institutions and practices, Muslim women were assiduous visitors to holy places.
This anomaly was explained by propagandists as resulting from the women's
superstition and lack of education. Beyond that, it was to be viewed as a further
reflection of their spiritual exploitation by reUgious figures.72
But what anti-reUgious propagandists emphasized most frequently and
insistently was the "enslaved" position of women within the family. The
propagandists insisted that the life of Muslim women was one of deepest tragedy.
And it was the Qur'an that was responsible for that life. Propagandists pointed
out that the Qur'an states that women are but fields to be plowed by their
owners.73 As a consequence, a woman is a man's accessory, a voiceless slave, a
beast of burden, and a tool of man's lust.
69 Nukhrat, 24.
70 Brullova-Shaskol'skaia, 302.
71 See for example: Ageev, 35; "Islam (v SSSR)," by N. Smimov, Bol'shaia Sovetskaia
Entsiklopediia, 1st ed; Ardi; and Khadzhibeili, 44.
72 "Kak Stroit' Lektsiiu," 51-2.
73 Salim, "Musul'manskaia Religiia i Zhenshchina," Bezbozhnik (newspaper), 10, 1928, 6,
cited by Massell, 120. Also see Gafurov, "Usilim," 26; and "Zamechatel'nye," 2.
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The women's family world, as depicted by anti-Islamic propagandists, was
violent and arbitrary. A woman was cloistered and veiled from early
adolescence, as ordered by Muhammad himself because of his jealous temper74
She could be beaten as savagely and as often as a father, husband, or male-
guardian deemed appropriate, because the Qur'anic law exphcitly allowed a
woman's physical punishment75 With rehgious sanction, she could be killed
outright for illegitimate loss of virginity, for adultery, and for undermining the
family's honor76
The rites and customs surrounding marriage and divorce were favorite
subjects of anti-religious propagandists. Some of those customs had nothing to do
with Islam. But because they were practiced in a Muslim society, the
propagandists regarded such customs as sanctified by Islam. At the very least
they were not opposed by rehgious authorities. The custom of marriage-by-
abduction is a case in point. It was a custom practiced by some nomads and
mountain people. Propagandists depicted it as an Islamic practice in which a girl
is stolen just hke a head of cattle, and then raped.77
Marriages of girls prior to the canonically authorized age were widely
publicized, and said to be permitted by clerics in return for bribes.
Propagandists claimed that the example was set by Muhammad himself.78 Anti-
Islamic propaganda abounded with stories of httle girls being sold to old men,
mcluding clerics, generally into polygamous households. Similarly, they were
74 Puretskii, 119. Also see L.K., 34.
75 Zaturanskaia, 72; and "Zamechaternye," 2.
76 Nakhrat, 23; Dobrianskii; Polkanov; and Klimovich, "Religioznye Perezhitki."
77 See for example: Nukhrat, 27-8; Brullova-Shaskol'skaia, 302-3; and Perovskii, 10.
78 Puretskii, 120.
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said to be sold or forcibly delivered to the harems of emirs and khans, often
through clerical intermediariesJ9
The marriage itself was described as an undisguised business transaction in
which the bride-to-be had no part in decision-making.80 The father would
decide whom and when the daughter would marry. Because a woman must
marry a man she had never seen, according to the propagandists, there could be
no question of friendship or love. The father's choice of a husband depended on
the importance of the groom's kin-group, and on the amount of money and goods
(the kalym or bride-price) bid for the bride. Accordingly, a girl was viewed by
the propagandists as being bought and sold like a commodity, of being an object
of speculation. Such a practice, they insisted, was prescribed by the Qur'an.^^
Religious law allowed the marriage of a MusHm woman only to a Muslim.
But a Muslim man could marry a Christian or a Jew.82 a wife had to be
monogamous. In contrast, her husband was entitled to four wives at a time.
Furthermore, he could manipulate the law to have ten wives or more, because the
Prophet had set the example.^^ Beyond that, the law authorized a man to have
temporary wives.84 Upon being introduced into a polygamous family, a girl was
likely to encounter vicious competition and persecution by older wives.
Propagandists pointed to discrimination against the Muslim woman in
divorce. If the woman wanted a divorce, religious law and social pressure made
79 Mal'tsev, "Tak Bylo."
80 Gidulianov, "Brak," 18; id., "Sobstvennost'," 24-5; Michurina, 81; Nukhrat, 22;
Puretskii, 116-7; Chemysheva, "Bez Voli"; and Perovskii.
81 See for example: F. Popov, 13; and Gafurov, "Usilim," 26.
82 Zaturanskaia, 72.
83 Puretskii, 118-9; and Gafurov, "Usilim," 26.
84 Gudilianov, "Brak," 22.
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it almost impossible. She was forced to go to court where she stood little chance
of obtaining a divorce if the husband objected. In contrast, if the husband wanted
a divorce, the law made it very easy. He could obtain it on a moment's whim, by
proclaiming it aloud three times.^^ Propagandists claimed that a man could
divorce his wife if she bore no children, especially if she failed to bear a son; if
she were not sufficiently obedient; if she were too weak to work; or if she were
no longer attractive.86 Furthermore, by Islamic law children belonged to the
father.87
The struggle for the emancipation of women was an aspect of the class
struggle. The mobihzation of the masses among women was necessary for the
building of sociahsm.88 The activists' view, which they wanted to force upon
MusHm women, was that Islam and Islamized customary laws, prescriptions,
practices, and rituals had exercised a profoundly circumscribing influence on
their lives. The propagandists believed that women were attached to Islam by
their illiteracy, ignorance, superstition, as well as their generalized inferiority in
cultural and judicial roles. To the Muslim woman, they constantly compared the
life and achievements of the allegedly liberated Soviet woman, the beneficiary of
numerous socialist achievements, a woman freed from the weight of religious
discrimination and prejudices, full of vigor and looking into the sociaUst future
with purpose.
85 Gudilianov, "Brak," 18; Puretskii, 117-8; and Zaturanskaia, 72.
86 Michurina, 8 1 ; and Nukhrat, 30- 1
.
87 Gudilianov, "Brak," 18.
88 See Pravda Vostoka, 31 October 1928, cited by Monteil, 35; and Salim, "Budem."
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Religious Rites and Practices
. In line with the emphasis upon practical
atheism, attention was given to attacks against visible and explicit manifestations
of religious beUefs. Recall that the Communists themselves were attempting to
create a set of rituals to replace those of traditional religion. As it tumed out,
however, the new Communist rituals did not cause the reUgious rituals to wither
away. Rather, in some instances the new rituals were simply added to the life of
the Muslims. For example, it would be common for a mullah to be invited to a
Red Wedding; or, there might be a Red Wedding followed by an Islamic
wedding.89 At Red Funerals, speeches by the local Party comrades might be
preceded or followed by the reading of prayers by the mullah; or, the mullah
might simply wait for the body at the Muslim cemetery in order to see that the
burial was in accordance with Islamic practices.^O Those Islamic rituals
associated with rites of passage were especially tenacious. Virtually without
exception, Muslim men continued to be circumcised.^l The Communist hohdays
such as May Day were celebrated much like any other MusUm holidays. They
were celebrated by visits to holy places, hstening to stories by the mullahs about
the life of the Prophet, and by the reading of prayers.
Principal Islamic rituals subjected to Soviet propaganda besides those
associated with the rites of passage included the Ramadan (fasting), the Hajj (and
pilgrimages to other holy places), religious holy days (such as Kurban-bairam or
^9 Logvinovich, 17; and Kasymov, Ocherki po Religioznomu, 48.
90 Gafurov, "Religioznye," 31; and Kasymov, Ocherki po Religioznomu, 48.
91 Logvinovich, 16; Shavaldin; Tikhomirov; laroslavskii, "Ob Ocherednykh," 23; and
Kogan, 28.
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the Ashura), along with other common acts such as the obligatory prayers and
alms-giving.92
Because their propaganda was targeted toward the popular masses, the
propagandists relied upon a limited number of rather simple, predictable and
unsophisticated arguments (frequently used earlier by Russian missionaries). In
addition, it was common in the early-1930s to denounce the rehgious practices as
being of a "reactionary character" (not used by the missionaries!). It was argued
diat the practices consisted of forcing the masses to move through a sequence of
carefuUy prescribed actions. Consequently, the practices were merely tools by
which the ruling eUte was assisted in holding its grip.93
A second common approach to undermining the religious rituals, already
used by the Orthodox missionaries, was to unmask their pre-Islamic origins. In
this vein, Soviet propagandists asserted that the fasting of the month of Ramadan,
with its rituals and prescriptions, was an unexpurgated transposition into Islam of
the period of fast observed by pre-Islamic Arabs.94 They alleged that the Hajj\
or pilgrimages to other holy places, and the celebrations of Uraza-bairam,
Kurban-bairam and Ashura were survivals of polytheistic practices of pre-Islamic
92 Uraza-bairam celebrates the end of the fasting of the month ofRamadan, and Kurban-
bairam commemorates the sacrifice of Ismail by his father Abraham. The Shi'ah holy day of
Ashura (sometimes called Shakhsei-Vakhsei in the Russian literature) commemorates the
martyrdom of Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet. It is celebrated on the 10th day of the month
of Muharram,
93 See for example: Tolin; and Klimovich, "Protiv Kurban-Bairama."
94 See for example: Klimovich, "Proiskhozhdenie Ramazana," 45; and Shokhor, 4. Others
believed it to be borrowed from Christianity see Gidulianov, "Sobstvennost'," 22.
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Arabs.95 The many saints honored by Muslim masses were described as barely
disguised Zoroastrian, Shamanist, or Buddhist deities 96
At other times, the Soviet propagandists chided the Muslims for following
meaningless practices. The Ramadan, they claimed, is an exterior act without
deep spiritual meaning, it is a "ridiculous and silly pantomime."9'7 To support
this assertion, they pointed to the fact that at night all "pleasures" are permitted,
including sexual relations with women.98 Similarly, the most important part of
the namaz (prayer), the propagandists claimed, is a strict observance of postural
details.99 Although there were other arguments used from time to time, the most
conmion ones included the notion that this or that rite is physically unhealthy, that
it is a disruption of productivity, and that it encourages religious fanaticism and
submission to the authority of the religious leadership. 100 In these arguments,
the Soviets were simply repeating arguments used earUer by the Russian
missionaries.
A substantial share of popular Soviet propaganda was directed against the
Muslim practice of visiting holy places, and leaving donations at the sites. The
practice was ridiculed as superstition, a vestige from the Dark Ages.101 These
holy sites often held out the hope of healing to those who made the pilgrimage
95 See for example the series of articles by KUmovich: "Khadzhzh," 84; "Uraza," 61;
"Kurban-Bairam," 54; and "Proiskhozhdenie Shakhsei-Vakhsei," 39. Almost word for word
Klimovich advanced the same arguments in all four articles. It is as if he had just changed the
name of one holy day for another.
96 See for example "Kak Stroit' Lektsiiu," 48.
97 Shokhor, 21.
98 Gidulianov, "Sobstvennost'," 22; Puretskii, 112; and Shokhor, 10.
99 Puretskii, 111-2.
100 For a review of such arguments see for example M.K..
101 See for example Orlovets, "Tselebnaia."
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and left a donation. The propagandists denounced the mullahs who maintained
the sites, charging that they were crooks, frauds, parasites, and capitalists. The
propagandists contended that the mullahs simply invented the miracles in order to
take advantage of the naive believers. 102 After 1928, holy places were also
denounced as cradles of anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary activities. 1^3
Another argument used against the holy places, also to be found in the missionary
literature, was to point out that the holy character of the sites often preceded the
emergence of Islam. In many instances the holy places were of Shamanistic,
Buddhist, or Zoroastrian origin.
The propaganda campaigns employing themes against Islamic practices and
rituals were among the most enduring. They had begun in the 1920s and
continued throughout the Stalin era. After the death of Stalin, in the late- 1950s,
this same theme was stepped up and was dramatically accelerated in the 1980s.
The Foundations of Islam
At least three anti-Islamic themes were developed by Soviet scholars in
response to Lenin's appeals to intellectuals to examine the materiahst origins of
rehgion. One set of writings undertook to explain the origin of Islam within a
Marxist framework. A second set revolved around an exploration of the
character of Muhammad, the central figure of Islam. A third set of writings
clustered around the Qur'an, die principal source of Islamic religious authority.
Materialist Origin of Islam . The methods of attack discussed above sought
to identify negative features of Islamic institutions, holdmg them up to the
102 L. Solov'ev; S.B., "Sledy Allakha"; Dubinskaia; and Mikhailov, 8.
103 See for example: G. Platonov; Aleksandrov; and Klimovich, "Tarn Gde Byli," 6.
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ordinary Muslims so that they could see Islam in its true light. Another approach
to removing the influence of reUgion from the present was to strip it of its
spiritual authority. Engels had made this point, arguing that it was essential to
provide a secular account of the emergence of religion. 10^ xhe most important
and interesting contribution of Soviet Islamists of the 1920s and 1930s consisted
of explaining the rise and history of Islam in Marxist-Leninist terms. There was
an older generation of scholars ~ including Bartol'd, Krachkovskii, Gordlevskii,
Krymskii, and Semenov ~ who worked both during the Russian and Soviet
periods. These scholars had virtually ignored Marxist-Leninist theories of the
origin of rehgion, and remained outside the newly-developing body of
explanation. The task of explaining the secular emergence of Islam in socio-
economic terms and, thus, its class character, was assumed by a younger
generation of Soviet historians. 105
Eager students of Marxism, the early Soviet Islamists searched for
economic explanations of the rise of Islam. Islam was an aspect of the
superstructure corresponding to the specific socio-economic formation of the
populations of the Hejaz in the seventh century, and in particular of the cities of
Mecca and Medina. The development of the theories of these young Marxist
historians did not proceed without difficulties. As we shall see, competing
theories emerged. In part, differences among theories reflected differences
among historians in their understanding of the socio-economic structure of the
Hejaz. In turn, these differing understandings produced altemative analytical
approaches to the analysis of the Hejaz.
104 Cited by Thrower, 425.
105 See the surveys of early Soviet scholarship on Islam by N.A. Smimov, Ocherki, 175-202;
and "Piat'desiat," 410-3.
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One early analytical approach involved accounting for the origin and rise
of Islam on the basis of the theories of M.N. Pokrovskii relating to the historical
significance of "merchant capitalism," originally used by him to explain the rise
of Moscovy.106 in one form or another, historians using this approach argued
that the motive force of the nascent religion was supplied by the merchant
bourgeoisie of Mecca and Medina. 107 islam was the ideological by-product of
the socio-economic formation (merchant capitalism) dominating the Arabs from
the seventh to the twelfth century. Hence, Islam can be viewed as arising in
response to the demands of trade in the international trading centers of Mecca and
Medina.
Perhaps taking their cue from the correspondence cited above between
Marx and Engels, historians pointed out that, prior to Muhammad, international
trade routes through the Hejaz were constantly disrupted by nomadic Arab tribes
seeking booty. To resist these disruptions, petty traders promoted the idea of a
union of all Arabs of the Hejaz. Muhammad, a trader, was successful in
exploiting his teachings about one God as a means of gaining influence over the
Arab masses. He was able to use his God figure as a basis for unifying Arab
tribes; at the same time, it was clear that the underlying purpose for the
unification was that it served the interests of organized trade. 108
Historians subscribing to the merchant theory supported their thesis by an
analysis of the Qur'an. They insisted that the Qur'an carried a strong merchant
106 M.N. Pokrovskii viewed merchant capitalism as a significant factor in Russian history, in
particular in the rise of Moscovy and the formation of the Russian Empire. Pokrovskii's views of
Russian history began to be challenged in the early 1930s. In 1934 and again in 1936 they were
officially condemned as non-Marxist by the Central Committee.
107 The theory of Islam as the product of merchant capitalism was first articulated by M.A.
Reisner in "Koran i Ego Sotsial'naia Ideologiia," Krasnaia Nov', 1926, V. Vn and DC, and
reproduced in his book, Ideologiia, 131-67.
108 M.A. Reisner, 131-3.
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flavor in its textual presentations. "By its sober rationalism, dry economy,
constant measuring and weighing, as well as by its individualistic character ..."
the Qur'an "... strikingly reflects the interests ... of trade and even of miUtant
capitalism. Basic class interests seeking satisfaction in that book of new laws are
obviously, and at time quite coarsely, expressing the interests of petty and large-
scale bourgeoisie." 109 Even the idea of the Divine in the Qur'an was viewed as
an anthropomorphic vision of "a thrifty merchant, ... an apotheosis of merchant-
trader, ... a deified, all-powerful merchant established in heaven."! 10 These
views carried considerable influence among Soviet historians, who were attracted
by its "economism" and its seemingly Marxist orientation.m The theory was
sufficiently well-accepted to be found in teaching manuals for hands-on
propagandists. 112
In a variation on that theme, other historians tried to give tiie "merchant
capitalist" arguments an appearance of class struggle by contending that Islam was
bom out of a struggle for political and economic power between the petty
bourgeoisie of Mecca and the rich hereditary aristocracy that controlled
intemational trade.l 13 This struggle for power took the form of an ideological
combat between polytheism, the ideology of the rich trading aristocracy, and
monotheism, the ideology of the rising petty bourgeoisie. 114
109 M.A. Reisner, 137.
1 10 M.A. Reisner, 139; and Nikolaev, 31.
111 See in particular: Klimovich, "K Voprosu"; Mochanov, 8-15; Beliaev,
"Rol'Mekkanskogo"; N.A. Smimov, Islam; Bolotnikov; and the Tatar historian Khakim,
1 12 See for example V Pomoshch\ 70. Also see N.A. Smimov, "Proiskhozhdenie," 326 and
335.
113 Beliaev, "Ror."
114 Klimovich, "Proiskhozhdenie Islama," 19.
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The 1929 publication of Lenin's lecture "On the State" exerted a marked
effect on research dealing with the rise of Islam, as well as on similar research
relating to the rise of Christianity. As we have seen, eariier research of Soviet
historians consisted largely of efforts to identify elements of emerging capitalism
in ancient societies. By finding such elements, it was possible to insinuate a
capitaUst content into those societies. But Lenin's lecture offered the suggestion
that ancient society ought to be analyzed in terms of their socio-economic and
political structures.! 15 As Pokrovskii's theory of the historical significance of
merchant capitaUsm was progressively challenged as non-Marxist in the early
1930s, so too was the merchant theory of the rise of Islam.H^ Soviet historians
began to search for opportunities to explain history in terms of the Marxian
sequence of movements from pre-feudal societies to feudaUsm to capitalism to
communism. This shift in historiography was reflected in the study of Islam.
The emergence of Islam was viewed as an aspect of an evolution toward
feudalism. The thesis that Islam had arisen in connection with a feudal revolution
had in fact been articulated early on, but had paled in the face of the theory that
Islam was the ideology of merchant capitalism.! 17
One theory emerging from the new approach asserted that Islam arose as a
result of deep socio-economic changes that set into motion concomitant changes
on the socio-political front. The loose tribal stmcture was shifting toward a
centraUzed feudaUsm. At the same time, the superstructure of ideas and fantasy
was undergoing a parallel change. Decentralized and informal rehgious cults
115 Thrower, 426-7.
116 See for example: Naumov; and Klimovich, "Marks," 76-9. By 1932 the mercantile theory
was described as "unfounded" in the courses for anti-religious propagandists. See Antireligioznyi,
45.
1 17 Rozhkov, 386-400; see also Filipov.
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were coalescing toward a single conception. That conception turned out to be
Islam. 118
Another theory that featured Islam as arising out of feudalism, began with
the thesis that the driving force behind Islam was the impoverished Arab
peasantry. Islam was bom in the trading center of Mecca, and its eariy adherents
were chiefly among the urban poor. But Muhammad was driven out of Mecca
and took refuge in Medina, the center of an agricultural area. It was in Medina
that Islam found its economic and ideological base. However, in Muhammad's
time agriculture was experiencing difficulties, thereby fostering growing poverty
among the Medina peasantry. Medina was losing its agricultural land ~ its
economic base — to Bedouin nomads, whose leadership centered in Mecca. The
occasion had thereby been created for an alliance between the Muslim Meccan
poor and the Medina peasantry. This alliance was the tuming point for the
Islamic movement, and the beginning of the victorious march of Islam. 119
Historians who supported the proposition that the Arab peasantry was the
driving force behind Islam, argued that "monotheism was the natural ideology of
the peasantry of that region ... who, because they were afraid of only one thing,
the lack of water, idohzed only one God." 120 By its extreme simplicity, the
brevity of its rituals, and its vision of life after death, Islam was designed for the
hard-laboring peasants. Furthermore, these historians pointed out that the poor
and the peasant were favored, at the expense of the bedouin, by the position of
1 18 Klimovich, "Marks," 59-63.
119 Tomara, "Proiskhozhdenie," 29 and 32.
120 Tomara, "Istoki," 73 and 75.
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Islam on inheritance, usury, and taxation, as well as by the agrarian policies of
the first Ma/ZA .121
Following Engels' observations, another explanation seeking to break with
the merchant theory emphasized a purely bedouin origin of Islam. According to
this view, the God of Muhammad was not different in his essence from other
tribal gods. 122 in fact, eariy Islam was not an ideology but simply a political
movement in which a tribal God served as a rallying caU.123 Poor bedouins of
central Arabia, impoverished by a pastoral recession, united in a movement of
protest against the rich bedouin-traders of Mecca. The poor bedouins had been
attracted to the ranting of Muhammad against the rich bedouins. Not until later
did Islam become a full-fledged ideology. 124 in yet another version of bedouin
theory, Islam was the syncretism resulting from the confrontation of two
cultures. 125 One was the primitive, monotheist bedouin culture; the other was a
progressive, polytheistic merchant urban culture.
With the Cultural Revolution and its emphasis on the class war, the
preceding theories came under criticism because they had failed to give adequate
attention to the class character of Islam. A criticism leveled by the history
profession upon the proponents of the merchant, peasant, or bedouin theories was
that the defenders of those theories idealized early Islam and thus failed to
121 Tomara, "Proiskhozhdenie," 32 and 47.
122 Asfendiarov, "Islam," 12; and id., Prichiny, 30.
123 Asfendiarov, "Islam," 12.
124 Asfendiarov, "Islam," 15-6.
125 That thesis was articulated by Ditiakin in two articles: "Marks," 85-6 and 92; and
"Osnovnye," 68-72.
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understand its class character. 1^6 Indeed, advocates of those theories had tended
to view early Islam as a progressive or democratic movement; it had arisen from
protests of the masses. Muhammad had been viewed as a revolutionary defender
of the poor and the underdog, and as an opponent to the rich and the
powerful. 127 Not until later, under the Khalifate, had Islam fallen into the hands
of powerful tribes, rich merchants, and traders. 128
The view that early Christianity and early Islam were progressive
phenomena had been shared by many Western and pre-Revolutionary scholars.
In the case of Christianity that view had been expressed by Engels and had been
prominent among early Soviet historians. 129 in the case of Islam it had been the
view of the great Russian orientahst V. Bartol'd.l^O The work of Bartol'd had
provided Soviet historians with their basic knowledge of Islam as a religion.
Influenced by Barthold's views, a number of Soviet Islamists subscribed to the
view that Islam began as a democratic movement. Some, generally Muslim
historians, went farther, describing early Islam as the first manifestation of
communism.131 Such views were held and heralded by Muslim national
Communists. 132 However, as a consequence of political considerations
126 See critics of those theories in: Ditiakin, "Beduinskaia"; Tolstov, "Ocherki," 28-9; and
Klimovich, "Marks," 68-70. Also see Antireligioznyi, 45.
127 See the articles by Tomara: "Islam i Zemel'naia," 82; "Proiskhozhdenie," 31-2; and "Islam
i Kommunizm," 103-4. Also see Asfendiarov, "Islam," 14.
128 Tomara, "Proiskhozhdenie," 32; and id., "Islam i Kommunizm," 104-5.
129 See for example Ursynovich. Also see the review of the Soviet literature on early
Christianity in Thrower, 425-41.
130 See for example Bartol'd, "Epokha," 521.
131 See for example: Zhuze; and Navshirvanov.
132 See Sultan Galiev's enumeration of the positive features of Islam, "Metody," 43-5. See a
similar treatment of Islam in U. Aliev.
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(described in Chapter EI), by the eariy 1930s Muslim national Communists were
being physically eliminated. 133 Historians who had described eariy Islam in
favorable temis were accused of sympathy for the views of the counter-
revolutionary Muslim national Communists. ^ 34 xhe view fell out of favor.
Within the terms of reference of later Soviet historiographers, an
improved theory was put forward by Soviet Islamists. This tiieory was based on
ethnographic material studied in the light of Marxism-Leninism. 135 This new
theory was improved in the sense that its Marxist origins were clear and it
possessed sufficient explanatory power to incorporate a number of separate
theories outlined above.
According to this theory, the socio-economic formation of the Hejazian
cities in the sixth century resembled those of die ancient city-republics of Greece,
Rome, or Carthage. 136 On the eve of Islam, however, the ancient city-republic
structure of the Hejaz was decaying. A recession of international trade, resulting
from the collapse of the Roman Empire, had sharpened the class struggle within
the towns. At the same time, the agrarian and nomadic communities were
undergoing a process of class differentiation with the emergence of a feudal
aristocracy. 137 in such conditions of class struggle, a socio-religious movement
arose which eventually became Islam.
133 Sultan Galiev was arrested a second time in 1928 with all his family. They were all
executed shortly thereafter.
134 The accusation was levelled by: Tolstov, "Ocherki," 29; and Klimovich, "Marks," 72-4.
135 See the rather positive criticism of that "ethnographic" theory in N.A. Smimov, Ocherki,
196-9.
136 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 49 and 53; and id., "Sotsial'nye," 53.
137 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 50-3.
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Those ethnographers pointed out that Islam had not developed uniformly.
At different times and at different places, it was the ideology of various layers of
the population. In some regions Islam had developed as the ideology of the town
plebes against the town aristocracy. In other regions, it had developed as the
ideology of artisan-traders and peasants against the feudal lords. In the Arab
provinces of Byzantium, it even had been the ideology of merchants and feudal
lords against the government of Byzantium. 138
For a while, Islam was successful in binding together all the various social
elements. The Bedouin tribes drawn into the movement provided the armed
forces. Eventually, the bedouin tribal aristocracy together with the slave-owning
trading aristocracy secured the direction of the movement, dominating it during
the Umayyad Khalifate. Islam did not mature as a religious ideology until the
time of the Abbasid feudal revolution. From then on, it became the ideology of
"Asiatic feudalism."139
The "officially approved" Marxist interpretation of the rise and history of
Islam was the result of the collective work of historians. Its "officially approved'
status was signified by its pubUcation, under the title "Islam," in the first edition
of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia in 1935.140 Accordmg to this version, Islam
arose at the time of a deep crisis in the Arab society of the seventh century, a
crisis provoked by the decomposition of socio-economic clanic and tribal
relations and by their replacement with the first elements of a class society, the
feudal society. The ruling ohgarchy of one powerful tribe, the Quraysh tribe,
dominated Mecca and its trade. It was in the commercial interest of that
138 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 58-9.
139 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 77-8.
140 "Islam," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed. The article was written by E.
Beliaev, L. Klimovich, and N. Smimov.
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oligarchy to promote the political unification and centralization of contiguous
Arabian tribes. These tribes had already come under the economic domination of
the Quraysh. With the collapse of decentralized tribalism, there was a parallel
weakening of the moral, ethical, and religious ideas associated with specific
tribes. Consequently, the Quraysh-led economic and poUtical unification was
reflected in a centralization of tribal gods under Allah, the god of the Quraysh.
The rigorous monotheism of Islam, according to which all is created by Allah
and all must submit to his unlimited will, is nothing more than the reflection of
the centrahzing policies of the Quraysh of Mecca. 141
As an aside, it is of interest to trace the coopting of Islam by the Quraysh
oligarchy. Initially, Islam was embraced by the petty traders of Mecca, not the
ruling oligarchy. But the organization of the early Islamic community played
into the hands of the Quraysh rulers. Membership in the Mushm community was
based on faith, not tribal affiUation. It was in the interest of the Quraysh
oligarchy to embrace any idea or movement that minimized the importance of
tribal distinctions, because tribal distinctions were an impediment to effective
political unification and centralized control. Thus, Islam could be viewed as
merely the instrument through which the Quraysh ohgarchy had expanded its
dominance, and the means by which the ruling classes had maintained, for
centuries, their control and oppression over the masses. 142
The publication of "Islam" in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia of 1935 ended
the search for an appropriate explanation of the rise of Islam. By that time,
Stalin's revolution from above was coming to an end. There was an end to
experimentation, including intellectual experimentation, along with a striving for
141 "Islam (v Epokhu Feodalizma)," by E. Beliaev, Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st
ed.
142 "Islam (v Epokhu Feodalizma)," by E. Baliaev.
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stability and a yearning for the comfort that comes from political correctness.
The search for a fully satisfactory explanation of the rise of Islam was not
renewed until after Stalin's death. Although the Marxist interpretation of the rise
of Islam contained in the first edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia was not
considered entirely satisfactory by later historians, it was, even so, hailed by them
as the first pohtically correct Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the history of
Islam. 143 Variations brought to that first version in the subsequent editions of
the encyclopedia in 1953 and 1972 were not substantial.
The Personahty of the Prophet . Soviet historians were led to beUeve that
Lenin was of the opinion that Jesus was a mythical personahty. Their conclusions
regarding Lenin's thinking were inferred from the fact that Lenin had levelled
substantial criticism of many opinions of the German Arthur Drews, but had not
criticized Drews' assertion that Jesus was a mythical character. 144 Based on this
assessment of Lenin's behefs, which dominated Soviet analyses of the personahty
of Christ well into the post-Stalin era, a substantial literature was spawned on the
mythical character of Jesus.145 in that same vein, historians of Islam developed
a similar literature regarding Muhammad.
The personahty of the Prophet was an important aspect of the discussion of
the rise of Islam in the early 1930s. The proponents of the idea that Muhammad
was a mythical figure asserted that the accounts of Muhammad's life and activities
in major Arab sources ~ such as Ibn-Ishaq, Ibn-Hisham, Vakidi, Ibn-Sa'd, and al-
Tabari ~ were suspect because they were not written by contemporaries of the
143 N.A. Smimov, Ocherki, 240.
144 A. Drews, Die Christusmythe, Belin, 1909. Lenin criticized Drews' work in an essay
entitled "On Militant Materialism," Collected Works, V. 33, 231, cited by Thrower, 426.
145 On the discussion concerning the authenticity of Christ in the 1930s see Thrower, 425-7.
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rise of Islam. Instead, based on hearsay, they were written several centuries after
its rise. Beyond that, it was argued that the Qur'an itself could not provide
biographic evidence relating to the existence of Muhammad. 146 it is well known
that the content of the Qur'an had been maintamed orally during the eariy years
of Islam and was not put into writing until after the death of the Prophet. This
fact was used by Soviet historians to cast doubt on knowledge of Muhammad.
Substantial myth had emerged, they argued, during the intervening time between
the early years of Islam and the writing of the Qur'an. Hence, they asserted that
die underlying reahty relating to Muhammad's personahty became hopelessly
obscured. Myth had turned into reality. 147
In analyzing the "mythical" material surrounding Muhammad, Soviet
ethnographers found strong parallels to the shamanistic legends of the ancient
Arabs, and to the idoUzed shamans of some northern people such as lakut, Buriat,
and Altai. 148 Further supporting the shamanist-Islam connections, they pointed
out that shamanist traits can also be found in the practices of Islam. In particular,
they pointed to the celebration of Kurban-bairam, which they asserted was
nothing else than a shamanist cattle-breeding celebration. 149 Similarly, the
mythical personahty of Ali - Muhammad's son-in-law and fourth Khalif of the
Islamic community ~ originated from an Asiatic totemic-solar deity. The legend
of Ah, together with the legend of Fatimah, Muhammad's daughter and Ah's
wife, and the legend of Hasan and Husayn, Fatimah and All's sons, represented
146 Klimovich, "Sushchestvoval," 194-200; and Tolstov, "Ocherki," 59-64.
147 Klimovich, "Sushchestvoval," 198 and 203; and Tolstov, "Ocherki," 64. Also see
"Koran," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed.
148 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 66-7; and Vinnikov, 136-8. According to Vinninkov, the account of
Muhammad's call lay in primitive shamanism which was prevalent in all ancient culture.
149 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 66-8.
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variations on agrarian myths. Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, the first three
Khalifs, were viewed as having their roots in Arab nomads' legends. 150 Soviet
ethnographers argued that the legend of Muhammad came to its full fruition
during the Abbasid Khalifate in the eighth century. The political purpose of the
legend, they argued, was to create a basis for the coalescence of various social
and ethnic groups within the expanded khalifate - including merchants, nomads,
peasants and feudal aristocracy. The legends relating to Muhammad pulled
together threads from the these diverse groups.l^l
The Our'an: Its Veracity and Its Class Character . Issues relating to the
existence of Muhammad or to the veracity of descriptive material relating to his
hfe and personality led Soviet Islamists to analyze the genesis of the Qur'an.
Soviet Islamists claimed that a sociological analysis of the Qur'an, and an analysis
of its literary style, demonstrated that only portions of the Qur'an belonged to the
period of Muhammad's supposed lifetime. They claimed that different sections of
the Qur'an belonged to different periods of the history of the Arabs ~ running
from primitive tribal society to the fuU development of feudalism in the
khalifate.^^'^
Other characteristics of the Qur'an could have been drawn by Soviet
propagandists from the missionary hterature. For example, we read in Soviet
hterature that the organization of the Qur'an is chaotic, that it is illogical, fuU of
contradictions and nonsenses. 1^3 We also read that the Qur'an is only a
150 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 69-77.
151 Tolstov, "Ocherki," 78.
152 "Koran," Bol'shaia Sovetskai Entsiklopediia, 1st ed.; and Puretskii, 106.
153 Puretskii, 107.
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conglomerate of pre-existing religious beliefs adapted to a specific Arab
milieu. 154 We are told that its moral code is that of the social-moral norms of
the Arabs at the time of its writing. 155 These arguments were also made by the
Orthodox missionaries.
Both the Orthodox missionaries and the Soviets concluded that the idea of
God contained in the Qur'an was flawed. For the missionaries the idea of God in
the Qur'an was that of an anthropomorphic vision of an oriental despot. For the
Soviet propagandists it was an anthropomorphic vision of a merchant-trader, of
an oriental feudal despot, or a reincamation of a tribal or agrarian deity.
Interestingly, Soviet scholars of the 1920s and 1930s did not address the
religious content of the Qur'an. The very Umited number of studies dealing
specifically with the Qur'an concentrated on highlighting its class character.
According to Soviet Islamists of the early 1930s, with the development of a class
society (feudahsm) in the khalifate, Islam became the state religion. The Qur'an^
as the main monument of Islam, acquired primary importance as an instrument of
deception and oppression of the masses. 156 Indeed, argued Soviet historians, the
Qur'an's imagery of the last judgement, of the torments of heU and pleasures of
heaven, were powerful instruments to impress submission upon uneducated
minds. 157 Soviet propagandists emphasized that the Qur'an teaches submission to
existing order which comes from God. The Qur'an sanctions inequality.
154 Mochanov, 26; Puretskii, 107-8; and G. Ibragimov, Proiskhozhdenie, 69.
155 Puretskii, 109-10.
156 See for example Nikolaev, 39-41.
157 Mochanov, 27-8; and Klimovich, "Klassovaia," 21-3.
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injustice, and oppression, which together with its teaching of predestination
constitute an effective brake upon the development of the class struggle. 158
The scholarly writings of the Soviet historians dealing with the materialist
origins of Islam, and raising questions about the authenticity of the Prophet and
the divine origins of the Qur'an are viewed in this study as constituting a body of
propaganda. But the major contributions of this literature occurred later, as it
made its way into the work of the hands-on anti-Islamic propagandists.
Conclusions
Propaganda during the Stalin era accompanied direct measures to destroy
rehgion. Because those measures were focused on the observable aspects of
Islam, so too was the propaganda directed against those same features. The class
war was the dominant intellectual feature of the myriad of social changes
accompanying the movement from pre-revolutionary Russia to the post-
revolutionary Soviet Union. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the class war
formed the dominant framework within which anti-rehgious, including anti-
Islamic, propaganda was presented. The period generated numerous sets of
themes and arguments, some of which lasted through the remainder of the Soviet
period. The most durable themes and arguments were those that were generally
supportive of the long-term Marxist goal to create Soviet Man, focusing on
efforts to change the mind set of the masses..Even though reUgion continued to be
understood as a class ideology, the propaganda themes that disappeared were
those that used the class war to attack such observable aspects of Islam as the
mosques and clerics.
Ijo Mochanov, 30-1; and Klimovich, "Klassovaia," 21.
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Aside from the practical propaganda accompanying direct measures to
liquidate religion, the period generated a scholarly propaganda literature. In
their struggle for a Marxist interpretation of the emergence of Islam, the Soviet
intellectuals experimented with sets of ideas that bloomed for a period, especially
during the Cultural Revolution, then died, never to return again. The spirit of
experimentation and rather free discussion that had characterized those years ~ a
type of free-thinking Marxism ~ also died. The study of rehgion became cast
into a rigid doctrinaire mold, from which it did not emerge.
There had not yet developed a strong body of positive propaganda to extoll
the virtues of scientific atheism. Nor had the propaganda apparatus been
integrated fully into the State and Party structures. Those features of the anti-
reUgious campaigns were not to emerge until after the death of Stalin.

167
Chapter VI: Anti-Islamic Propaganda in the Post-Stalin Era
Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda after the death of Stalin was conducted
from within the framework of so-called "scientific atheism." Atheism was not
invented by the Soviets, but they were the principal pohtical force with a stake in
its development. Reinforced by a series of post-Stalin Party decrees (discussed in
Chapters HI and IV), scientific atheism had become a fimily based, broadly
elaborated body of thought by the decade of the 1960s.
By virtue of the growth of science, traditional rehgious thought has been
subjected to a steady stream of difficult questions. Marxism-Leninism, because of
its materiaUst orientation, insinuated itself onto the side of science, or some
sciences/ Traditional religious thought has always had difficulty in dealing, once-
and-for-all, with the central rehgious issue, proving the existence of God. Hence,
Soviet scientific atheism identified and exploited weaknesses in traditional
explanations of God's existence, and attempted to present substantive refutations.
These exploitations and refutations constituted the core of scientific atheism. But
the bulk of scientific atheism dealt with other concerns. In particular, it
concentrated on explaining why rehgious behef was widespread. Atheism moved
into areas of psychology, sociology, history, and ethnography, formulating
specific bodies of thought relating to belief in God and the role of religious belief
and experience.!
This chapter discusses the anti-Islamic themes and arguments emergmg
from scientific atheism in the post-Stalin era. Part of the propaganda literature is
at an advanced scholarly level, and would not find its way directly into the work
of the hands-on propagandists. Even so, such work is an important pre-requisite
For a detailed analysis of Soviet scientific atheistic literature see the work of Thrower.
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to the work of popular propagandists. Once laid out correctly and given the
imprimatur of the Party, the work of the theoretician could form the foundation
upon which popular propaganda could be built. It was not until Glasnosf was
weU underway that scholariy research began to emerge from the propaganda
mold. Although the themes during the post-Stalin era are substantially identical
to those used by propagandists during the 1920s and 1930s, the arguments were
directed toward a changed audience. By the post-Stahn era, the education of the
Soviet population, including the Muslims, had improved markedly. It was
possible, even necessary, for the arguments to become more sophisticated and
subtle than had been the case earher. During the Stalin era the hands-on
propaganda was prepared by a different set of writers from those engaged in
scholarly anti-religious work. In contrast, during the post-Stalin era the hands-on
propaganda and the scholarly work were the responsibility of essentially the same
researchers.
Themes and Arguments
Following up on the efforts of historians of the 1930s, the search for a
satisfactory Marxist interpretation of the rise of Islam was renewed. There was
also a revival of efforts to show the class character of Islam. Propagandists again
concerned themselves with showing that Islam was inconsistent with science; by
this time the propagandists were in a position to point proudly to major
achievements in the Soviet Union. As in the Stalin era, propagandists attacked
Islam's rehgious credentials. The final topic considered in this chapter deals with
Soviet concerns about Islam as a divisive force, especially relating to nationalism.
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Marxist Interpretation of the Emergence of Islam
If it is anything, Marxism is a philosophy of history. Hence, it is not
surprising that reUgion's historical explanation would continue to be a prominent
part of Soviet criticism of religion. Efforts had been made during the Stalin era
to explain the history of Islam within a Marxist context. However, Soviet
intellectuals of the 1960s were unsatisfied. Explanation set forth during the Stalin
era had treated Islam and other religions separately. Little if any attempt had
been made to provide a single explanation of the emergence of rehgion.
Marxist-Leninist intellectual thought in the 1960s moved toward a
consistent explanation of the origin and development of religion in general. In
the Ught of what Marx and Lenin had said of the essence and function of religion,
we would have expected Soviet scholars to attempt to show how, across world
cultures, certain historical forms of material relations have given rise to and have
been reflected in certain historical forms of rehgion. In the post-Stalin era Soviet
historians attempted to do just that.2
One Marxist explanation of the emergence of rehgion and its evolution
from primitive forms to the principal world religions — Christianity, Buddhism
and Islam, ran parallel to the Marxist explanation of the emergence of the
capitalist nation-state.3 After aU, each of these developments was but a
movement along the evolution of the consciousness of man; each is an aspect of
man's increasing differentiation of the world. Just as society stratified itself ~
e.g., from a pre-class society to a fully differentiated aristocracy ~ so too there
was a reflected stratification in the supernatural world. Pre-class society found
2 See for example: Tokarev, Religiia; Semenov; and Zhukov. Also see the detailed analysis
of the Soviet studies of the history of religion in Thrower, 215-88.
3 Semenov.
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its supernatural reflection in nascent polytheism ~ i.e., several supernatural
powers of approximately equal standing. As pre-class society evolved into a fully
developed class structure, but characterized by decentralized government,
polytheism found added sustenance. Within such a material, political and social
setting "the gods acquire the characteristics of terrible sovereigns, ruling over
both people and the world." In contrast, as class society evolved toward the
centralized nation-state; its supernatural counterpart evolved into monotheism,
with its single high god and a panoply of lesser figures.^
With the development of the nation state, there were profound changes in
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Similarly, as rehgion moved
toward monotheism there were marked changes in the relationship between the
god figure(s) and the worshiper. By and large, within polytheism the chief aim
of ritual was to pacify the gods, often with items of common value to the god
figure(s) and the worshiper. In contrast, monotheism is characterized by an
increased separation between the reUgious subjects and the ruling high god, and
an increased separation between the natural world and the supernatural world.5
In analyzing the emergence of the principal world rehgions, the vehicle of
the dialectic carried the evolution of the various religions from one crisis to
another. In the initial crisis, the religion in question was a cohesive force of the
underclass. With the successful movement of the underclass to successive
positions of leadership, the successful religion made appropriate adaptations to
the emerging environment. Within the context of this Darwinian-like dialectic,
adaptabihty is a distinctive characteristic of those religions moving to the class of
4 Semenov, 53.
^ Semenov, 53.
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world religions. Once established, a chief role of religion is to legitimize the
estabhshed order.
But Soviet philosophers and historians were unable to make a fully
satisfactory use of dialectical materialism in explaining religion. While they
found themselves able to speak sensibly about a few relationships between specific
material conditions and corresponding reUgious forms, they were hard-pressed to
argue that these few examples constituted sufficient evidence to validate their
theories. Too often they found that religious views persisted in the face of
changed material conditions. Indeed, some of the strongest reUgious sects have
persevered for centuries within an economic and social climate quite alien to that
within which they emerged.
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, for historians of the 1950s and 1960s
the rise and history of Islam was a rough apphcation of the dialectical explanation
of the rise of religion in general. Similar to the explanations historians had
offered in the 1930s, they argued that the rise of Islam was closely coupled with
deep socio-economic changes taking place in northem Arabia at the beginning of
the seventh century. The deep crisis with which the rise of Islam was associated
was the shaping of a class society among the Arabs. Nascent as yet, the emerging
class society was to culminate in the creation of an Arab state, the Khalifate.
Soviet historians disagreed as to the nature of the class society that was
shaping up in the Hejaz and that pre-conditioned the rise of Islam. Two schools
of thought gained acceptance in Soviet scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s,
schools of thought that owed much to the theories of the pre-war Islamologists.^
One school of thought explained the emergence of Islam as an aspect of a protest
" For an overview of how the subject was treated in Soviet historiography see: Nadiradze,
"Voprosy Obshchestvenno"; and Stetskevich.
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movement within a slave-owning society; a second school explained the
emergence of Islam as a tool of a developing feudal ruling class.
According to the first school of thought, a disintegrating patriarchal system
and the formation of a slave-owning economy had been the pre-conditions to the
rise of Islam. Reflecting the contradictions of the Arab society within which it
emerged ~ prosperity and poverty, slavery and the growth of trade ~ the new
ideology arose as a movement of protest of the under-privileged against the slave-
owning structure of powerful tribes.^ The view of early Islam as a movement
of protest had already been put forward early in the late 1920s. But its further
elaboration in the 1950s- 1960s built upon the emerging work of the theoreticians
of the history of reUgion. The paradigm of these theoreticians was based on the
view that Christianity, Buddhism and Islam became world religions because their
original movements of protest were capable of appeahng beyond national
boundaries.8 Proponents of this view insisted that it was not until after the great
conquests of the Khalifate that Islam developed into the rehgion of the feudal
ruling class.9
According to the second school of thought, a decay of the tribal society and
the formation of early feudal relations had been the pre-conditions of the rise of
Islam. Insisting that feudal relations were already dominant before the great
conquests, these historians argued that Islam was the rehgion of a feudal elite
83.
Beliaev, Ara&j, 107-8; and Petrushevskii, 8-10.
Tokarev, Religiia, 445, 470, and 512, Tokarev elaborated on this point in "Problemy,
^ The main advocates of that theory were: lakubovskii, 179; Beliaev, Araby, 94-5; and
Petrushevskii, 5-7 and 24. Also see the collective work htoriia Irana, 84.
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from its very beginning. 10 According to this view, Islam was not a spontaneous
movement, nor was it a movement of the underclass. Rather, it was the result of
intentional activity on the part of the ruling social elite. 1 1 This ehte was
interested in uniting its forces with a view toward territorial expansion and
international trade. In its differentiation of the tribe into social classes and in its
emphasis upon the role of the class struggle, this post-Stalin interpretation of the
emergence of Islam differed from the interpretation presented in the 1930s and
included in the first edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia. However, some
similarities were continued. For example, both interpretations asserted that the
proclamation of monotheism, by uniting locaUzed cults under one authority, was
one way of overcoming the resistance of small fragmented tribal groups.
Imposed from above, the propagation of the faith by the force of arms was an
important characteristic of Islam.
One variant of this theme was to highlight the argument that Islam is an
aUen religion. Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists were able to point out that Islam
had been brought to Central Asia by the Arabs and imposed by force. Because
Islam's rehgious writings are in Arabic, it remained intellectually
incomprehensible to its popular adherents. Consequently, its spread had been
superficial. 12 By viewing Islam m this fashion, it was seen as being quite
different from the other two world religions, Christianity and Buddhism. These,
emerging as protest movements which transcended national boundaries, had been
spread by popular consent.
1^ This view had been stated tentatively and without much elaboration by Pigulevskaia, 402-3;
and more forcefully by N.A. Smimov, 181 and passim. The view finds expression in the work
of: Nadiradze, "K Voprosu o Rabstve," 139 and passim; and Lundin, 95.
1
1
Mavliutov, 12; Zhukov, 22; and Vsemirnaia, 104.
12 Mavliutov, 23-4; and Mullaev, 23-4.
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Although there was no general agreement as to the specifics of the socio-
economic crises associated with the rise of Islam, there was agreement among
Soviet Islamists that the rise of Islam reflected a deep crisis connected with the
disintegration of the decentralized tribal system. The biting edge of the new
Islamic preaching was directed against this dying order, against its morality and
against the ideas embodied in paganism. 13 in addition, there was agreement
about the role of Islam once estabhshed. Its role was to legitimize the established
social order. Soviet Islamists claimed that Islam was particularly weU adapted to
the formalized relations characteristic of feudalism. By uniting temporal and
spiritual authorities under one supreme ruler, the khalif, Islam provided the
strong centraUzed power necessary to keep the unsatisfied and unfortunate masses
under control. Moreover, in suppressing the masses, Islam was used in much
cruder ways than Christianity. 1^
Neither of these explanations of the rise of Islam left much room for the
potential contribution of a central personality such as Muhammad. As had been
the case among historians of the 1930s, a common theme of Soviet historians of
the 1950s and 1960s, and even 1970s, related to the shortcomings of Muhammad.
His existence was either denied absolutely or seriously doubted, or his personal
characteristics were vilified. 15 Beyond that, it was argued that Islam was the
product of an era, not of a central religious figure.
13 See for example: Petrushevskii, 7 and 10; Beliaev, Araby, 104; Mavliutov, 11-2;
Klimovich, Islam (1965), 20-1; Patrushev, 4; Borisov, 10-1 and 29; Ocherki Nauchnogo, 87-8;
and "Islam," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd ed. (not signed), and 3rd ed. by M.A.
Batunskii.
14 See for example Zhukov, 24,
15 See for example: Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 18-24; Beliaev, "Sushchestvoval"; and id.,
Araby, 85-6; Klimovich, /^/aw (1965), 37-9; Mavliutov, 15-6; Frolova; and Bairamsakhatov and
Mavliutov, 17-26.
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An area to which Soviet scholars turned their attention in the post-1954
period was the history of divisions within Islam, a phenomenon generally ignored
during the early decades following the revolution. 16 Islamists explored the
development of Shi'ism, and, more generally, the history of the evolution of
Islamic sectarianism. 17 in contrast, beginning in the 1930s substantial attention
had been paid to sectarian differences within Christianity. Why there would be
propaganda value in the historical analysis of divisions within Christianity is
readily understandable. First, the study of Russian sectarianism had provided
early Marxist scholars with examples of social movements within the class
struggle. Some sects possessed communal characteristics with which Marxists
could readily identify. 18 Second, continuing Russian sectarianism constituted
real, observable, potentially exploitable, cleavages within the community of
Christians. It is also easy to understand why there would be httle demand from
propagandists for research that would assist them in exploiting sectarian divisions
within Islam. After all, Muslims with whom they were dealing had essentially no
contact with sects outside the ummah; and differences among Muslims within the
ummah — e.g., between Sunnis and Shi'ahs, or different schools of thought within
Sunniism and Shi'ism - did not constitute meaningful divisions. 19
It appears likely that the post-Stahn movement of Islamic scholarship into
the study of Islamic sectarianism was merely a reasonable pursuit of their own
16 Some exception to this generalization was provided by research relatmg to the Bahais, the
most outwardly evident movement of struggle against established Islam. See M.S. Ivanov, 74.
17 Among "Islamic" sects Soviet historians included: Kharijis, Qarmatians, Mu'tazilis,
Isma'ilis, Druzes, Alauis, and Bahais.
18 Stites, Revolutionary, 121-2. For an analysis of the rich literature of the 1920s and 1930s
conceming Russian sectarianism see Thrower, 430-8.
19 For rare attacks on "Islamic" sects in the 1930s see: Salim, "Babizm"; Arshanini,
"Babizm"; and Klimovich, "Ismaihsm."
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developing interests. Such interests may have been stimulated by the fact that the
Soviet Union was pursuing interests in the Middle East, where quasi-Islamic sects
were prominent.
The history of sectarianism within Islam, as understood by Soviet
historians, was but a further application of the dialectic used to explain the
emergence of Islam itself. Namely, specific sects emerged as an aspect of revolt
against the estabhshed status-quo, and reflected some kind of crisis of the socio-
economic base. Sects were organs of expression of a struggle, generally by
peasants, against exploitation under the feudal social structure.^O The history of
the development of Shi'ism was explained in similar terms. ShVism arose in the
first century of Islam as an aspect of a struggle for power in the Khalifate. By
the fifteenth century it had become the ideological banner of feudal lords in their
struggle with central authorities. The fact that Shi'ism at that time was
persecuted drew to it many peasants and lower class town people, who enroUed
under its flag.^l After Shi'ism was adopted as a state religion in Iran in the
sixteenth century, however, it become reconciled with the established order and
actively supported it.
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s interest in the historical rise of
Islam appears to have decreased in Soviet scholarship. If broached, such material
was used as an introduction to a different substantive topic. Moreover, the
explanations were more-or-less fixed in their major features, with essentially no
new ideas introduced. In part the lack of apparent interest may be due to the fact
that Soviet historians were severely limited in their access to source material
20 See for example: Beliaev, Musul'manskoe, 4 and passim; Mavliutov, 70; Klimovich, Islam
(1965), 137 djid passim; Petrushevskii, 234-5; and Stroeva.
2^ See for example: Miklukho-Maklaia, 224-5; and Petrushevskii, 202, 303, andposs/w.
Also see Kadyrova.
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relating to early Islam. A translation with commentary on the Qur'an, a work
initiated and largely produced by Liu. Krachkovsky, appeared in the Soviet
Union in 1963.22 Soviet scholars admit that prior to Krachkovsky's edition, the
old pre-revolutionary translation and commentaries on the Qur'an by G.S.
Sablukov, an Arabist but also an Orthodox missionary, had served the needs of
the academic profession.23 But there was no translation or commentary on the
Hadith, or of basic Islamic sources such as Ibn-Ishaq, Ibn-Hisham, Ibn-Sa'ad, al-
Balaziri and many others. Judging by references provided by Soviet scholars,
access to such sources was limited. Access to foreign scholarship, Muslim or
western, was difficult.
Not until the 1980s did Soviet historians again register interest in the
historical evolution of Islam. The renewed interest was associated with the
resurgence of Islam both within the Soviet Union and abroad. In order to
evaluate the results of education in scientific atheism with a view toward
improving the overall education effort, begiiming in the late- 1960s
ethnographers, sociologists, historians, and hands-on-propagandists conducted a
series of surveys of reUgiosity across the repubUcs of the Soviet Union.24 By die
early 1980s, results of studies conducted by Soviet scholars had shown that an
interest in religion was growing among diverse sections of the Soviet population.
Whereas the Marxist explanation of rehgion had led the Soviets to beUeve that
22 Koran: PerevodKrachkovskogo.
23 Sablukov, Koran; and id., commentary on the Qur'an, Svedeniia o Korane. Soviet
scholars acknowledged that Sablukov's translation and commentary served the needs of the
academic profession until Krachkovskii's translation in 1963. See for example: Stetskevich, 128;
and Griaznevich, "Koran," 80.
24 The list of surveys is very long. Below is a sample of surveys of religiosity in the various
Muslim republics: Baltanov; labbarov; Makatov, Islam; Pivovarov, Na Etapakh; Sarsenbaev,
Obychai; Religioznye Perezhitki; Bazarbaev, Opyt Sotsiologicheskogo; Problemy Ateisticheskogo;
and Baialieva.
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secularization would have resolved the religious problem, the studies
demonstiated that rehgion continued to play an important part in the lives of
many Soviet citizens. As an aspect of intellectual developments leading to
Glasnosf, historians had begun to question their Marxist explanatory framework.
To explain the rise and subsequent tenacity of Islam a number of Soviet
Islamists began to call for a broadened analysis. They believed that it was
necessary to go beyond the socio-economic and pohtical conditions into the realm
of motivating factors forming the tissue of human concerns ~ such as human
hopes, fears, anxieties, rehgious ideas, and so forth.25 it is precisely upon such
factors that western historians have been laying stress in seeking to account for
the rise of and adherence to Islam or, for that matter, any other religion.
Islam as a Class Ideology
According to its theoreticians, one of the basic aims of scientific atheism
was to identify the functions served by rehgion in a class society. Whatever
Marx's interpretation of rehgion and of its role in society, Soviet anti-religious
specialists had viewed rehgion within one context only, as the ideology of the
ruling class. Consequently, according to the accepted analysis of scientific
atheism, religion was nothing but a tool serving the interests of that ruling class.
In the analysis and propaganda generated in the 1920s and 1930s, Islamic
clerics were identified as the specific tools of the ruling class. For the most part
the analysis was made on the basis of the identification of the services rendered
by the clerics. No real attempt had been made to analyze the sources of Islamic
teaching ~ the Qur'an, the Hadith, and many dimensions of the Shari'ah - to
2^ See for example the interesting article by Griaznevich, "Problemy," 5-18. Also note the
change in tone and ideas in the dictionary Islam: Slovar, in particular the essay on Islam at the
beginning of the dictionary, 6-22. The dictionary is the collective work by well-known scholars.
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expose Islam on ideological grounds. However, in the mid-1950s the direction of
inquiry shifted toward a subject matter more in line with the interests of its
increasingly sophisticated audience. The shift toward the underlying sources of
Islamic thought and practices was an aspect of the overall movement of
propaganda toward ideology. In any event, by then the registered clerics had
become part of the Soviet establishment and had been incorporated into the
nomenklatura. Hence, they were no longer available as objects of direct attack.
The studies of the Qur'an and other sources were particularly numerous in
the 1960s and early-1970s. As it turns out, it is something of an overstatement to
use such words as "analysis" and "studies" in characterizing the work of Islamists
in this area. In fact, the chief results of the investigations were a collection of a
limited number of suspicious quotations,26 along with ex-cathedra
pronouncements, indictments, and findings. From within the context of modem
Islamic studies these results appear to be simplistic and naive. In any event, the
results of these studies were presented in all levels of the print media ~ from the
scholarly journals, apparently directed toward other religious specialists, to the
popular press, apparently to be read by the masses.
Anti-Islamic propagandists condemned Islam for diverting man's attention
from this life. The central message of the Qur'an, according to Soviet specialists,
is that man is tied to God in both this life and after death. Life on earth is an
illusion, merely a preparation for life after death. The chief hope of man is that
he wiU achieve paradise. In pursuit of this hope, everything man does on earth is
to be directed toward pleasing God. Indeed, even in this life man is weU-advised
to please God; on his own man is a feeble creature without independent will. As
2" Many of the numbers of Qur'anic verses given by Soviet writers do not correspond to
those found in the Muslim-accepted English version, The Meaning, translated by Abdullah Yusuf
All.
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man looks toward God, he must have unquestioned faith; he must submit to God
in all things. Thus, the Soviet speciahsts were particularly concerned with the
eschatological features of Islam, the cutting edge of decision between paradise and
hell. As with other rehgions, it is within this area that the social and poUtical
inferences can be drawn. Simply put they are this: If you do not obey God (the
ruling class), you will go to heU.27 in addition, it diverts people, both
emotionally and inteUectuaUy, from those activities that would better their lot in a
social and political sense.^S
In their analysis of the Qur'an, anti-Islamic specialists were most
frequently drawn to four quotes. The fkst verse given below, in which the
itahcized portion was the part to which the Soviets confined their attention, was
used as a basis for arguing that the Qur'an is an ideological document of the
ruling class.29
Oh ye who believe!
Obey God, and obey the Apostle,
And those charged
With authority among you.
If ye differ in anything
Among yourselves, refer it
To God and His Apostle,
If ye do beheve in God
And the Last Day;
That is best, and most suitable
27 See for example: Klimovich, Koran, 30; id., Islam (1965), 79-80; Patrushev, 11-2;
Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 7; MuUaev, 30; Mavliutov, 37-42; and Izimbetov, 67. Also see:
Ishmukhametov, Islam; Baltanov and Gil'fanov; and Shaidullina.
28 In particular see: Klimovich, Koran, 27; and Mullaev, 30.
29 See for example: M. AbduUaev, 33; Klimovich, Islam, 80; id., "Islam i Sovremennost'.
V. 9, 16; Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 4, 52; Mullaev, 9 and 28-29; and Ocherki Nauchnogo, 104.
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For final determination.(S. IV. 59)30
The argument that the Qur'an is an ideological document for the ruling
class has a historical basis. As indicated in the preceding section, it justified the
dominance of the centralized feudal system of the Khalifate. In analyzing the
verse shown above, the Soviet anti-Islamic specialists caUed attention to the fact
that God, Allah, was placed in the center of the spiritual worid, suggesting that it
was only natural that there be a central ruler in the temporal world. Also, by
mentioning "... those charged with authority among you... " so closely juxtaposed
to a reference to God, it could be inferred that the ruling classes were
representatives of God and, accordingly, should be obeyed.
Further justification of the ruhng class was given by the following verse:
Is it they who would portion out
The Mercy of the Lord?
It is We Who portion out
Between them their livelihood
In the life of this world:
And We raise some of them
Above others in ranks,
So that some may command
Work from others.
But the Mercy of thy Lord
Is better than the (wealth)
Which they amass.(S. XLDI. 32)
Clearly, the leadership structure is determined by God. At the same tune,
God portions out among men their respective economic roles ~ i.e., God
determines the productive relations. It is also clear that the ruhng class has the
God-given right to command work from others. Hence, the Qur'an sanctions
30 The English translation of the Qur'anic verses is from The Meaning.
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inequality and, hence, injustice.31 Soviet specialists generally left out the
redeeming character of the verse, that the mercy of the Lord is better than mere
wealth. The Soviet propagandists provided further fortification of their
arguments that the Qur'an sanctioned inequality and injustice by citations directed
toward justifications of slavery and of woman's inferior role,32 or by analyzing
aspects of the Muslim law dealing with property, the tax system, and commercial
regulations.33
Another verse used to show that the Qur'an sanctions income inequality and
injustice was the following:
God has bestowed His gifts
of sustenance more fi'eely on some
Ofyou than on others; those
More favored are not going
To throw back their gifts
To those whom their right hands
possess, so as to be equal
In that respect. Will they then
Deny the favors of God? (S. XVI. 71)
Aside from showing the spiritual basis of inequality, the above-cited verse
was used to show the Qur'anic basis of private property.34 Coupled with the
verse presented below, we are led to understand that income inequality is used as
31 M. Abdullaev, 33; KUmovich, Islam (1965), 80; id., "Islam i Sovremennost'," V.9, 16;
Mullaev, 28-9; Mavliutov, 52; Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 59; "Ocherki Nauchnogo, 104; and
Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 67-8.
32 See for example: Klimovich, Islam (1965), 287-9 and passim; Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 6;
Sarymsakov, 79-81; M.V. Wsigabo\, Islam, 13-5 and passim; Akliev, "Chto Takoe Shariat?" 55-6;
Ocherki Nauchnogo, 104; and Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 137-9.
33 See for example the studies of: Mullaev; and Kerimov, Shariat.
34 M. Abdullaev, 34-5; Klimovich, Islam (1965), 80; id., "Islam i Sovremennost'," V. 9, 16;
Mavliutov, 52-3; Bairamsakhatov and MavUutov, 58-9 and 73; and Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 67-
8.
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a testing device.35 God tests some by providing riches; others he tests by
oppressing them. Man is not to concern himself with whether he is being tested
by excessive riches, or by poverty. Each of these material situations arises by the
wiU of God. Hence, the believer should not rebel against the existing order. He
should accept it.
Nor strain thine eyes in longing
For the things We have given
For enjoyment to parties
Of them, the splendors
Of the life of this world,
Through which We test them:
But the provision of thy Lord
Is better and more enduring.(S. XX. 131)
Through quotes such as those illustrated above, the Soviet anti-Islamic
specialists portrayed Islam as a class ideology. The upshot of these and other
quotes was to show that the Qur'an provides the ideological basis for the existing
class structure. The Qur'an orders all Muslims to be brothers. Such an order, if
accepted, would mean that the rich and poor would be cooperative rather than
recognizmg their class differences.^^ The Muslim believer is told that only faith
can make man happy; he is wamed not to look for happiness in this world. Such
views, coupled with predestination, another aspect of Islamic ideology to receive
substantial attention of Soviet Islamic specialists, would, if unchallenged, place an
ideological brake on the class struggle.37 in some sense. Islamic notions of
predestination became intellectually pitted against Marxist ideas of historical
^^ In particular see Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 4, 52.
36 Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 70; and Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 4, 52.
37 See for example: Klimovich, Islam (1965), 89-90; Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 4, 49; and
Mavliutov, 53-4.
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inevitability. But while predestination constitutes an excuse for the Muslims to
accept the status quo, the Marxist concept of historical determinism served as a
rallying cry for the masses to jump on the winning bandwagon.
It is of interest to note that these, and other similar, quotes were to be
found in both propaganda directed toward the MusUm believers, and in the high-
level scholarly presentations directed toward anti-reUgious specialists and lower-
level activists. This point is not of interest merely because the subject matter is
identical; indeed, it would be expected that the propagandists would use the work
of the academics. However, one would expect that the analysis of the academics
would be conducted on one level of abstraction and that the writings of the
propagandists would be presented at quite another. But that was not the case.
Both the Islamic academics and the propagandists used essentially the same words.
One might speculate that such uniformity reflected the efforts of the writers to
avoid inadvertent deviation from positions approved by the Party.
The theme that Islam was the ideology of the ruling classes had great
propaganda value inmiediately after the Revolution, and during the decades
preceding World War H, decades that were still impregnated with revolutionary
fervor. If a theme were evaluated in terms of its ability to find resonance within
its target audience, the durabihty of the idea that Islam was the ideology of the
ruling classes is virtually incomprehensible. After all, by the 1980s the pre-
revolutionary class structure had been absent for more than seventy years.
However, because the Soviet system was, in fact, sustained on the basis of the
Marxian ideology, and because the class struggle was a major element of that
ideology, the durabihty of that theme was assured.
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Islam Not Consistent with Science
One means of undermining religion is to show that some of its explicit
teachings are wrong. To the extent that such a showing can be made, it fortifies a
presumption that there are other, perhaps more serious, errors. Beyond that,
within the intellectual framework of behevers themselves there is agreement that
divine truth can contain no error. Hence, if error is shown, it follows that the
source of the truth cannot be divine. Based on such considerations, scientific
atheism and Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists directed their attention toward the
identification of error within Islam.
It is of interest to recall that the Russian Orthodox missionaries had already
taken the Muslims to task because Islamic teachings were inconsistent with
science. But to the missionaries science meant reason. Islamic dogma was
viewed by the Orthodox missionaries as primitive and irrational. To the
Marxists, however, science meant something else. In part, science referred to the
scientific method, and to that collection of leamings and technology that had
become the common property of the world at large; and, in part, science referred
to the Marxist doctrine embodied in scientific atheism.
Before going further, it should be pointed out that for Soviet scholars the
realm of inquiry relating to the nature of rehgion was essentially closed.
SpeciaUsts operated with the understanding that the Party was in possession of
truth.38 The only means of knowmg truth consisted of the scientific method
articulated within the framework of dialectical materialism To the extent that
there was any need to explore the dialectical framework, that work took place at
a philosophical level. The treatment of religion within the framework of the
dialectic was not directed specifically at Islam, but dealt with rehgion in
38 Thrower, 208.
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general.39 Much of the hterature dealing with the incompatibility of Islam with
science was directed toward a general audience and was to be found in popular
journals such as Nauka i Religiia (Science and ReUgion).
A substantial literature emerged around the argument that the religious
picture of the world has disintegrated in the face of natural science and the
empirical method. Thus, for example, we know that the earth is round, not flat
as stated in the Qur'an ; we know that the world is several biUions years old; and
we know that it was not created in six days. Propagandists ridiculed Islamic
notions that the earth is an immobile surface situated in the center of the universe
and organized in two parts, the earth and the sky; that the sky consists of seven
floors, or layers, suspended above the earth, one on top of the other, and held
there by God; that the sky is inhabited by the souls of the dead, by angels, and by
Allah; that the sun was created to heat the earth; that the moon was created in
order to help us maintain a calendar and to lighten the roads at night; and that the
chief role of the stars is to decorate the sky. The Qur'an teaches that man was
created by God, and that everything else had been created by God for the benefit
of man. These accounts were juxtaposed with Darwinian explanations of
evolution. In short, questions were raised about the rehgious stories of creation
and, looking to the future, of fmal judgment. Following such ridicule, the
propagandists would then caU forth Soviet advances in astronomy or astrophysics,
thereby setting the record straight.^O
39 In the philosophical realm see among others: "Nauchnoe i Religioznoe"; Kessidi; Klor,
Inov and Pereturin; Pantskhava; Chemiak; Nauka i Teologiia; and Fundamentals.
40 For such treatment of the Qur'anic stories of creation see: Gadzhiev, 132-8; Klimovich,
Koran, 14-25; id., Islam (1965), 60-74; id., "Islam i Sovremennost," V. 8, 51-5; M. AbduUaev,
32-3; Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 2; Mavliutov, 47-8; Ocherki Nauchnogo, 91-109; Bairamsakhatov
and Mavliutov, 46-55; and Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 57-66. Also see: Kuliev, Antinauchnaia;
Muslimov and Churkin; and Shaniiazova.
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Propagandists pointed out that unusual events could be explained as natural
phenomena, rather than as expressions of God's will. For example, the shaking
of the earth would be identified as an earthquake; darkness during daylight hours
would be identified as an echpse; the spouting of smoke and fire by the earth
would be identified as a volcano; and a blazing hght movmg through the sky
would be identified as a comet 41 In a positive vein, anti-religious propagandists
would then move on to extoll Soviet advances in the natural sciences.
Soviet medicine played an important role in anti-Islamic propaganda
directed toward showing that Islam is inconsistent with science. The typical
propaganda involved describing a situation in which an unofficial Muslim cleric
practiced faith healing on a patient who could have been saved by a Soviet
doctor.42 Thus, Soviet advances in medicine could be highlighted. Another
typical argument consisted in providing information conceming the health risks
incurred by practicing certain religious customs and rites such as circumcision,
the fasting of the month oi Ramadan, or pilgrimage to holy places.43
On a somewhat different front, anti-Islamic specialists attacked official
clerics who maintained that there is no real contradiction between science and
religion. The clerics asserted that natural science is the sphere of empirical
reason and experiment, while theology is the sphere of reason guided by faith.
They argued that science deals with experimental aspects of knowledge, while
faith deals with intemal cognition. Indeed, going fuU circle in logic, the clerics
41 See for example: AbduUaev and Vagabov, 17 1-2; Ismailov; and Klimovich, Znanie.
42 See among others: Khairullaev; Protiv Religioznogo, 74-81; and "Uspekhi."
43 See for example Akliev, "Uraza" (fasting), 72; Karaev, "Sunnet" (circumcision), 64; Protiv
Religioznogo, 77; Mezhidov, 30-1; Ovezov, 92 and 98; Petrash, Sviatye, 95; and as late as 1987
Kurbanov and Kurbanov, 37.
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insisted that science and natural science are forms of God's revelation.44 The
anti-Islamic propagandists argued that the clerics were simply trying to regain
their constituency; that they were giving up peripheral aspects of their dogma as a
means of preserving their position. The clerics were charged with mystical
obscurantism and with attempting simply to cover up their intellectual
bankruptcy.45 With a view toward administering the intellectual coup de grace,
the scientific atheists asserted that religious explanations of the emergence of the
universe did not permit the dialectical unfolding of matter.46 Most simply put,
because religious explanations were inconsistent with dialectical materiaUsm, they
were wrong. The attempts of Muslim clerics to reconcile science with religion
only confused the masses, preventing them from grasping fuUy the material
essence of Ufe.47
In one of their most inventive and curious charges, anti-Islamic specialists
ventured to argue that major Islamic thinkers were, in fact, "closet" atheists. The
propagandists attempted to show that even the most powerful Islamic thinkers of
the Middle Ages had come to recognize that religion and science were
incompatible, and had struggled to free contemporary philosophy and science
from the dictates of dogmatic Islamic theology. However, during the period
when Islam was all-powerful, tiiese Islamic scientists, and other thinkers, were
obhged to camouflage their findings within theologically acceptable terms. Such
44 Gadzhiev, 141-2; Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 1 15-6 and 121-3; Petrash and Khamitova,
327-9; Artykov, 22; Radzhapov; Alieva, 60-1; and "Modemizatsiia Ideologii," 106-7.
45 Gadzhiev, 141; Artykov, 20-1; Radzhapov, 132-3 and 137; and Ashirov, Evoliutsiia
(1973), 7, \U,^J^d passim.
46 Alieva, 61.
47 Gadzhiev, 143.
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charges were made regarding Avicenna (Ibn-Sina), Averroes (Ibn-Rushd'), al-
Kindi, al-Biruni, Uluqbeg, Umar Khayyam, Ah Shir-Navoi (a Sufi Naqshbandi),
Makhtum-KuU (another Naqshbandi shaykh), and many others.48
Islam Not a Legitimate Rehgion
The scientific atheists were very much interested in proving that Islam was
created by man and, consequently, was not of divine origin. Why it was that the
scientific atheists were so preoccupied with making such a showing — not only in
the popular media but also in their scholariy pubhcations ~ is surprising in view
of their confidence in the superiority of their own doctrinal position. The Soviet
propagandists used two approaches to attack the rehgious legitimacy of Islam.
One approach consisted of questioning the authenticity of its doctrinal basis. The
second approach was to attack the popular beliefs and practices of Muslim
believers.
Islam Not of Divine Origin . In arguing that Islam was not of divine origin
the scientific atheists were virtually at one with the earher positions of the
Russian Orthodox missionaries. While the Orthodox missionaries were advocates
of the principle of divine origin and the Soviet anti-religious specialists were not,
their anti-Islamic arguments were remarkably similar. Each denied the revealed
nature of Islam, with particular emphasis on the Qur'an, its holy book. As had
been the case with the Russian Orthodox missionaries, Soviet propagandists
emphasized the human characteristics of the Qur'an; they raised questions relating
48 Articles describing Islamic thinkers as 'closet' atheists were numerous in popular journals.
See for example: Klimovich, "Islam i Sovremennost'," V. 12; "Velikii Gumanist"; Mendelevich;
Urazaev; Akiniiazov; and as late as 1987 Zaitsev.

190
to the source of Islamic precepts; and, they pointed out that the precepts were not
constant, rather that they had varied over time and across geography.
In emphasizing the human characteristics of the Holy Book, the speciaUsts
in scientific atheism, as had the Russian missionaries, spent a great deal of energy
in describing its chaotic organization, and the absence of chronological and
logical order.49 The various styles of the Qur'an were regarded as evidence both
of its collective authorship and of the different historical periods in which it had
been written 50 Soviets linguists argued that the Uterary achievement of the
Qur'an, although it was excellent, was not better than that of the outstanding Arab
poetry of that time.51 Such an argument contradicted the Muslim view that the
Qur'an's hterary excellence is an evidence of its revealed nature. Soviet scholars
insisted that the fact that the Qur'an was written in Arabic was itself evidence that
it was not a gift from God. Why would an Omnipotent, Omnipresent God have
concerned Himself with, and have sent His last Prophet to, such inconsequential
places as Mecca and Medina if He were laying the basis for a universal
reUgion?52 Questions such as these were raised by serious Soviet scholars.
Further evidence of the Qur'an's human authorship was provided by the
fact that, contrary to what the Qur'an itself stated, its teaching was inconsistent.
Soviet Islamists asserted that they had identified more than 200 contradictions
^^ See for example: M. Abdullaev, 32; Klimovich, Koran, 10; Bairamsakhatov and
Mavliutov, 37; Izimbetov, 64; and Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 38 ?ind passim.
5^ Klimovich, Islam (1965), 47; Mavliutov, 45-7; and Avksent'ev and Mavliutov, 23-4.
5
1 Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 9-10.
5^ Mavliutov, 48; and Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 8-9.
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within the Qur'an, a number similar to that advanced by the missionaries.53
Examples of Qur'anic inconsistencies provided by the propagandists were also
choice examples of the missionaries. A favorite example of both the Soviets and
the missionaries claimed that the Qur'anic dogma of predestination contradicted
the Qur'anic teaching of man's responsibihty for his acts. In another favorite
example of internal inconsistency, both propagandists and missionaries pointed
out that although the Qur'an teaches that other religions ~ Judaism and
Christianity ~ were God's creation, at the same time it teaches hatred of those
same rehgions.54
One further approach to arguing that Islam was the product of man's
imagination and not of revelation was to trace the source of Islamic precepts to
other systems of beliefs prominent in the Arabian peninsula of the seventh
century. Similar to the approach of the Russian Orthodox missionaries, to make
their point Soviet Islamists compared excerpts from the Qur'an with excerpts
from the Bible.55 But in an unconscious foray into Russian chauvinism, or in a
continuation of their predisposition towards European thought, the Russian anti-
Islamic speciahsts betrayed a preference for Christianity that was uncharacteristic
of Marxists, arguing that the Islamic originators were unable to appreciate the
high level of intellectual development represented by Christianity.56 Necessarily
limited by their primitive framework of knowledge, the Muslims mixed Christian
^3 See for example: M. Abdullaev, 32; Klimovich, Islam (1965), 52 2ind.passim\ Mavliutov,
54-7; and Ocherki Nauchnogo, 92-5.
^^ Klimovich, Islam (1965), 52; Mavliutov, 54-5; and Ocherki Nauchnogo, 94-5.
55 See in particular: Sarymsakov, 45-6; Saidbaev, "Chemu," V. 9, 27; and Avksent'ev and
Mavliutov, 56, 60, and passim.
56 Semenov, 59 and 61. Except for Semenov, the argument was rarely as bluntly put but it
was pervasive in the work of most Russian anti-Islamic propagandists.
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and Judaic concepts with their own primitive beliefs. In short, Islam did not
bring a new system of beliefs into the worid.
Moving away from the idea that Islam is locked in time to the seventh
century and locked in space to the Arab world, Soviet Islamists argued that the
fact that Islam has varied through time and across geography, depending upon the
conditions within which man has found himself, is evidence that it is a man made
religion. The argument emerged from general Marxist views of the relationship
between the superstructure and the productive forces. Turning specifically to the
twentieth century, Soviet Islamists argued that the enormous changes in social
relations and the increased tempo of scientific and technical progress had led
Muslim clerics, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the Muslim world, to
rethink Islamic teaching of social doctrine, moral values, and theological-
dogmatic precepts.
Scientific atheists pointed to changes in social doctrine as an example of
Islamic deviation. According to ancient Islamic teaching, power was sent by
God. Consequently, no power was to be opposed, not even an evil power. But
within the twentieth century Soviet State the Muslim clerics were teaching that
oppression and exploitation must be opposed and that the freedom of man must be
defended. In pre-revolutionary Russia the clerics had found that the Qur'an
advocated private property; but in the Soviet Union the clerics advocated public
ownership. Beyond that, the clerics had managed to find a way to oppose class
differences, inequality, and injustice. Although such modem views were laudable
according to scientific atheists, they showed that Islamic teaching had emerged
from its historical surroundings, not from unchanging principles.57
5^ For such arguments see: Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 36-43; id., "Evoliutsiia
Sotsial'nykh," 38-9; and Ishmukhametov, Sotsial'naia, 187-90.
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In their analysis of Islam in different countries throughout the world,
Soviet Islamists found that the clerics invariably supported the existing socio-
economic system, be it capitalist, socialist or otherwise.58 The Islamists pointed
out that throughout history and at every place the Muslim clerics managed to
interpret the Qur'an in such a way as to support the existing order.
Soviet specialists of Islam found that Islamic moral values have changed
over time. One of the most common examples of such change was found in
Islamic teaching relating to the role of women. Prior to the Revolution, Islamic
teaching and tradition considered the public interaction of women with men in
virtually any type of setting as sinful. After the Revolution, however, men and
women were to work together in building the socialist state. Taking their cue in
chameleon-like fashion, MusUm clerics opened the doors of the mosques to
women, encouraging them to participate fuUy in the reUgious life of the Muslim
community.59 The Muslim clerics made not-so-oblique concessions that there
were some aspects of the SharVah — e.g., polygamy and divorce ~ that could be
reconsidered.60
To the Soviet Islamists, probably the most convincing evidence that Islam is
man-made was found in the metamorphosis of Islamic dogma. In the eyes of the
Islamists, two aspects of dogma had been abandoned. One, the Muslim clerics
were accused of acknowledgmg implicitly that the Qur'an is not the word of God.
Two, the clerics were charged with abandoning Islam's traditional views on
predestination. As a basis for the accusation that Muslim clerics had
58 See in particular: Akhmedov, 8 dja.d passim; and Kerimov, "Nekotorye."
59 Gadzhiev, 53-5; Dadabaeva, 53-4; Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 20, 91, and 95-106; and
Ishmukhametov, Sotsial'naia, 195-8.
60 Ashirov, Evoliutsiia.i\91'i\ 1 10 and 119; id., "Evoliutsiia Bogoslovsko," 22; and
Artykov, 22-3.
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acknowledged that the Qur'an is not the word of God, Soviet Islamists
concentrated on the fact that Islamic theologians in recent time had found
reinterpretation to be necessary in order to address specific situations.^! It is
surprising that anything noteworthy was found in the fact that authoritative
sources were being reinterpreted in order to address new situations. After all,
there had been continuing effort among the Soviets in their interpretation of
Marx and Lenin. Apparently, however, the reinterpretation of the Qur'an was
thought to be of a qualitatively different character.
God might have elected to have written the Qur'an in broad generalities ~
a la Christian Bible. Had God done so His followers would have become
accustomed to interpreting from the general to the specific. Although some
Christian sects have made an effort to freeze their interpretations in time, by-and-
large, Christians have become accustomed to the necessity of reinterpreting the
Bible in light of changing circumstances. But because of the way it was written,
the Qur'an presents unusual difficulties in interpretation. Even among Muslims
there are substantial and continuing difficulties about issues related to
interpretation of the Qur'an. Hence, the propagandists were exploiting an issue
about which the Muslims were, and continue to be, sensitive. But among Muslims
there is a view that God, through the Prophet, elected to address Himself directly
to a specific society and to a specific social stmcture. He explicitly eschewed the
option of making grandiose pronouncements set forth in broad generalities. As a
consequence of this approach to writing eternal truth, God, through the Prophet,
chose to cause His followers to interpret specific situations cast in seventh century
Arabia and to extrapolate those fmdings to whatever situation might present
61 Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 1 12-5 and passim; id., "Evoliutsiia Bogoslovsko," 21-2.
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itself.62 Among Muslim clerics attempting to make Islam relevant to the Soviet
condition, this view of Quar'anic interpretation seemed to prevail.63 in a related
charge, Soviet Islamists pointed to a change in the stance of Muslim clerics about
how and by whom the Qur'an is to be interpreted. During the Soviet period,
Soviet Muslim clerics encouraged the faithful to read the Qur'an and to interpret
it for themselves 64
The second aspect of changed dogma was the changed position about
predestination in Islam. Although predestination is no longer an important issue
within Islam, Soviet specialists of Islam seized upon it as a propaganda
opportunity. They asserted that Muslim clerics in tsarist times taught doctrine
intertwined with notions of predestination; during the tsarist period,
predestmation was a useful tool of exploitation. However, the Soviet Revolution
resulted in the Uberation of man from exploitation. Muslim clerics were accused
of changing their teaching following the Revolution to the idea that man is
responsible for his actions.65 As a naive and amusing example, Soviet specialists
pointed out that there had been a time when Muslims did not find it useful to plan
for the future. AU that happened was God's will. However, after the Revolution
the Muslim clerics supported the five-year plan.66 The Russian Orthodox
missionaries had also criticized Islamic teaching relating to predestination.
However, they criticized it because it constituted a denial of free wiU.
62 See Rahman, 232.
63 This seems to be the position of Soviet Muslim clerics as seen through their preaching
quoted by Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists. See for example Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 11 1-2.
64 Ashu-ov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 109-1 1.
65 Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 125-31; and id., "Evoliutsiia Bogoslovsko," 23-4.
66 Ashirov, Evoliutsiia (1973), 128-9.
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Soviet propagandists raised yet another charge to accompany their
accusation of Islamic shifts in dogma. They suggested that the clerics were
adapting to new conditions as a means of holding onto their constituencies.
According to Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists, such wavering was evidence of
deep problems within Islam. The Soviet hterature on the subject is extensive,
suggesting that they regarded it as a matter about which Islam was seriously
vulnerable.
At the same time, the Soviets may have been apprehensive that a
modemized Islam would prove to be too powerful to be penetrated by their anti-
Islamic propaganda. More than that, in the 1970s there was a growing
recognition that Islam was serving as a rallying point for nationaUsm.67 in part,
the increased sensitivity of Soviet propagandists to the role of Islam in the growth
of nationahsm resulted from the surveys of rehgiosity conducted during the
1960s and 1970s. In some respects, the attitude of the Soviet anti-Islamic
specialists resembled the views and perspective of the Russian Orthodox
missionaries regarding the Jadid reformers of the nineteenth century. The Jadid
movement was proving to be a popular, cohesive force among the Muslims.
Accordingly, it was regarded as dangerous to the interests of the tsars. While the
missionaries used the reformist movement as an occasion for propaganda
purposes, arguing that it was contrary to the true fiber of Islam, their chief
concem, as with the Soviet propagandists, was focused on the poUtical front.
Popular Behefs and Practices Not of Divine Origin . A second chief
approach to die analysis of Islam with a view toward showing that it is not a
6^ See for example: Bazarbaev, Sekularizatsiia, 29 zn&passim; E.G. Filimonov, 81;
Abdullaev and Vagabov, 148-9; Ostroushko; and Saidbaev, "Islam, Istoriia," 41-3.
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legitimate religion, was to concentrate on the popular beliefs and practices of
ordinary Muslims. Responsive to Party calls for research from all branches of
knowledge, ethnographers and others delved extensively into pre-Islamic
reUgions and practices throughout the Muslim lands of the Soviet Union. As a
consequence, a substantial literature emerged on the survival of pre-Islamic
beliefs, customs, and rituals ~ such as those included within shamanism,
paganism, magic, demonology, and so forth. Although there was nothing sinister
about tracing the survival of earlier practices, such studies could have great
propaganda value, a point of emphasis by those involved in die research.68
According to Soviet ethnographers, there were clear survivals of pagan
beliefs that continued to exert themselves in Islamic practices. A chief example
of such surviving practices is provided by the veneration of saints within popular
Islam, a matter to which Soviet specialists devoted much energy and attention.
They argued that, over the centuries, pagan deities had been transformed into
Muslim saints. Thus transformed, they made their way into the Cult of the
Muslim Saints, one of the most important practices within popular Islam.
Soviet ethnographers pointed out that the saints generally retained their
pre-Islamic functions. Thus, for example, there are various agrarian saints
corresponding to important events relating to the land ~ such as planting,
harvest, and rain.69 The Avars of Daghestan beheve that pouring water on the
tomb of a saint can assist in bringing rain. Even better, the tomb could be
opened, water poured into the tomb, aU accompanied by the reading of the
^^ In the distinguished publications of the Academy of Sciences, two scholars, Snesarev and
Basilov, pointed to the propaganda value of such studies. Snesarev, 15; and Basilov, Kul't, 6-7
and 142-3.
69 Peshchereva, 129-30; Sukhareva, Islam, 35; Salamov, 157; Karaev, "Islam"; and
Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 151.
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Qur'anP^ For special wishes or other matters, gifts can be brought to the saint
in an effort to induce favorable consideration. Or, in some instances, animal
sacrifices may be appropriate. In similar fashion, there are Karachai, Balkar and
Ossetian saints whose chief purpose is to protect hunters.71 There are Central
Asian saints whose purpose is to protect various trades, such as cattle or horse
breeders in Kirgizia and Turkmenistan, or musicians in Turkmenistan.72
Throughout the Muslim lands there are local saints assigned to the protection of
particular villages. Some saints occupy themselves with the protection of women,
and, in return, are venerated only by women.73 Virtually all of these saints can
be traced to pagan deities, according to Soviet anti-Islamic specialists.
In many instances, the rituals and legends that had been associated with
various saints in pre-Islamic tunes continued essentially unchanged. In clanic and
tribal regions of the Soviet Union, especially among the Turkmen, it tums out
that saints had been the legendary founders of the tribes.74 In those regions,
according to Soviet speciahsts, ancestor worship was recast into into the Cult of
the Saints.^S
According to Soviet ethnographers, there are popular practices among
Muslims that resemble the worship of spirits. The spirits may be associated with
70 Nikol'skaia, 323; and Klimovich, Islam (1965), 267-8.
71 Kaloev, 83.
72 Amanaliev, 22; Basilov, Kul't, 62; Demidov, "Perezhitki," 148-9; and "Doislamskie
Verovaniia," 90-1. Also see Sukhareva, "K Voprosu."
73 Sukhareva, Islam, 40-1; Snesarev, 239-43; and Murodov.
74 Amanaliev, 24; and "Doislamskie Verovaniia," 92. For more extensive information on the
subject see the work of: Basilov, "0 Proiskhozhdenii"; and Demidov, "Magtymy."
75 See for example: Basilov, "Nekotorye"; id., Kul't, 70 2Si& passim; and lampol'skii.

199
specific locations. Such locations might include a natural spring, the top of a
mountain, a wooded area, or a bend in the road. Frequently, these locations ~
endowed with special virtues ~ are venerated as holy places.76 Or, the spirits
may not be associated with a specific location; rather, they may be simply an evil
spirit, a good spirit, an angry spirit, or a happy spirit.^V By certain practices,
people may protect themselves against these spirits or, if appropriate, attempt to
gain their favor. The practices may consist of the offering of specified prayers,
or the wearing or display of amulets containing an inscription from the
Qur'anP^ These practices, referred to as the Cult of the Spirits, have been
traced to demonology associated with ancient local reUgions.
The ancient local religions in Central Asia were of a shamanistic character.
Soviet ethnographers argued that shamanistic practices had insinuated themselves
into Islam. Legends about famous shamans had been recast into legends about
Muslim saints. Thus, similar to their shamanistic counterparts, certain Muslim
saints have the ability to travel large distances with great speed. Some saints have
the power to revive the dead, to make barren women fertile, or to cure the
sick79 Some Muslim saints are characterized by their abiUty to live with their
head separated from their body, a practice attributed to especially gifted
^^ See for example: Rudenko, 317; Makatov, "Kul't," 171-3; Avksent'ev, Islam na
Severnom, 150-1; Demidov, "Perezhitki," 135 and 138; and "Doislamskie Verovaniia," 92-3.
7^ Amanaliev, 25-7; Snesarev, 26-9 and passim', Kereitov, 105-8; and "Doislamskie
Verovaniia," 92-6.
'^^ Snesarev, 37; Kereitov, 107; Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 149-50; and "Doislamskie
Verovaniia," 95 and 101.
79
"Doislamskie Verovaniia," 97.
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shamans.80 Sufi shaykhs or ishans, regarded as holy men by Muslim believers,
were described as having adopted shamanistic methods ~ such as telling fortunes
and faith healing.81
Soviet ethnographers argued that pre-Islamic practices had been
incorporated into Muslim rituals relating to marriage and burial, and that pre-
Islamic beliefs had exerted themselves in Muslim views regarding the soul of the
dead. In order for Muslim women to avoid being cursed by the "evil eye" (being
unable to bear children), the bride, the groom, and the parents go through a
specific set of prayers from the Qur'an.^'^ Throughout history and across many
cultures there has been a practice of burying the dead with provisions they would
need in their journey. But Islam has eschewed the practice. Even so, the practice
has survived in many Muslim areas ~ Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and
North Caucasus ~ by taking a different form. Muslim tombstones are sometimes
engraved with pictures of provisions and artifacts that other cultures enclose with
the dead.83 a related pre-Islamic practice, that of providing a feast for those
attending the funeral, has survived without criticism. In famiUes with strong
tribal or clanic traditions, there is a practice of burying members in groups in
order to facihtate their coming together after death.84 The soul of the dead is
given anthropomorphic character by several pre-Islamic practices. For example.
^0 Such legend is associated with Shah i-Zinda, a saint venerated in Samarkand. See:
Sukhareva, Islam, 34; Snesarev, 208; and "Doislamskie Verovaniia," 97.
8
1 Sukhareva, "O Nekotorykh," 128-33; id., Islam, 49-50; Snesarev, 54 and 27 1 ; and
Basilov, Kul't, 92.
°2
"Doislamskie Verovaniia," 101. On the maniage-z/A:r among the Turkmen see Snesarev,
53-4.
83
"Doislamskie Verovaniia," 98-7; and Snesarev, 1 12-3 and 1 18.
84
"Doislamskie Veronaniia," 99.
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it is common for the relatives of a recently departed believer to place a small pile
of stones, symbolizing a hut, on the tomb of a Muslim saint.85 The hope is that
the soul of the dead can use this abode as a resting place. In some Soviet Muslim
areas, mainly in Tatarstan, there is a practice of removing the body of the dead
through the window of the house, rather than through the door, all accompanied
by special prayers from the Qur'an.^^ The purpose of this practice is to confuse
the soul, making it difficult for it to find its way back home.
As indicated, the Soviet anti-Islamic specialists were convinced that there
was substantial propaganda value in the recitation of these and similar examples
of pre-Islamic practices. By showing that the practices and beliefs embedded in
the everyday religious life of the Muslim people were drawn from pre-Islamic
sources of dubious character, anti-Islamic specialists sought to undermine Islam
itself. They were able to make the case that Islam is nothing more than the
survival of superstitions, or a coUage of pre-existing forms. Such a showing
drawn from popular practices supplemented their attacks on orthodox Islam.
Popular practices ~ including religious marriages, religious burials in
purely Muslim cemeteries, circumcision, pilgrimages to holy places, and religious
holidays ~ continued to be attacked in the post-Stalin era. As in the 1930s, the
practices were denounced for a variety reasons. But because this subject was
developed in Chapter V, it is not repeated here. The post-Stalin era witnessed
Uttle change in the nature of the arguments used against respective practices.
However, there was a marked increase in the quantity of propaganda devoted to
85 Snesarev, 111.
86 Tatary, 346-7.
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the topic, especially after 1980 when it became clear that these practices were
associated with the Islamic revival.87
Divisive Character of Islam
Soviet scientific atheists asserted that Islam is a divisive force, preventing
the full realization of sociaUst society. There were essentially two bases for
describing the divisive character of Islam. One basis, that discussed by Marx and
Engels, focused on the Islamic predisposition to divide the worid into two parts,
Muslim and non-Muslim. Such a mind-set is divisive by its very nature. A
second basis for discussing the divisive character of Islam focused on Islam as a
rallying point for nationalism. In addition to the sharp division between Muslims
and non-Muslims, there is a recognition of meaningful differences within the
Muslim community, the ummah. Although all Muslims are equal, the Qur'an
teaches that there are ethnic or tribal differences that can be maintained and
celebrated. Muslim clerics were accused of taking advantage of such differences
as a means of marketing their otherwise moribund rehgion.
Arguments such as these were directed toward those sections of the Muslim
intelligentsia, especially young people, who had received a progressive education,
but who might still be involved in one way or another with Islamic practices. It
is possible to infer the target of the propaganda by the fact that the theme - Islam
is a divisive force in Soviet society ~ was often accompanied by complaints from
Soviet propagandists that some members of the inteUigentsia, including Party
°7 For example see: Bairamsakhatov; Novye Vremena; Dzhabbarov; Kalilov; Nuraliev;
Khakuashev; Urazmanova; Mirrakhimov; Zumakulov; and Sarsenbaev, Sotsialisticheskie. Also
see the rapid succession of articles in Pravda Vostoka: "Dobrye Traditsii: Novye Obriady i Ritualy
V Zhizn'," 14 March 1985; "Akh, Eta Svad'ba," 24 March 1985; "Traditsionnoe i Novoe v
Sovremennoi Obriadnosti," 12 April 1985; "Utverzhdat' v Zhizni Sovetskikh Liudei Novye
Obriady: Ritualy," 14 April 1985; and "V Makhalle Segodnia Prazdnik," 10 July 1985.
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people, viewed the observance of certain religious rites and customs as innocuous
national traditions.
Muslim Non-Muslim Dichotomy . Soviet scientific atheists did not need to
strain to identify the most fundamentally divisive aspect of Islam. The argument
that Islam divides the world into two parts had already been articulated by Marx
and Engels, discussed by the Orthodox missionaries, and set forth by the anti-
Islamic propagandists of the Stalin era. Islam is viewed by believers as a way of
hfe. Such a concept is central to the teaching of the clerics. The main principles
of that way of life are belief in Allah and His Prophet, and the concept of Muslim
brotherhood, a type of supra-national or pan-Islamic consciousness. Absent from
such a way of life is even the shadow of intemationalism, according to scientific
atheists.88 By the very word of God, Muslims are enjoined to maintain an
antagonistic posture or at least shy away from unbehevers. Numerous quotes
from the Qur'an were provided by the propagandists to support their argument.
For example,
O ye who beheve!
Take not for friends
And protectors those
Who take your rehgion
For a mockery or sport, ~
Whether among those
Who received the Scripture
Before you, or among those
Who reject Faith; (S.V, 60.)
Or,
O ye who believe!
Take not
88
107-8; and Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 62-71.
Ashirov, Islam i Natsii, 92. Also see: Gadzhiev, 55-7; Faseev; Kuliev, "O Prichinakh,"
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For protectors your fathers
And brothers if they love
Infidelity above Faith:
If any of you do so,
They do wrong. (S.DC, 23.)89
Furthermore, Islam, by the very will of God, fosters the view that it is
superior to all other religions and to atheism, and that, by a logical extension, its
adepts are superior. The following verse from the Qur'an was generally quoted
by propagandists to illustrate their point.
It is He Who has sent
His Apostle with Guidance
And the Religion of Truth,
That he may proclaim it
Over all religion.
Even though the Pagans
May detest (it). (S.LXI, 9.)90
The preaching of Muslim clerics, be they official or unofficial, epitomizes
the exclusiveness of Islam and fosters the distrust of unbeUevers and followers of
other religions, the propagandists emphasized. "Muslim brothers, you became
the most righteous of all men. Is there a people that could compare to the
followers of Islam? Is it possible to find a people that could stand above us, the
people of the Beloved of both world, our Prophet?"91 "We must be grateful to
our ancestors, and remember them in our prayer. Had they not accepted Islam,
God forbid, we today would be prisoner of false beliefs, we would be
primitives." Or, "We must be thousand times grateful to our ancestors for they
^^ Quoted by Ashirov, Islam i Natsii, 34.
90 Quoted by N.M. Vagabov, 7-8.
91 Excerpt from the sermon of Charkhiakhmedov, imam-khatib of the mosque of Ufa, on 17
December 1974, cited by Ashirov, Musul'manskaia, 68; and id., "Nravstvennye," 50.
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have accepted the best of all faith ~ Islam."92 "islam is the truest and the latest,
(sent by God) to last until the Day of Judgement. All the requisites of the highest
morahty are indicated in Islam."93 As for the atheist, "he is a madman whose
company must be avoided."94 Such preaching, claimed the anti-Islamic
propagandists, were not innocuous. They oriented the behevers toward
remaining closed within their reUgion, thereby militating against the drawing
togetiier of die various peoples of the Soviet Union.95
The religious exclusiveness of Islam, propagandists continued, is codified
in its religious rites, law, and practices. The dietary laws, forbiddmg the
consumption of pork and wine, serve to introduce difficulties into even the most
simple social discourse between Muslims and non-Muslims. Circumcision and
rituals associated with the rites of passages, birth, marriage and burial, are
expressions of exclusiveness. But probably the most unposing barrier to the
coming together of all peoples is the prohibition for a Muslim woman to marry a
non-Muslim man, although a Muslim man may marry from among the People of
the Book.96
92 Excerpts from: the sermon of Kh. larullin, imam-khatib of the mosque Maijaniyeh in
Kazan, on 8 March 1968; and from the sermon of the imam-khatib of the mosque in Ufa on 26
August 1977, cited by Ashirov, Musul'manskaia, 66 and 35.
93 Excerpt from the sermon of the imam-khatib of the mosque of Semipalatinsk on 14
September 1977, cited by Ashirov, Musul'manskaia, 33.
94 Cited by M.A. AbduUaev, 34.
95 Ashirov, "Nravstvennye," 50-1.
9o Prohibitions of the Shari'ah relating to marriage, family matters, and dietary consumption
are considered by Soviet anti-Islamic propagandists to be one of the main barriers to the sblizhenie
process. For studies of the Shari'ah's prohibitions and their impact on the process oi sblizhenie
see Kerimov, Shariat, 106-40; and id., "Islam."
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When Soviet propagandists accused Islam of imposing a biological barrier
to the fusion (sliianie) of the people of the Soviet Union, they were generally
careful to avoid specifics. Satisfactory statistical data concerning intermarriage
between Mushms and non-Muslims are, therefore, very difficult to fmd. The
data on mixed marriages generally lack two components. First, the data never
provide information regarding religion. Even so, if the data were clear on ethnic
backgrounds of the marriage partners it would be possible to make inferences
regarding reUgion. Although the data do identify mixed marriages, they rarely
indicate the ethnic breakdown of those marriages. They lump together all mixed
marriages, making it impossible to differentiate between those marriages
composed of ethnically akin groups ~ such as between Russians and Ukrainians
(both of whom are likely to be of Christian backgrounds) or between Turkic
groups such as Uzbeks and Kazakhs (both of whom are likely to be of Muslim
backgrounds) ~ and those between religiously different groups, such as between
Russians and Uzbeks. Second, the data do not indicate the ethnic breakdown by
sex. While most Soviet Islamists of Islam admitted that the great majority of
mixed marriages taking place in Muslim repubhcs were between reUgiously akin
groups, in those rare cases when Muslim/non-Muslim marriages took place it was
almost always between a Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman.97 Such a
marriage pattern was attributed in part to the Shari'ah, which prohibits the
marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men.
A rare illustration of the potential impact of the SharVah on the marriage
patterns within Muslim areas is provided by data on marriages in the
^7 See for example a recent statistical study by the head of the Department of Demography of
the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR State Statistical Committee on mixed marriages, A.
Volkov, "Etnicheskie," V. 7, 16 and 20.
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Autonomous Republic of Daghestan for the year 1973.98 Considering all
marriages differentiated by ethnic group of the Muslim women, the percent
consisting of marriages to non-Muslim men were: Avar 0.17; Darghin 0.9;
Lezgin 0.9; Kumyk 1.1; Lak 1.5; Tabassaran 0.2; Nogai 2.0; Agul, Tsakhur, and
Rutul 0.0. Considering all marriages differentiated by ethnic group of the
Muslim men, the percent marrying non-Muslim women were: Avar 2.7; Darghin
1.6; Lezghin 3.1; Kumyk 6.0; Lak 5.0; Tabassaran 3.5; Nogai 3.7; Agul,
Tsakhur, and Rutul 0.0. Two inferences may be drawn from the data. First,
there were very few marriages taking place between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Second, marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men were markedly
rarer than between Muslim men and non-Muslim women.
Although these data were supportive of the accusations of the Soviet
propagandists, they were never presented in a way that supported those
accusations. Instead, they were shown in a manner that suggested that the
propaganda was succeeding. For example, as discussed above, marriage data
were presented in a manner that permitted one to believe that there had been
substantial intermarriage.
Even the Islamic code of morality serves to operate in a divisive fashion,
according to propagandists. While propagandists acknowledged that there were
laudable aspects to the Islamic code of morality ~ including its caU for respect of
parents and older generations, its call for peace with neighbors, its condensation
of arrogance, brutality, and theft ~ they complained of its limited application.
Islam asserts that its moral code has been sent directly to them by God. Hence,
the propagandists claimed, Muslims feel justified in limiting its application to the
"° Gadzhieva and lankova, table 5. Percents are calculated from raw data. The data covered
all marriages in the Republic for the year 1973.
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family of believers. In contrast, atheistic morality emerged from the practical
experiences of the masses Uving within a classless society; hence, it extended to
aU.99
Islam Fosters Nationalism . A second argument highlighting the divisive
character of Islam was that it served as a vehicle for maintaining the national
character of the various peoples in the Muslim lands. It is important to note that
this argument did not surface until the late 1960s. It is also important to
recognize that its late arrival as a subject for Soviet propaganda did not reflect its
recent discovery as an issue within Muslim lands. The subject had been
addressed, albeit eUipticaUy, by the Russian Orthodox missionaries. As discussed
in Chapter H, the missionaries had recognized the connection between the Tatar
identity and Islam. In any event, either because nationaUsm was a taboo issue
and/or because Soviet scholars, especially sociologists, had not taken nationalism
seriously as a factor associated widi religious beliefs, the topic was not addressed.
But a series of developments ~ sociological surveys throughout the 1960s and
1970s, along with the unfolding of mirasism (the rediscovery of the past as
discussed in Chapter III) ~ forced the subject into the open. 1^0 By the late 1970s
the argument had become the dominant theme in anti-Islamic propaganda.
When the nationalism issue had first surfaced in the anti-Islamic literature,
the scientific atheists had charged that only the most backward rural elements of
99 Ashirov, Musul'manskaia, 70. Also see: Ashirov's more extensive study concerning the
incompatibility of Islamic and Communist norms of morality in Nravstvennye, 37-55; Petrash,
"Islam"; B.Kh. Tsavkilov; Bairamsakhatov and Mavliutov, 95-6 and passim; and B.A. Tsavlikov.
100 Among the earliest studies making the connection between Islam and nationalism see for
example: Avksent'ev, Islam i Byt, 40; id., O Preodolenii, 7; Madzhidov, 1 10; Kadyrov, 59;
Dorzhenov; Esbergenov, 206; Bokov, 32-3; Bazarbaev, "Nekotorye Rezul'taty," 93 and 99;
Kuliev, "O Prichinakh," 109; M.V. Vagabov, "Perezhitki Islama," 126-7; and Khalmukhamedov,
58.
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the population were confused about Islam and national tradition. For a long time,
most propagandists maintained such a position. Not until the 1980s did the
propagandists concede that the population at large, including urban workers,
intellectuals of all fields, the pohtical elite, and people of all ages, considered
Islam to be an integral part of their national patrimony.
In mounting the argument that Islam fostered nationalism, Soviet
propagandists, historians, and political scientists were forced to smooth over a
problem within their own doctrine. The concept of nation should have withered
away with the advancement of sociahsm in the wake of the 1917 Revolution.
Indeed, the concept of nation did, in fact, effectively disappear from print.
However, the sociological surveys forced the Soviet historians to come to grips
with this unwanted detritus from bourgeois times.
Preserving doctrinal consistency, the pohtical scientists created a distinction
between the concept of nation as the term is popularly understood in the west and
the concept of a so-called sociaUst nation. 101 They conceded that, in the turmoil
following the Revolution, the Party decided to consoUdate various groups along
ethnic Unes, forming sociahst nations. A sociahst nation is characterized by the
absence of class exploitation and private property; hence, there is an absence of
those layers of society seeking to preserve reUgion. Within a socialist nation, the
leading force is the working class, the most irreligious class of society. Its avant
garde is the Conununist Party, whose ideology is dialectical materiahsm. In
short, the leadership within the socialist nation is uncomfortable with religious
beliefs. The socialist nation is characterized by a new set of social relations.
101 See Ashirov, Islam i Natsii, 20- 1
.
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leading to a new type of spiritual configuration having nothing in common with
religion. 102
The Soviet political scientists argued that the Muslim clerics ~ the official
clerics and even more the Sufis — sought to identify themselves with these newly-
created nations. Seizing upon the understandable interest of people in their
historical past, the Muslim clerics attempted to reinvigorate an otherwise
declining interest in religion by linking their teachings about Islam to the national
patrimony. 103 xhe clerics "... present Islam as the guardian of national morals,
and of national cultural values." 104 "They speculate upon the religious feelings
of the Turkmens (or Tajiks, or Kirghiz ...), especially the young people, who are
unable to distinguish the national from the religious." 105 "By every possible
means tiiey try to consolidate the ties (between national and religious survivals) to
give a reUgious coloring to nationalism and a national meaning to religious
feelings." 106 They "propagate among the believers, especially the younger
generation, the idea that ... the observance of reUgious rites and customs are tiie
very symbol of nationalism and the guarantor ... of national survival." 107 The
list of such accusations is remarkably long and the accusations are remarkably
unvaried. They sum up as a charge that the clerics confused their followers into
believing that they were attesting to their national identity by observing the
102 AshiroV , Islam i Natsii, 2 1
.
103 Ashirov, Islam i Natsii, 46 and passim; and Khalmukhamedov.
104 Pivovarov, "Sotsiologicheskie," 317-8.
105 Ostroushkov.
106 Makatov, Ateisty, 32.
107 Klimovich, "Bor'ba Ortodoksov," 85.
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Islamic rituals. That is, the Soviet speciahsts charged that the clerics attempted to
fuse the concept of Muslim with that of Uzbek or, altematively, Tajik, Turkmen,
and so forth. According to the Soviet anti-Islamic specialists, however, nothing
could be further from the truth.
Pohtical scientists and historians argued that the true national character of
these ethnic groups, has little, if anything, to do with Islam. 108 They pointed out
that Islam is a foreign rehgion, imposed and maintained by force. As such, it
could not be a part of the tme national patrimony. 109 This is particularly true,
the propagandists insisted, in those areas of the North Caucasus ~ Chechnia,
Ingushetia, and North Ossetia ~ where Islam had not been introduced until the
nineteenth century. While it is tme, they said, that Islam spread a veneer over
certain pre-Islamic rites emerging from the land ~ the permutations of pre-
Islamic practices discussed above ~ this veneer did not form a genuine bond with
the national past of these peoples.
The pohtical scientists' attacks were a broadside against both official and
unofficial clerics. However, the pohtical scientists came to view the Sufi orders
as the most dynamic and aggressive defenders and propagators of the
misidentification of Islam with nationality.HO
The sociological surveys of the 1960s and 1970s had revealed that Islam
was particularly strong in regions where the Sufi orders had been historically
vigorous. Thus, for example, Sufi orders had been historically prominent in the
Chechen-Ingush Repubhc and Turkmenistan, and the sociological surveys
108 Mazakhin.
109 See among others: Kaikatsishvili and Kontselidze; Mavliutov, 23-4; and Mullaev, 23-4.
110 For a study of the Sufi orders in the USSR see Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Le
Soufi, in particular 158-63.
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revealed that they continued to be active in those areas. 1 1 1 According to the
surveys, Islamic rehgiosity was high in the Chechen-Ingush RepubUc and
Turkmenistan notwithstanding the absence of official mosques and registered
clericsf Political scientists accused the Sufi propagandists of promoting an
uninhibited nationalist message. Going further, the Sufis were charged with even
greater crimes. Not limiting themselves to religious objectives, the Sufis were
charged with engaging in political activities, teaching that a negative attitude
toward the faith of their ancestors constituted treason. The Sufi message was
distinguished by its anti-communist and anti-Russian character. 1 12 it was alleged
that the Sufis preached that a believer should obey only those governments
consisting of good Muslims, but he should not permit himself to be governed by
non-beUevers ~ and certainly not by atheists.! 13 Political scientists and
historians charged the Sufis with an interesting application of the
misidentification of ethnicity with belief. They accused the Sufis of directing the
Muslim hatred of their tsarist Russian conquerors towards their current
Communist liberators. 114 The national patrimony celebrated by the Sufis served
to glorify non-Marxist heroes, chiefly the Sufis who had fought the Russians.H^
The anti-nationalism writings of the Soviet propagandists were not
sustained throughout the remainder of the Soviet period. The only consistent
111 For example see: Sukhareva, Islam, 51-8; Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 76- 102;
Abdullaev and Vagabov; ladaev and Pivovarov; Pivovarov, "Sotsiologicheskie"; Makatov,
Religioznye', Tutaev; Mambetaliev, 35-43; Mamleev; Mustafimov; Demidov, Suftzm, 130-60; and
Umarov.
1 1^ Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 100; Tutaev, 20; and E. Filimonov.
113 Aliskerov,37
1 14 Avksent'ev, Islam na Severnom, 35.
115 In particular see Kurbanov and Kurbanov, 36-7.
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arguments that persisted throughout the post-Stalin era and into the 1980s were
those highUghting the divisive character of Islam. Arguments suggesting that
Islam was unrelated to the true national patrimony of the various ethnic groups
had been abandoned by the late 1970s. By the late 1980s, faced with the Iranian
Revolution and the war in Afghanistan, the Soviets came to recognize that they
faced a real danger, not only a delay in bringing their socialist revolution to
fruition.
No longer were the Soviets working to build Soviet Man. Instead, the
propaganda efforts of the 1980s retumed to simple attacks similar to those
mounted m the 1930s. The Uterature of denunciation in the 1980s was directed
against the clerics, primarily the Sufis. Curiously, just as the Soviet Hterature
had followed so many examples of the Russian Orthodox missionaries, their
literature of denouement resembled that of the missionaries. By the end of the
nineteenth century, when it had become clear to the Orthodox missionaries that
they were losing, their writings too had tumed to denunciations and warnings.
Conclusions
Anti-Islamic propaganda during the post-Stalin era was directed toward a
more sophisticated and better educated public than during the 1920s and 1930s.
Consequently, although the themes and arguments remained substantially
unchanged from those that characterized the Stalin era, the presentations were
less crude, more elaborate, perhaps more sophisticated. Moreover, the
distinction between scholarly work and popular propaganda literature ~ as
exemplified by the popular journal Nauka i Religiia ~ becomes blurred during
the post-StaUn era. This is not a surprising outcome in view of the fact that the
researchers doing scholarly work also had responsibility for preparing the
hterature for hands-on propaganda. Some themes and arguments that were
I
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prominent during the Stalin era also continued in the post-Stalin era. In
particular, the propaganda denouncing holidays, rites of passage, and other
aspects of the Muslim way of life, continued throughout the post-Stalin era, even
accelerating during the 1980s.
Aside from the Khrushchev period, poUcies involving the direct
eUmination of the religious establishment were abandoned. Hence, the
propaganda supporting such direct efforts was substantially absent. This is not to
suggest that the propagandists no longer resorted to direct confrontation. In fact,
throughout much of the post-Stalin era there was a continuing attack against
unofficial, or parallel, Islam. The principal brunt of these attacks were the Sufi
brotherhoods. Much of the propaganda directed agamst the Sufis resembled the
attacks against the clerics mounted during the 1920s and 1930s. But by the end of
the Khrushchev period, the Sufis alone had remained as enemies of the people.
After all, by then the official clerics had been incorporated into the
nomenklatura.
\
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Chapter VII: Conclusions
In the introductory chapter, the study was motivated along two lines. First,
anti-Islamic propaganda was viewed as an aspect of Marxist efforts to create
Soviet Man. It is accurate to admit that thinking and research during the course
of the study was dominated by that perspective. Second, however, it was
suggested that anti-Islamic propaganda during the Soviet period could be viewed
as an aspect of coloniahsm. As it tums out, remarks of a conclusive character are
shaped by the perspective from which the study is viewed.
At this writing, it has become reasonably clear that Islam remains strong
within the Muslim lands of the former Soviet Union. Does the strength of Islam
within these areas reflect the failure of anti-Islamic propaganda? Does it reflect
the spiritual impotence of Soviet Man? Such conclusions are unduly specific
within the context of a broadened body of evidence. That broadened evidence
reminds us that Islam has experienced a resurgence throughout much of the
Muslim world. Hence, it may be more plausible to view the Soviet experience as
an aspect of the persistent rejection of the oppressors by the oppressed. Viewed
within that context, the present study can be regarded as one case study among
many.
The study did not encompass the specific responses of the Muslim
population to the Soviet propaganda. Even so, we are persuaded that there was
not passive acceptance. Certainly there was an extensive dialogue between the
anti-Islamic propagandists and the Muslim intellectuals during the pre-
Revolutionary period (e.g., the Jadid movement). Beyond that, we know that
those oppressed in other colonized areas of the world did not accept their fate
with passivity. There is no reason to believe that experience within the Muslim
lands of the Soviet Union would have been different.
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This study has confirmed some of the views expressed at the outset
regarding the potential value of the study of propaganda as an aspect of historical
analysis. Even though propaganda is likely to present a distorted image of its
own subject matter, the propaganda themes and arguments reflect the picture that
one gets from other, more general, sources. Accordingly, the study of
propaganda can provide a supplement to and a verification of other forms of
historical analysis.
This final chapter moves in seven-league steps through the history just
traversed, tracing chronologically the propaganda changes during the Soviet
period, then summarizing the major findings relating to changing themes and
arguments, and, finally, suggesting directions for future research.
Propaganda and Historical Developments
At the outset it was suggested that propaganda shifts would parallel, or
reflect, the changing exigencies facing the state. As it turns out, major shifts in
propaganda themes and arguments provided the basis for the organization of the
study into the Stalin era and the remainder of the Soviet period. Such
propaganda shifts also permitted a further within-period delineation. In fact,
however, it is unclear whether the propaganda shifts were in response to
changing concerns of the state, to varying demands of the target audience, or to
changmg interests of the propagandists themselves.
The post-revolutionary period began with the outright destruction of the
rehgious establishment during the Civil War. The Bolsheviks closed mosques and
physically eliminated the clerics; in support, there was practically no propaganda
effort. Following the Civil War and its anti-Islamic excesses, the Bolsheviks
elected to suspend active and direct attacks. This period of relative moderation
corresponded with the NEP. Although some propaganda developed during the
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period, it concentrated on ridiculing the Muslim clerics. Later, as an aspect of
Stalin's Revolution From Above, anti-Islamic propaganda became an integral part
of the Cultural Revolution. Attacks against the Muslim clerics shifted from mere
ridicule to scholariy demonstrations that the clerics were class enemies. With
Worid War n, however, Stalin achieved a detente with the reUgious
establishments of all faiths.
Following the death of Stalin, Khrushchev marked his return to Leninism
with a renewed determination to hquidate all religion, including Islam. Within
this setting, one in which the Soviet Union had reached its zenith both in terms of
economic and mihtary power and as the role model for world Communism, anti-
Islamic propaganda became part of a gigantic centralized propaganda mechanism.
By this time, scientific atheism had developed into a full-fledged, well-staffed
intellectual discipline. As a consequence, anti-Islamic thought, which had
heretofore surfaced from a variety of intellectual currents, became an outgrowth
of a consistent, weU thought-out, body of Marxist-Leninist theory.
No longer was anti-Islamic propaganda concemed with an observable
Islamic estabUshment. The bulk of that estabhshment, the mosques and working
clerics, had been effectively eUminated; the part of the estabUshment tiiat
remained, the Official Spiritual Boards {Muftiats), had been appointed by the
Soviet authorities. The official clerics were so much a part of the estabhshment
that Brezhnev was able to use them as ambassadors in the conservative Muslim
world. The Soviet state was comfortably in power. ,^rom this point forward,
anti-Islamic propaganda could be directed towards laying the underpinnings for
Soviet man. Its role was to shape the myriad of beliefs, presuppositions,
attitudes, prejudices, values, and mind-sets that make instinctive the reactions of a
modem member of Soviet-style socialist society.
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But the concerns of the Soviet state were profoundly changed during the
1980s. Nationalist sentiments around the periphery of the Soviet Union, always
just below the surface, began to assert themselves. Although there had been
growing evidence of Islamic revival in the late 1970s, it was not until the Iranian
Revolution and the Afghan War that the propagandists began to link this Islamic
revival with nationalism. Reflecting these new concerns, anti-Islamic propaganda
shifted towards efforts to highlight the divisive character of Islam.
Changing Themes and Arguments
In view of the role of the class struggle in Marxist theory, it is
unremarkable that it forms a major theme in anti-religious, including anti-
Islamic, propaganda. Although the class stmggle theme persisted throughout the
Soviet period, there was an important shift in the way the theme was applied. In
the Stalin era, the religious establishment received the brunt of the anti-Islamic
attack. During this period, the class character of the religious establishment, the
clerics, provided cursory justification for attack. Notwithstanding the
generalized Marxist view that aU religion is a tool of the ruling class, there was
essentially no change regarding the class character of Islam. However, the class
struggle theme was revisited in the post-Stalin era as a subject for scholarly
investigation. During this period, emphasis was placed on the class character of
Islam, with essentially no propaganda directed agamst the clerics.
The shift in the treatment of the class character of Islam is but one example
of many changes that occurred in anti-Islamic writings. There were a number of
individual themes ~ e.g., the materiaUst origin of Islam, the personaUty of the
Prophet, and the validity and class character of the Qur'an ~ that were begun in
the 1920s and 1930s, were continued and developed further during the post-Stalin
era, but were effectively swallowed-up by more generic themes. To a major
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extent, these changes reflect the evolution of scientific atheism, propaganda, and
the propaganda apparatus over the course of the Soviet period. Prior to the
Great Purges, there was an element of spontaneity in the anti-Islamic literature.
The mtellectual die had not yet been cast. It was possible, even necessary, during
this period to mount an attack against, for example, the materialist origin of
Islam, without having that attack firmly rooted within received Marxist doctrine.
But in the post-Stalin era, each theme was placed within a broadened perspective.
They were placed within an overall effort to explain within Marxist-Leninist
thought the emergence and subsequent development of reUgion in general. In
addition, there was an abundance of historical and ethnographical studies tracing
the origin of Islamic beliefs and practices to a pre-Islamic past. As a consequence
of these studies, Soviet propagandists were able to develop more fully the theme
that Islam was not a legitimate religion.
One propaganda theme, which accelerated sharply in the late- 1970s, had
remained essentially unchanged throughout the preceding sixty years of the Soviet
period. Attacks against Islam in daily life had begun in the 1930s and continued
throughout the remainder of Soviet history, even though attacks on the treatment
of women were toned down until tiie 1980s. Popular practices - such as
religious marriages, religious burials in purely MusUm cemeteries, circumcision,
pilgrimages to holy places, and rehgious holidays ~ were attacked during the
late-1930s, and continued to be attacked throughout the Soviet period. But in the
1980s, as it became clear that these popular practices were the domain of the
Sufis, regarded by the Soviets as chief carriers of nationaUsm, the pace of attack
accelerated. Interestingly, there was little change in the nature of the arguments
used against the practices; rather, the apparent increase in Soviet concem was
reflected wholly by the marked increase in the quantity of propaganda devoted to
the topic.
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Only one new theme emerged prominently in the post-Stalin era. That
theme, developed during the late-1970s and 1980s in response to nascent
nationalism, related to the divisive character of Islam. We should remind
ourselves, however, that this concem was not new to the Soviets. The Bolsheviks
had acted against this potential problem early on by dividing the Muslim lands
and by Uquidating Muslim national communists. The apparent success of these
early strategies may have lulled the Soviets into a false sense of security. In any
event, the anti-nationaUst propaganda theme was dormant until the very end of
the Soviet period.
In reviewing the propaganda Uterature produced during the Soviet period,
one is struck repeatedly by its similarity to the hterature of the Russian Orthodox
missionaries. The literatures were similar both in terms of their content and, at
times, in terms of the audiences to which they were directed. The literature of
the missionary period was addressed to a largely Russian-educated public, and
consisted chiefly of an analysis of religious texts, such as the Qur'an or the
SharVah. In contrast, the anti-Islamic Uterature during the Stalin period was
addressed toward the broad masses, and, therefore, a largely uneducated public.
This literature contained essentially no analysis of religious texts However,
during the post-Stalin era the anti-Islamic literature was substantially targeted
toward in intellectual elite, an audience similar to that targeted by the
missionaries. Perhaps as a consequence, the literature retumed increasingly to an
analysis of rehgious texts. If this interpretation of causation is accurate,
developments such as these deviate from an underlying presumption of this study.
We have suggested that shifts in themes and arguments reflect shifts in concerns
of the state. Rather, at least to some extent, the shifts in messages during the
Soviet period reflected changes in the target audience, not changes in the concerns
of the state.
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Directions for Future Research
Future research can productively be undertaken in at least three directions.
The first direction for future research is to assess the impact of the Soviet
propaganda effort on the Muslim population. As in the rest of the colonized
world, we know that the reaction of Muslims to anti-Islamic literature and
campaigns was not passive. Accordingly, it would be of interest to identify and
characterize these responses during the Soviet period. As a backdrop to this
investigation it would be useful to review the responses of the Muslim scholars to
the writings and activities of the Russian Orthodox missionaries. We know that
there is just such a literature. We also know that there is a similar literature of
reaction in the 1920s, prior to the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s there
was also a not-so-"veiled" dialogue conducted within the Party-run newspapers of
the Muslim republics. In response to articles criticizing various religious
activities, the newspapers pubhshed letters to the Editor and other articles,
presumably unsolicited, in support of those activities. Additional research in this
vein would help in resolving problems related to distinctions between cause and
effect.
Second, it would be of interest to determine the extent to which there were
differences in anti-Islamic propaganda themes and arguments across different
parts of the Soviet Muslim world. Within that context, it would be important to
attempt to understand why such differences emerged. Underlying the present
study is the presumption that shifts in propaganda through time reflect changes in
the state's perceptions of threats and concems. Is there reason to believe that
Soviet concems were sufficiently fme-tuned to be sensitive to differences across
the Muslim republics? Directly related to an investigation of the variance in
themes and arguments across different Muslim republics are questions relating to
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the propaganda apparatus itself and to the role of the Communist Party. What
was the role of the Party in defining and insuring orthodoxy in propaganda
themes and arguments? Who in the Party was responsible? What institutions
served to insure that emerging propaganda did not deviate from the Party line?
To what extent was the propaganda apparatus in some republics better developed
than in others? What are the explanations for such differences?
A third du-ection for future research is to broaden the analysis within and
beyond the print media. We know that anti-Islamic themes were to be found in
novels, plays, and poetry. But a thorough investigation of these areas, available
in printed form, was beyond the scope of this study. It is known that radio,
television, and movies were part of the propaganda apparatus. We have no way
of knowing whether, or the extent to which, accounts of such propaganda have
been preserved. Even so, the subject area deserves exploration.
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APPENDIX
The following is a summary of articles appearing in Bezbozhnik, in
chronological order. The choice of Bezbozhnik for the analysis of anti-Islamic
themes and arguments at a popular level reflects several considerations. It is the
specialized anti-rehgious journal that survived the longest, from 1925 to 1941. It
was targeted to a broad pubUc. It was published by the Society of Militant
Godless, which also published anti-religious journals in Turkic languages at the
same intellectual level (not available in the west). It is reasonable to assume,
however, that the themes and arguments against Islam printed in Turkic joumals
are the same as those printed in Bezbozhnik.
The periodicity oi Bezbozhnik was: 1925 (1-6: August-March) and (1-3:
October-December), 1926-1932 (twice a month), 1933-1940 (monthly), and 1941
(6 numbers: January-June). At this writing, several volumes for 1937 and 1940
were missing.
Even a casual inspection of this bibUography reveals tiie dominant anti-
rehgious themes discussed above. It is quite clear that the largest number of
articles was devoted to criticisms of clerics. Probably the next three most
important themes, in about equal proportions dealt with the exploitation of
Muslim women, religious rites, or science versus religion. The geographic
distribution of subject matter covered essentially all Muslim areas, but the largest
number related to the North Caucasus.
Although we know very little about the background of the writers, it is
probable that many or most were members of the Society of Mihtant Godless.
The writers were chiefly journalists, probably emerging from the meshchane.
There were only a few weU-known intellectuals. Judging from their names they
were mostly Russians, some clearly Jewish, some Armenian, and some Muslims.
However, some obviously wrote under pseudonyms.
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The propaganda assumed many forms: poems, cartoons, pictures, riddles,
news reports, historical articles, literary criticism, tales, memoirs, and so forth.
The articles were lacking m sophistication. They consisted of brutal, rude, and
even stupid language and themes. One point emerges clearly. The writers had
little regard for the Muslim population and its clerics.
1926
DOBRIANSKII, V.N., "Khadzh: Palomnichestvo Musul'man v Mekku,"
Bezbozhnik, 1926, V. 9, pp. 10-11. Report. Attack on religious rites. The Hajj,
one of the five "pillars of Islam," is described as expensive and unhealthy.
GVOZDEV, I., "Sheiku Krai a Gassanu Rai," Bezbozhnik, 1926, V. 11, p. 3.
Poem. Attack on Clerics. Rich clerics rob the poor from the fruits of tiieir labor
by promising them rewards in heaven.
DOBRIANSKII, V., "Persidskoe Dukhovenstvo i Ego Rol' v Konstitutsionnom
Dvizhenii 1906-1908g.," Bezbozhnik, 1926, V. 11, pp. 4-5. (Persia). Historical
article. Attack on clerics. Muslim clerics initially sided with the Constitutional
movement in Persia. Under the cover of the Constitutional slogan they wanted to
restore antiquated forms of rehgious and economic exploitation of the masses.
Clerics were the first to betray the movement for material advantages.
GORODETSKII, S., "Pro Samykh Glupykh i Samykh Zhadnykh," BezbozhniK
1926, V. 11, pp. 6-8. Tale. Attack on clerics. Clerics are ridiculed for their
stupidity and greediness.
ROSTOVTSEV, A., "Religioznoe Izuverstvo v Persii," Bezbozhnik, 1926, V. 11,
p. 11. (Persia). Report. Attack on religious customs. Denounces religious
fanaticism using the example of the Ashura. For Shi'ah Muslims the Ashura
involves self-flagellation on the anniversary of the death of Imam Husayn.
VEL'TMAN, S.L., "Antireligioznyi Moment v Khudozhestveimoi Literare
Vostoka," Bezbozhnik, 1926, V. 11, p. 16. Literary criticism. The article
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identifies anti-religious themes in mystic literature, suggesting that novelists and
poets could and should use anti-religious themes. 1
1927
CHERNYSHEVA, A., "Bez VoH Allakha," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 3, pp. 2-5.
(Chechnia). Tale. Attack on customs (adats) and on clerics. Article attacks the
kalym (bride-price), the marriage of young girls, the forced marriage,
polygamy, the abduction of the bride. Calls for the liberation of women. Attack
on clerics suggesting that they are sexist. Barbarian customs are displayed in
contrast to Soviet progress. In this article the propagandist confuses the way of
life with religious rituals.
CHERNYSHEVA, A., "Protiv Khrista i Magometa," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 4,
pp. 8-9. (Ajaristan). Historical article. Attack on clerics. Muslim and Orthodox
clerics dealt in white slavery, supplying women for the rich harems of Turkey,
Persia, and Egypt.
PEROVSKn, N., "Chelovek Di Tovar," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 5, pp. 10-12.
(North Caucasus). Report. Attack on customs and on clerics. Article attacks the
kalym, the marriage of young girls, forced marriages, polygamy, the abduction
of brides. Article attacks clerics, suggesting that they seek only their material
self-interest. For example, in exchange for bribes they sanctioned barbarian
customs. The article argues that Soviet law is changing the life of women
enslaved by the Shari'ah.
NAZAROVA, S., "Krov' Za Krov'," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 5, pp. 14-15.
(Daghestan). Memoir. Attack on customs. The article describes the waste
associated with the custom of blood feud. This custom has nothing to do with
Islam, but the author claims that it is sanctified by Islam.
MALTSEV, v., "Nov'," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 10, pp. 7-9. (Tajikistan). Tale.
Soviet achievements are extolled - here kerosene lamps. Soviets foster the
possibility of progress, thereby freeing man from the religious past.
MALTSEV, v., "Shaitan-arba" (Devil's Wheel), Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 12, p. 13.
(Tajikistan). Tale. Soviet achievements ~ here the railroad ~ foster the
possibility of progress, thereby freeing man from the religious past.
Vertman-Pavlovich was the only professional orientalist among the early Bolsheviks.
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KOR. No. Ill, "U Podnozhiia En^rusa," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 13, p. 10.
(Karachai oblast). Report. Soviet achievements ~ schools, hospitals, cooperatives
- are extolled, fostering the possibility of progress, thereby freeing man from
the religious past.
CHERNYSHEVA, A., "Bereket-Beresi," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 15, pp. 11-12.
(Karachai oblast). Memoir. Attack on clerics. An untrustworthy cleric runs
away with the money entrusted to him by poor mountaineers. Clerics stole,
robbed and exploited people until the coming of Soviet power.
MALTSEV, K., "V Gorakh Tadzhikistana," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 15, pp. 13-14.
(Tajikistan). Memoir. Soviet schools versus obscurantist Qur'anic school. Attack
on clerics who opposed Soviet schools.
SALIM, "Dukhovenstvo Persii Deistvuet," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 16, pp. 2-3.
(Persia). Report. Attack on clerics. The powerful clerics of Persia are
reactionary and conservative. Not satisfied with the constitution of 1907, they
agitate the masses against the government.
CHERNYSHEVA, A., "Bezbozhnyi Gorod," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 21, p. 15.
(Karachai oblast). Report. Soviet pohtical, economic and cultural achievements
empty the mosques and destroy religious customs such as the marriage of young
girls. Newly built towns are free from religion, but they have theaters, movies-
theaters, post-offices and radios.
CHERNYSHEVA, A., "Erbrus Svidetel* Istorii," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 22, pp.
12-13. (Karachai oblast). Historical article. Attack on clerics. Clerics are
counter-revolutionaries. In the Karachai country, Muslim clerics preached
against the Red Army during the Civil War. In 1920, under their lead, a
reUgious rebellion engulfed the Karachai country. Since the end of the Civil
War, mullahs are losing their grip over the population.^
MALTSEV, "ReUgiia v Tadzhikistane," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 22, pp. 14-15.
(Tajikistan). Report. Attack on clerics and the Basmachis. Clerics and beys
exploited the poor peasants of Tajikistan. They agitated in favor of the
Basmachis who pillaged, robbed and burned villages. When the Tajik peasants
understood that the Soviets wanted only their well-being, they helped to defeat the
Basmachis. Since the victory over the Basmachis, Soviet power has brought hope
^
It is interesting to note that the author discusses a heretofore unknown rebellion in 1920 in
the Karachai country. It may suggest that the religious uprising in 1920 in the North Caucasus
was more extensive that had been previously thought.

227
for the future. They opened a school for the poor, not for the rich as it had been
previously.
"Poezd V Kavkazskie Gory," Bezbozhnik, 1927, V. 24, p. 14. (North Caucasus).
Report. Soviet achievements ~ here the railroad — are undermining faith in the
Qur'an and the clerics.
1928
OZERSKH, A., "V Strane Chemogo Zolota," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 1, pp. 5-6.
(Azerbaijan). Tale/report combined. Attack on clerics. Clerics exploited the
naivete of people to live a parasitic Ufe. Soviet achievements ~ the
industrialization of Baku ~ are undermining the belief of people in the Qur'an
and the mullahs.
OZERSKn, A., "Dagestan," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 2, pp. 9-10. (Daghestan).
Report. Soviet idealized future is contrasted with the dreary past. In the
industrialized future there is no place left for the Shari'ah nor Islam.
POLKANOV,!, "Zhertva," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 2, pp. 11-12. Report. Attack
on customs alleged to be sanctified by the Qur'an including: the veiling, the
kalym, polygamy, the forced marriage, and the marriage of young girls.
According to the report, an old husband killed his young bride because she was
not a virgin.
MALTSEV, "Tak bylo," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 4, pp. 12-13. (Bukhara).
Historical tale. Attack on clerics. In the past, clerics helped the beys to oppress
the poor. Also, clerics were providers of young gu-ls for the pleasure of the
rich.
KARLOV, L., "Na Prazdnike Smychki v Tatarii," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 4, pp.
14-15. (Tatarstan). Report. The first all-Tatar congress of women workers and
peasants. Liberated women swear never to retum to old ways.
APUSHKIN, I., "Zakon Gor," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 10, pp. 1-3. (Probably the
North Caucasus). Tale. Attack on customs. Attacked are the kalym and the
forced marriage. If a girl runs away with her lover, she is forcibly brought back
by her relatives. The lover is killed. Such "customs" are said to be sanctified by
fanatic clerics. The way of hfe of Muslims is contrasted to that of the "giaours"
(here the Soviets) which is said to mean freedom.
RAVICH, N., "V Strane Chudes," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 10, pp. 4-5.
(Afghanistan). Report. SociaUst progress is loosening the grip of religion in
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Afghanistan. Under the king Amanullah, Afghanistan entered into a friendly
relationship with the Soviet regime.
KARACHAILY, I., "Pod Prikrytiem Religii," BezbozhniK 1928, V. 10, p. 10.
(North Caucasus). Tale. Attack on the levirat custom. In the tale a woman is
forced to marry a young boy, brother of her dead husband.
LEBEDEV, L., "Za To Chto Sniala Parandzhu," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 11, p. 16.
(Uzbekistan). Report. A woman activist is murdered by her own family because
she corrupted other women and disrupted the work of the clerics.
BAZAROV, v., "Vekhi," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V, 12, pp. 10-11. (Uzbekistan).
Report. Attack on customs. Attacked are the veihng and the "cloistering" of
women. The article emphasizes improvements in women's Hfe brought by Soviet
power.
ADAM, "Vchera Takikh Zhenshchin Pobili By Kamniami Vo Imia Allakh,"
Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 15, p. 15. (Cherkess oblast). Report. Attack on religious
rites, clerics, and on Qur'anic schools. Women refuse to observe the fasting of
Ramadan. Clerics agitated against Soviet schools and especially against education
for women. Qur'anic schools are described as nests of obscurantism and are
contrasted to Soviet schools.
GORODETSKH, S., "AUakh Vse Mozhet," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 18, pp. 6-7.
Tale. Attack on clerics. Greedy mullahs take advantage of the naivete of poor
people in order to fleece them in the name of Allah.
SALIM, "Sovetskie Negry," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 18, p. 16. (Abkhazia).
Historico-ethnographic article. Short article on MusUm negroes in Abkhazia,
descendants of former slaves brought by Turks. They are listed as Abkhazians in
the census, speak Abkhazian, have Abkhazian names, but preserve some African
beliefs.
OZERSKH, A., "Storona Bashkirskaia," Bezbozhnik, 1928, V. 19, pp. 6-7.
(Bashkiria). Report. Attack on clerics. The article contrasts Soviet successes to
the poverty and oppression of the past. It raises questions conceming the
continued strength of Islam in Bashkiria. At the writing there continued to be a
large number of clerics under the control of the mufti of Ufa, Fakhretdinov. In
1928, there were 3,527 open mosques with 9,500 mullahs, and 40 thousand
"religious activists" (maybe Sufis). In other words, there was one mosque for
360 inhabitants, one mullah for 137 inhabitants, and one rehgious activist for 40
inhabitants. According to the author, Fakhretdinov is a modernist and is appar-
ently loyal to the regime but he is hiding his ideas and conducts a holy war
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against Leninism. 3 The article also mentions that two sons of Fakhretdinov are
atheist communists, working for socially useful organizations.
1929
SALIM, "Bor'ba v Afganistane," Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 1, p. 3. (Afghanistan).
Report. Attack on clerics. The article deals with the 1929 uprising of the
Shinwari tribe (Pashtun) against King Amanullah, friend of die Soviet Union.
The uprising is said to have been stirred up by reactionary, anti-socialist,
conservative clerics, and to have been sponsored by the British imperialists.
4
SHUR, lA., "Na Bor'bu Za Osvobozhdenie Zhenshchiny Vostochnitsy,"
Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 4, p. 3. Report. Attack on clerics. Conservative, anti-
Soviet clerics strive to undermine Soviet reforms. In the case at hand they agitate
against Soviet education for girls.
BONCH-BRUEVICH, V., "Rol' Magometanskogo Dukhovenstva v Ubiistve A.S.
Griboedova," Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 4, p. 8. (Persia). Historical article. Attack
on clerics. Written by a well known Bolshevik, the article is a patriotic defense
of the 19th century Russian ambassador to Persia assassinated by order of
"fanatic" clerics.
SALIM, "Babizm i Bekhaizm," Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 5, pp. 12-14.
Historical/ethnographical article. Unfriendly account of the Bahai communities
in the Soviet Union. The Bahais are criticized for their pacifism, their obnoxious
"Tolstoyan" character, their rejection of the class-struggle, and their religious
propagandizing, in particular among Muslim masses. The Bahais of the Soviet
Union are said to be manipulated by the Bahais of the United States.^
BOL'SHOI, P., "Tatarskaia Basnia o Sotvorenii Mira," Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 9,
p. 14. (Crimea). Tale. A not too crude and rather nice variant on the accepted
Adam and Eve theme, as told by children. The site of paradise is Baghchesaray
in the Crimea. Eve is made of a dog's tail. God's apple was forbidden, not
3 Rizaeddin Fakhreddin was killed in prison in 1936.
4 The same Shinvari tribe resisting the Soviets in the 1980s was said to be sponsored by the
Pakistani, the Chinese, or the Americans.
^ The Bahai sect, a sect that stemmed from Islam, is not recognized by the Muslim
community as part of Islam. In the early years of the Soviet regime, Bahais were generally viewed
as revolutionaries. This article is one of the first attacks upon them.
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because it held the secret of Ufe but because it was the most expensive fruit, five
kopecks.
OZERSKn, A., "Gandzha -- Bezbozhnyi Gorod," Bezbozhnik, 1929, V. 9, pp.
16-17. (Azerbaijan). Report. Soviet industrial achievements are killing rehgion.
The industrial new Gandja is free from religion. Instead of mosques it has clubs,
movie-theaters, red-comers, radio, etc..
1930
GREKOV, A., "Zeinab," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 3, pp. 18-19. Tale. Attack on
religious rites and clerics. The article calls for the hberation of women from
observance of barbarian rehgious practices. In the case at hand, the article
promotes resistance to the fasting of the month of Ramadan. Attack on
conservative clerics who agitate for the continuous observance of such rites.
"Tam Gde Zhili Tsari," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 4, pp. 16-17. (Crimea). Historical
article/report. Under the old regime, clerics teamed up with the bourgeoisie to
enslave the masses spiritually. They built mosques but not schools or hospitals.
Since the revolution, Soviet achievements are emptying the mosques.
SALIM, "Sed'maia Soiuznaia Sovetskaia Tadzhikskaia Respublika," Bezbozhnik,
1930, V. 5, pp. 6-7. (Tajikistan). Report. The article contrasts Soviet cultural
and economic progress to the pre-Revolutionary obscurantism. However,
concems are voiced about the strong influence exercised by the conservative
Ismaih rehgious leaders (pirs) in Badakhshan, who hinder progress.
KREMEN', M., "Shagaia Po Kavkazu," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 5, pp. 14- 15.
(Daghestan). Report. Attack on clerics. In this article, for the first time, clerics
are presented as counter-revolutionaries, and enemies of the people. Clerics are
accused of sabotaging collectivization and refusing to comply with Soviet
administrative reforms. In particular, they refuse to recognize civil marriages.
The article also describes the work of Society of MiUtant Godless: efforts of
Society to attract women, creation of an anti-religious museum in Makhach-Kala,
development of anti-religious press, pamphlets, posters, etc.. On the demands of
workers, mosques are being closed by the Society. Of interest in the article are
data relating to mosques and clerics. In Daghestan, for a population of one
miUion, there are 2 thousand mosques, 2 thousand mullahs, several thousand
mutalims, and 3 thousand Sufis who struggle against Soviet power.
SOLOV'EV, L., "Many," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 9, pp. 8-9. (Ferghana vaUey
near Kokand). Tale. Attack on clerics. Article makes fun of Sufis. Sufis are
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depicted as crooks, frauds, parasites, and capitalists. They invent miracles to take
advantage of naive people.
DOBRIANSKU, V., "U Azerbaidzhanskikli Kurdov," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 9,
pp. 12-13. (Kurds of Azerbaijan). Ethnographic report. Attack on Kurdish
clerics and such customs as: aqsaqalism (reliance on the council of the elders),
polygamy, kalym, pilgrimage to holy places, and various superstitious practices.
The article describes the assassination of a woman ordered by the council of
elders (including her relatives) because after her marriage she was found not to
be a virgin. Islam is half heathen among the Kurds, and their clerics are as much
sorcerers as servants of the cult. Islam and its clerics are, therefore, a social evil.
SALIM, "Kirgizy i Islam," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 10, pp. 10-11. (Kirgizia).
Historical/ethnographic article. Attack on clerics and customs. Islam among the
Kirghiz is accused of compromising with pre-Islamic beliefs. The class character
of Islam is revealed by the commonahty of interest between the Kirghiz manaps
(aristocracy) and the clerics. In the first years of the Soviet regime, under the
agitation of clerics and manaps, Islam went through a period of expansion. The
article presents data on the construction of mosques built near Issyk-Kul between
1917 and 1926: in 1917, 2 mosques; 1918, 6; 1919, 9; 1920, 10; 1921, 7; 1922,
13; 1923, 28; 1924, 34; 1925, 14; 1926, 9. From 1927 on, with the elimination
of the manaps, Islam is said to be losing strength. Attack on customs such as:
polygamy, kalym, and the marriage of young girls.
PLATONOV, G., "O Shamkhorskom Chude," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 10, p. 19.
(Azerbaijan). Report. Attack on holy places and clerics. The article concems the
founding of a holy place (tomb of a saint whose name is not specified) in the
viUage of Bittili, district of Shamkhor, okrug of Gandja. It is a place were
peasants came for healing. The article attacks not only the superstitious aspect of
the pilgrimage but also its anti-sociaUst aspect. Clerics and other enemies of the
Soviet regime organize pilgrimages to the holy place in the spring in order to
sabotage the work of kolkhoz.^
ORLOVETS, P., "Tselebnaia Griaz' Allakha," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 12, pp. 14-
16. (Crimea). Tale. Attack on holy places and clerics. The article is an attack on
the superstitious behef in holy places (here a holy place in Cairo), and upon the
crooked clerics who attend them. A believer goes to Cairo to buy and bring back
some healing dirt from a holy place, later to sell it to other fools. Instead, he
falls ill and is cured by a doctor, not the healing dirt. As a result he becomes an
atheist.
On the particular events surrounding the holy place of Bittili see Khadzhibeih, 43-4.

232
PASLAVLEV, M., "Padaiushchie minarety," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 15/16, pp.
10-1 1. (Uzbekistan). Report. In the cities, Islam is dying out under the impact of
modemization. The article compares 1930 with the pre-1924 period when people
were wasting their time in useless prayers. After 1924, clerics lost their raison
d'etreJ Women are emancipated, Qur'anic schools were closed, justice was in
the hands of the Soviets, and medicine in the hands of doctors. Mosques are
being closed or transformed into movie theaters, power stations, hotels, garages,
museums, clubs, schools, Ubraries, and so forth. Like rats, clerics take refuge in
the backward countryside.
KLIMOVICH, L., "Khadzh i Biudzhet Khidzhaso-Nedzhskogo Gosudarstva,"
Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 15-16, p. 21. (Arabia). Report. Attack on religious rites.
The Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) is a tool of exploitation of the masses in the hands
of capitalists and pro-British imperialists. In 1929, the Hajj brought 1.3 million
pounds stolen from the masses to the king of Saudi Arabia.
SALIM, "Budem Borot'sia s Chadroi," Bezbozhnik, 1930, V. 22, pp. 3-4.
(Central Asia). Methodological article. Attack on customs and clerics. The
author ties the fight for the emancipation of women (symbolized by the struggle
against the veil) with the fight against counter-revolutionary clerics. The
emancipation of women, their economic and social mobilization, wiU undermine
the role of the clerics and eventually bring the disappearance of Islam. Clerics,
who understand the danger, try to stop the process of emancipation by organizing
the assassination of activist women. The article mentions the errors made in the
early phase of the campaign against the veil, and calls for a long educational work
among women.
1931
B.C., "Molitvy Protiv Krizisa," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 4, p. 8. (Persia). Report.
Attack on clerics. The author dwells on the stupidity of clerics who believe and
preach that the economic crisis in Persia can be stopped by prayers. Clerics are
an opiate for the people.
ARDI, lU., "Cherkeshenka, Osvobozhdaiushchaiasia ot Tsepei ReUgii,"
Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 4, p. 9. (Adyghe A.R.). Report. Attack on clerics. The
article describes the sociahst progress in the Adyghe A.R., its alphabatization and
its economic successes. However, the clerics, together with their allies the
"white" bandits, continue their counter-revolutionary agitation of the population.
The nationalization of the waqfs began in 1924.
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The authors quote the case of the reopening of a village mosque, where women
have been admitted for the first time. Clerics are also infiltrating the kolkhoz.
The author complains about the virtual absence of anti-religious work in the
villages. Komsomol, Soviet and Party organizations are totally uninterested in
anti-rehgious work and even display a tolerant attitude toward religion. The
author calls for a change of attitude toward the clerics, who are enemies.
"Poslednii Imam," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 6, pp. 14-15. (Daghestan). Historical
article. Attack on Muridism. The article is a review of the 1920 religious
uprising in Daghestan, and a violent attack against Najmuddm Gotsinski and Uzun
Hajji, the leaders of the movement. Najmuddin Gotsinski and Uzun Hajji are
described as fanatics, capitalists, and counter-revolutionaries.^ The famous
saying of Uzun Hajji, "I am weaving a rope to hang engineers, students and in
general all those who write from left to right," is quoted. However, the article
concludes that the poor masses of Daghestan defeated those reactionaries.
Therefore, Islam and Muridism are counter-revolutionary.
LUKOVSKH, N., "Svin'i Byvaiut Raznye," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 6, pp. 16-17.
Tale. Attack on clerics and religious customs. Clerics are untrustwortiiy. The
crude story denounces a greedy fat village mullah who used to eat pork secretly.
The liberated people kicked the mullah out, closed the mosque, and started to eat
pork.
ORLOVETS, P., "Svin'ia," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 7, pp. 9-10. (Kabarda). Tale.
Attack on clerics and religious customs. Clerics are untrustworthy, they eat pork
secretly.
"Budni Kishlaka," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 11/12, pp. 12-13. (Uzbekistan). Tale.
Attack on clerics, rehgious schools and superstitions. Soviet education is better
than reUgious education. With the new alphabet in Soviet schools, even simple
villagers can leam to read. Clerics had declared the sanctity of the Arab alphabet
so that they alone would be able to read and, therefore, better cheat the people.
In the same article, clerics are accused of playing upon the superstition of people
to practice healing through prayers. Under the guise of special healing "prayers"
or ablutions, they satisfied their sexual drive (here by force) with naive women.
"ReUgii Byvshikh Ugnetennykh Natsii Samoderzhavnoi Rossii Sluzhili Tsarizmu,"
Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 16, p. 12. Historical article. Clerics of the Muslim Society
of Orenburg (Ufa) were agents of the Tsarist regime. They preached obedience
to the Tsarist authority; they acted as police informers; and they served the
Najmudin Gotsinski was executed in 1925.
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imperialistic interests of the state in its colonial expansion. Clerics are, and have
always been, enemies of the people.
ARISTOV-ARSOV, V., "Diadzhal," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 20, pp. 14-15. Tale.
Attack on clerics. Clerics oppose women's emancipation, in particular their
participation in women's clubs.
KLMOVICH, L., "Ateisticheskaia Propaganda na Tak Nazyvaemom
Musul'manskom Vostoke," Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 22, pp. 16-17. (Persia,
Palestine, India). Report. The article describes the rise of anti-religious
organizations in Muslim countries abroad.
ASLANBEK SHAKH-GIREI, Title illegible, Bezbozhnik, 1931, V. 23, pp. 10-11.
(Chechnia). Tale. Attack on clerics. The story is about an old, rich, fat, nasty
and sexist mullah, who tries to steal the wife of his poorest parishioner.9
1932
ASLANBEK SHAKH-GIREI, "Zakiat," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 3, pp. 13-14.
(Chechnia). Tale. Attack on clerics. The story is about a greedy and sexist
mullah who coUect the zakat (legal alms of 10% of the revenues for the poor),
hides it in his garden, and then spends it on girls. He also tries to sabotage the
estabhshment of a kolkhoz.
S.B., "Sledy AUakha," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 9, p. 14. (Daghestan) Tale. Attack
on clerics and holy places. The article is designed to undermine the legitimacy of
holy places by ridicuhng their origins. A crooked mullah pretends that God has
left a print of his foot in the mosque, and a pilgrimage is bom. The article also
ridicules the beUevers.
RAISKH, B., "Konkvistadory i Donoschiki: Iz Istorii Pravoslavnogo i
Musul'manskogo Dukhovenstva v Epokhu Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii,"
Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 10, p. 5. (Central Asia). Historical article. Attack on
clerics. The article denounces the local Orthodox and Muslim clerics in assistmg
the Tsarist administration. Muslim clerics (ulama), having realized that the
foreign oppressors did not diminish but on the contrary increased their influence
and revenues, supported them in all aspects, even denouncing those who agitated
among the masses against the Russian conquerors. The author acknowledges that
among the "non-official" clerics (ishans) there were some that were not friends of
the Tsarist regime. For example the author brings up the Andijan rebeUion.
I
The story takes place in the district of Urus-Martan, a center of the Sufi Qadiri order.
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However, he dismisses the ishans (Sufis) as striving to reestabUsh the despotic
rule of the khans. Muslim clerics showed themselves as agents of the Tsarist
administration when they joined the counter-revolutionary forces during the Civil
War. Clerics are, and have always been, enemies of the people.
GAI, M., "Tam, Gde 70% Kolkhoznikov Bezbozhniki," BezbozhniK 1932, V.
13/14, pp. 15-16. (Tatarstan). Report. Soviet achievements are killing rehgion.
Islam is dying out in the kolkhozes. In the village of Kazanbash, district of Arsk
(north of Kazan), there is no mosque left. Nobody observes the fasting of
Ramadan, nobody observe Kurban-bairam. Of some interest are data concerning
the activities of the Society of MiUtant Godless. In Kazanbash there are 6 atheist
circles, 42 atheist meetings had been organized (in 1932), 340 copies of
Bezbozhnik had been distributed, 182 women are activists.
GOTCHIKHANOV, A., and S. VISAEV, "Ibragim i MuUa," Bezbozhnik, 1932,
V. 13/14, pp. 16-17. (Chechnia). Report. Attack on clerics. The greedy mullah
of the aul of Valerik struggles against the transformation of the village into a
kolkhoz. He is sentenced to labor camp for sabotage.
"Voennyi Zaem* 1916 g.," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 15/16, p. 18. Historical article.
Attack on clerics. (Only a section of the article is devoted to Muslim clerics.) In
supporting their national governments in the War, MusUm clerics served the
interest of their national bourgeoisie, and not the interest of the masses.
"Poslednii Imam Chechni," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 15/16, pp. 18-19. (Chechnia,
aul of Makazhay). Report. Attack on Sufis. The article describes an uprising of
Qadiri murids in Chechnia in 1931.10 The information is interesting because the
events described were otherwise unknown. The religious leader, Seyfuddin
Saadaev, was also unknown. The uprising is said to be directed against the
Communists and the Russians.
A.S., "Ddi Imena Izvestny: Epizod Iz Deiatel'nosti Missionerov v Afganistane,"
Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 17/18, p. 11. (Afghanistan). Report. A conservative
reUgious uprising by a Pashtun tribe in the vaUey of Kara-Gebak (near the Indian
border) against a progressive government is said to have been organized by
British missionaries.
AMOSOV, N., "Bor'ba Popov, Rawinov, Mull i Sektanskikh Propovedni Protiv
Pervoi Piatiletki," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 19-20, p. 6. Report. Attack on Clerics.
1^ The Qadiri are not named but the article mentions a zikr with dances as practiced by the
Qadiri of the North Caucasus.

236
The article speaks of the anti- socialist clerical offensive against the five year
plan. Clerics of all denominations are class enemies.
ALEKSANDROV, "Shakhimardan," Bezbozhnik, 1932, V. 19/20, pp. 18- 19.
(Uzbekistan). Report. Attack on holy places and clerics. The holy place under
attack in this article is Shahimardan in the Ferghana valley, one of the most holy
centers in Cental Asia, where pilgrims used to come from Afghanistan and India.
Shahimardan (Shah-i Mardan = King of Men) is the mythical tomb oi Khalif PAi,
son-in-law of the Prophet. Shahimardan is described as the epitome of
obscurantism, a Basmachi nest, and a center of counter-revolutionary activities by
the clerics. In 1928, the Uzbek Bolshevik poet Hakim Zade Niyazi, who was
organizing atheistic work, was assassinated in Shahimardan under the instigation
of clerics. After the assassination of Niyazi, Soviet organizations closed the holy
place supposedly in response to popular pressure. The tomb of Ah had been
opened and no remains had been found. 1 1 A camp for pioneers had been built on
the site of the holy place. The author concludes that Soviet achievements and
women emancipation have destroyed popular superstitious beliefs. ^^
1933
TOLIN, N., "Vrednye Prazdniki," Bezbozhnik, 1933, V. 4, pp. 2-3. Think piece.
Attack on rehgious holy days. Attacked are: Muslim Kurban-bairam, Christian
Easter, and Jewish Passover. The Muslim Kurban-bairam ~ the day of sacrifice,
conmiemorating the sacrifice of Ismail by his father Abraham - is said to be a
survival of ancient times. Furthermore, science has long proved that Ismail and
Abraham have never existed. Such holy days have always been tools in the hands
of oppressors. By preaching submission to the existing order in exchange for the
joys of paradise, they were an obstacle to the development of the class-struggle.
The secular celebration of the 1st of May is replacing the rehgious holy days.
L'VOV, L., "Sobytiia v Kishlake," Bezbozhnik, 1933, V. 4, pp. 12- 13.
(Tajikistan). Tale. Attack on clerics. Clerics are sabotaging work in the
1 1 The very publicized exhumations of Orthodox saints had started in 19 17.
^^ Shakhimardan remains one of the most holy Mushm places in the Soviet Union. The
mazar was reopened in the late 1930s and closed again in 1940. In 1940, the mazar was replaced
by an anti-religious museum. Periodically Soviet propagandists continued to complain about
Shahimardan. In 1961 Petrash insisted that it continued to be one of the most frequented holy
place with hundreds of pilgrims. See Petrash, Sviatye, 44-5. In 1978 Saidbaev noted that
pilgrimages to Shahimardan took place under the cover of tourism. See Saidbaev, Islam i
Obshchestvo, 210. In 1979 Davlatbaev asserted that the mazar was very popular. See Davlatbaev,
41-2
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kolkhozes. The story relates how clerics destroyed a project of silk-worms by
bringing ants.
DOROFEEV, I., "Pamir," Bezbozhnik, 1933, V. 5, pp. 16-17. (Pamir). Report.
The author contrasts the backwardness of the pre-1917 Pamir, cut off from the
rest of the world, to Soviet achievements in the region. With Soviet achievements
~ here road construction, electricity, radio, hospitals, schools, and movie-theaters
- Islam is vanishing. Attack on clerics. Clerics, who were strong supporters of
the Basmachis, are opposing Soviet reforms.
ARISTOV, v., "Rasskaz o Saranche i Aeroplanakh," Bezbozhnik, 1933, V. 7, pp.
14-15. (Daghestan). Tale. Attack on clerics. The story tells of the conflict
between Bolsheviks and mullahs at the time of collectivization. However, Soviet
technology destroyed an invasion of locusts, and the population abandoned the
mullahs and entered the kolkhozes.
1934
"Oktiabr'skaia Revoliutsiia i Musul'manskoe Dukhovenstvo," Bezbozhnik, 1934,
V. 10, p. 3. Historical article. Attack on clerics. During the Civil War all
religious organizations took sides against the Soviet government. Muslim and
Orthodox rehgious authorities even called a truce and joined hands. The armies
of Kolchak, Denikin, Semenov had numerous Muslim clerics. Clerics actively
agitated among Muslim masses to fight with the whites. Clerics always have been
counter-revolutionaries.
KHODYREV, P., "Karyizhelik," Bezbozhnik, 1934, V. 10, pp. 10-11.
(Kazakhstan). Tale. Attack on customs, especially the authority of the elders.
Young Komsomol members are shown in conflict with their obscurantist elders.
"Desiatiletie Razmezhevaniia Srednei Azii," Bezbozhnik, 1934, V. 12, pp. 4-5.
(Central Asia). Report. The article contrasts pre-1917 Turkestan, dominated by
obscurantist clerics and khans, with Soviet Central Asia marching toward
progress and freedom from religion. Attack on clerics. Clerics are accused of
sabotaging the kolkhoz.
KLIMOVICH, L., "Tam Gde ByU Ochagi Durmana," Bezbozhnik, 1934, V. 12,
pp. 6-9. (Central Asia). Report. Attack on holy places and clerics. Holy places
are nests of obscurantism and centers of counter-revolutionary activities of the
clerics. However, they are being destroyed or converted into cradles for socialist
culture and atheism. The following holy places are mentioned: Holy Spring
"Qadiriia" near Tashkent became the Karl Marx hydro-electric station; mazar of
Hoja Zakariia Warak (a Sufi saint) near the Zarafshan river in the Samarkand
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region became the "1st of May" barrage; mausoleum of Chopan Ata (saint
protector of cattle breeders among the nomads) a XYth century monument east of
Samarkand had been replaced by a kolkhoz; mausoleum and mosque of Zengi Ata
(sumame of the Yasawi shaykh Aq Ishan) is closed; mausoleum of Shahimardan
(see earUer article) is closed; madrasah of Sheikhantawr in Tashkent is
transformed into a cinema; in the Registan of Samarkand the madrasahs of Ulug
Beg and Shir Dor are transformed into anti-religious museums, the madrasah of
Hoja Ahrar (a great Naqshbandi saint) has been converted to a depot. The
author, however, complains that the anti-reUgious drive is not hard enough.
More anti-reUgious museums should be organized in former mosques and
madrasahs in Bukhara, Kokand, Ashkhbad, Stalinabad (Dushanbe), Ferghana. 13.
1935
"Skazki o Mulle Nasr-ed-Dine," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 2, pp.4-5. Tales. Short
anti-clerical stories, copied from the famous Nasreddin Hoja character. The
article has no particular message, except that clerics are untrustworthy as they
enjoy playing tricks on people.
"Poslovitsy o Popakh i Mullakh," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 2, p. 12. Proverbs. Anti-
clerical proverbs picturing mullahs as gluttonous, greedy, and idiots.
MASHCHENKO, V., "Sovetskii Azerbaidzhan," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 4, pp. 6-8.
(Azerbaijan). Historical article/report. Attack on clerics, pan-Islamism and pan-
Turkism. Prior to the Revolution, the Tsarist regime, clerics and beys exploited
the masses of Azerbaijan. The Musavat Party, its leader Rasul Zade, and their
alUes the clerics are criticized for their pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic stand and
their bourgeois, anti-class struggle position. But, thanks to the wise Stalin and his
companions Ordjonikidze, Kirov, Beria and Bagirov, the bourgeois enemy was
crushed. Clerics are denounced for their continous opposition to Soviet power
and reforms. The article also details the achievements of 15 years of Soviet rule
in Azerbaijan: industrialization, collectivization, women's emancipation...
KLIMOVICH, L., "Islam v Tsarskom Azerbaidzhane," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 4,
p. 8. (Azerbaijan). Historical article. Attack on clerics. Clerics always have been
1 3 Some of the holy places discussed in this article remained places of pilgrimage throughout
much of the Soviet period. For example in 1979 Gapurov, First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CP of Turkmenistan, complained that local authorities were unable to stop
pilgrimages to the mausoleum of Zengi Ata. See M.N. Gapurov, Turkmenskaia Iskra, 21 July
1979.
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class enemies. They were loyal servants of the Tsars and the capitalists in their
economic and cultural oppression of the national masses.
KLIMOVICH, L., "Musul'manskoe Dukhovenstvo v 1905 Godu," Bezbozhnik,
1935, V. 4, p. 12. Historical article. Attack on clerics. Clerics have always been
class enemies. In the 1905 revolution, Muslim reUgious organizations came out
in support of the Tsarist government and against the proletariat. Particular
attacks are levelled against the muftiat of Ufa.
GASANOV, R.KH., "Iz Istorii Kontrrevoliutsii v Lenkorani," Bezbozhnik, 1935,
V. 7, p. 19. (Azerbaijan). Historical article. A rather interesting article on the
Revolution (1919-1920) in Lenkoran, in southern Azerbaijan on the Iranian
border. The author describes Lenkoran as the center of Shi'ah counter-
revolutionary activity in Azerbaijan. It also was the center of an anti-Soviet
Sunni (probably Sufi led) movement, led by a certain Hajji Shaykh. To add a
Uttle color, Lenkoran was a Christian sectarian (Baptists, Molokans, Old
believers) counter-revolutionary nest. Since the Bolsheviks' victory, however,
religion had disappeared in Lenkoran. All mosques had been destroyed or
transformed into garages or depots.
SHAVALDIN, "Varvarskie Obychai," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 8, p. 7. (Bashkiria).
Survey. Attack on religious customs. Attacked is circumcision. Three villages
have been investigated. The investigation shows that all male children are
circumcised, including children of Party activists. In the year 1935 alone, 25
children from the village of Khaibat, 40 children from Apsel, and 100 children
from Esaulovo, between the age of 1 and 15 have been circumcised. The article
calls for the justice department to investigate and to bring to justice the
perpetrators of that uiiiealthy custom.
"Pravda Pobedila," Bezbozhnik, 1935, V. 9, pp. 8-9. (Turkmenistan). Tale.
Attack on clerics. The story is about how an anti-Soviet mullah tries to sabotage
the construction of the canal of Kara-Kum.
1936
I., "S.M. Kirov o ReUgii," Bezbozhnik, 1936, V. 1, pp. 3-4. (Caucasus).
Historical/think piece. The author analyzes Kirov's anti-religious activities in the
Caucasus. The article is an occasion to attack the anti-Soviet reactionary clerics,
particularly those of die North Caucasus, and bourgeois nationaUst parties, such
as the Musavat of Azerbaijan.
"Zamechatel'nye S"ezdy Zhenskoi Molodezhi," Bezbozhnik, 1936, V. 2, pp. 2-3.
Report. The article report on women's congresses and on the need to continue
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the fight for women's emancipation. The article is an attack on Islam viewed as
the major obstacle to women's emancipation. The Qur'an had enslaved women in
every detail of Ufe. The author gives quotes from the Qur'an that show the
inferior status of women. The article also attack customs, such as kalym and
marriage of young girls. The author reports on the low participation of young
Muslim women in the Komsomol organizations. For example, there are only 9%
of natives in the Komsomol organization of Tajikistan. Such low participation is
explained by the insufficiencies of the anti-religious propaganda, some Party
activists considering it to be unnecessary.
SUMBATOV, G., "Ulybka Tanbiike," Bezbozhnik, 1936, V. 2, pp. 5-7. (North
Caucasus, Karanogay steppe). Tale. Soviet medicine saves lives where prayers
and reliance on Allah could not. A mid-wife saves the hfe of a Muslim woman in
child-labor. The mullah's prayers were kilhng her. Islam is anti-hygienic.
1937 (Incomplete)
"Zhadnii MuUa," "Bog Pomog," and "Smert' Boga," Bezbozhnik, 1937, V. 10,
pp. 12-13. Three tales. Two of the tales attack clerics for theu* greediness. The
third tale relates that God himself sided with the oppressors against Lenin and
Stalin, but was defeated.
1938
KLIMOVICH, L., "Protiv Kurban-Bairam," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 1, p. 9.
Historical/report. Attack on rehgious holy days and clerics. Attacked is Kurban-
bairam, said to be a survival of the pre- Islamic polytheistic practices of the
Arabs. Kurban-bairam has always been an instrument of oppressors, be it the
feudal ruling class of the Khalifate, the Tsarist government, or the White Army
generals. Indeed, at the time of Kurban-bairam clerical preaching emphasized
submission and obedience to the oppressors. During the Civil War Kurban-
bairam was an occasion for counter-revolutionary propaganda. In the Soviet
Union, clerics use it to agitate against industriaUzation, collectivization, and
socialism. Kurban-bairam is said to be a good source of revenues for the clerics.
The author also denounces Taqemanov, the head of the Muslim board in Ufa, for
having been a spy for the Japanese imperialists.
DUBINSKAIA, T., "V Ushchel'iakh Pamira," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 1, pp. 10-
11. (Pamir). Tale. Attack on Ismaih clerics and the Aga- Khan. The story
relates how Ismaili ishans try to rob naive peasants. They convince peasants that
if they do not pay the zakat (legal aim) to the Aga-Khan an epidemic of plague

241
will fall upon them. The Aga-Khan is denounced as an agent of British
imperialism.
"Nasr-ed-Din u Stalina," "Pro MuUy i Osla," "O Isporchennoi Propovedi i
Okrovavlennom Nose," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 2, pp. 10-11. Three tales. The
tales are attacks on greedy clerics and stupid behevers.
KLIMOVICH, L., "Pod Piatoi PokroviteUa," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 3, p. 8.
(Libya). Report. Attack on clerics. Mushm clerics of Libya serve are agents of
Mussolini.
GIL'L\RDI, N., "Uigyn," Bezbozhnik, 1938,V. 3, pp. 14-16. Tale. Attack on
clerics (Sufis). Clerics are sabotaging the work in the kolkhoz by organizing
zikrs at the time grain is to be harvested. Furthermore, they try to get themselves
or their murids elected to the kolkhoz councils.
KLIMOVICH, L., " Chto Takoe Musul'manstvo," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 4, pp. 6-
8. Historical/report. Nasty attack on Islam, the Qur'an, and the clerics. Islamic
teaching, its rites and customs (often borrowed from other religions) have always
served the interests of the oppressors. The Qur'an teaches submission to the
exploiters. It humiliates women, and sanctifies prostitution, corporal punish-
ments, and polygamy. In the colonized world, Islam and its clerics serve the
interests not only of the local exploiters, but also of the capitahsts of western
Europe. Furthermore, Muslim clerics help fascist propaganda in the Middle
East. In Tsarist Russia, in return for material benefits, clerics served as agents
and police informers of the government. In the Soviet Union today, they actively
oppose all legislation of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. They
organize anti-Soviet bands. They continue to oppose women's emancipation, to
push for the observance of humiliating rituals, to mutilate youngsters with
circumcision, to practice sorcery, healing and fortune telling.
"Skazka o Khadzhi Pil'ki i Pravovemykh Piligrimakh," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 4,
pp. 8-9. Tale. Attack on pilgrimages. This article ridicules credulous pilgrims
and cunning hajjis.
"ReUgiia: Vrag Naroda," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 5, p. 7. (Azerbaijan). Artistic
critic. Attack on Islam, clerics, and religious customs. Islam regards art and
artists, especially comedians, as detrimental and poUtically dangerous. Muslim
clerics during Tsarist times tried to harm and abase artists. Women artists were a
particular target of clerics. The author continues by explaining that clerics
opposed the emancipation of women, that they were loyal servants of the Tsarist
authorities in the exploitation of the masses, and that Islam is the epitome of
cruelty as it forced the masses to engage in such barbarian customs as the Ashura.
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"Dzhambul: Stareishii Narodnyi Pevets Kazakhstana," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 6, p.
7. (Kazakhstan), Literary article. The article honors the Kazakh poet Akyn
Djambul. The article pubhshes an ode of Djambul: "Velikii Stalinskii Zakon."
The poem glorifies Stalin's order, his achievements and his internationalism.
Stalin's order is opposed to that of Islam and of Tsarist Russia.
"Abbat-Musul'manina," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 8/9, p. 6. Poem. The poem makes
fun of the rite of circumcision and of polygamy.
FATYEV, R., "Istselenie Gadzhi-Aga," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V. 8/9, pp. 20-22.
Play. Attack on clerics. Clerics are crooks, charlatans and parasites. The play
relates how two clerics trick another cleric to rob him of his heaUng business.
GERSHENOVICH, R.S., "Chem Vredny Parandzha i Chachvan," Bezbozhnik,
1938, V. 12, p. 7. (Uzbekistan). Medical article. Attack on custom, the veiling.
The article reviews some of the diseases caused by the wearing of the veil,
diseases that affect mother and child. The author states that 30 to 35% of women
in Tashkent are still veiled, and in some quarters half or two-thirds are. 25% of
women between the age of 18 and 45 wear the veil, and 80% after the age of 45.
KLIMOVICH, L., "Religioznye Perezhitki v Karachae," Bezbozhnik, 1938, V.
12, p. 18. (Karachai oblast). Report. Attack on clerics, customs, and holy places.
This vicious article describes how clerics, shaykhs and other fanatics helped in the
martyrdom of women. For example, MusUm judges following the Shari'ah
ordered the stoning of mother and child bom out of wedlock. Clerics sanctified
the "first night right," whereas a young women had to spend her wedding with
the lord. Shaykhs, under the pretext of organizing women murids, took sexual
advantage of them. The Tsarist government, according to the author, covered up
such practices, so did the Whites and the bourgeois nationalists. Attacked also are
the kalym, the abduction of the bride, and pilgrimages to holy places. The author
concludes that religious survivals stiU remain and, therefore, that the fight for the
emancipation of women must continue.
1939
MIRER, S., "Otravlennaia Sladost'," Bezbozhnik, 1939, V. 1, p. 16. Tale.
Attack on clerics. Clerics play tricks on their followers, who play tricks on
them.
MIRER, S., "O Tom, Kak Akhmet-Akhai UtoUl Svoiiu Zhazhdu," Bezbozhnik,
1939, V. 3, p. 13. Tale. Attack on rehgious rites. Attacked is the fasting of
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Ramadan. A thirsty Muslim breaks the fast by drinking, and God does not send
the fire of hell upon him.
VLADIMIROV, M., "Title iUegible," Bezbozhnik, 1939, V. 8, pp. 11- 12.
(Chechen-Ingush A.R.) Report. This interesting article is an indirect attack on
Muridism (Sufism). The author comments on the extent, strength and authority
of the taip (clan) system in the villages of Chechnia-Ingushetia. The authority of
the taip m the villages is maintained by the clan elders, the murids (Sufis), and
other religious authorities. Children are taught from a tender age that the
solidarity of the clan is supreme. The author describes how, on order of clan
elders, assassinations are carried out. Religious practices are also maintained by
the clan elders. Attacked also in this article is the custom of kalym. It is said to
be so onerous that criminal acts, such as stealing {kolkhoz properties), are on the
rise. The author concludes by advising the Society of Militant Godless to transfer
their activity from the capital Groznyi to the villages. 14
lOMUDSKAIA, D., "Trakhoma i Bor'ba s Nei v Turkmenii," Bezbozhnik, 1939,
V. 8, pp. 15-17. (Turkmenistan). Medical article. Attack on clerics. The article
on trachoma (an infectious eye disease) is an occasion for an attack on charlatan
clerics who practice healing through prayers for good fees. The spread of the
disease is said to have been facilitated by religious practices. For example, the
disease was spread by pilgrims returning from trachoma infested Mecca.
Believers who have been cured by Soviet doctors are abandoning reUgion.
1940 (Incomplete)
GAFUROV, B.,15 "Aga-Khan," Bezbozhnik, 1940, V. 11/12, pp. 8-9.
Historical/report. Attack on the Aga-Khan and the Isma'ilis. The present (1940)
Aga-Khan, his father and grand-father are presented as agents of the British
imperialists in Afghanistan and in India. At the time when anti-westem feelings
are growing in India, the Aga-Khan is agitating in support of the British and the
14 The district mentioned in the article is Achkhoi-Martan, a center of the Sifi Qadiri order.
This article is one of the first, even if indirect, connection made by a Soviet writer between the clan
structure and the structure of the Sufi brotherhoods in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Since then,
Soviet specialists of Sufism have established that the taip was the basis of recruitment into the Sirfi
orders, and that the clan elders were generally the rehgious Sufi authorities. The clanic tribunals,
indirectiy mentioned in the article, ruled according to the Shari'ah and were very much alive. See
for example: Bokov; Mamakaev, Chechenskiii; and Umarov.
1^ AfterWW II, Bobojan Gafurov became a member of the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, chairman of the Institut Narodov Azii, member of the Cental Committee of the Tajik SSR,
and, later. First Secretary of the Tajik CP.
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imperialist war. He is also criticized for his drinking habit, his dissolute Ufe, and
for robbing his followers. The author mentions that a close advisor of the Aga-
Khan came to the Soviet Pamir in 1923.
1941
Bezbozhnik, 1941, V. 2, cover. The cover picture represents a veiled woman
with mullahs. The cover also includes a poem against the veiling of women, and
mentions that not all women have yet discarded the veil.
MIKHAILOV, v., "Sviatye Mesta i Prokhodimtsy," Bezbozhnik, 1941, V. 4, pp.
8-9. (Tatarstan). Report. Attack on holy places and clerics (here sufis). Holy
places are nests of obscurantism and superstition, where naive, uneducated
people, especially women, are taken advantage by cunning preachers. They are
also haphazards for the health. Preachers (probably Sufis) are described as
adventurers, parasites, vagrants, tricksters, crooks, and charlatans, still to be
found in many villages. The author gives a unique description of holy places in
Tatarstan. For example, the main center of pilgrimage prior to 1917 was the
ruins of the mosque of the ancient city of Bulgar, where tens of thousands of
pilgrims came every year. Today, the author notes, several dozens of pilgrims
still come every day, and more come on festivals such as Kurban-bairam. The
holy place is attended by a woman who read prayers for the pilgrims. Other
particularly venerated holy places include: the holy sources of the mazar of Saint
Kasym, and a cemetery in the Bondug district. Furthermore, the author notes
that most ancient cemeteries are places of pilgrimage, a fact already noted by the
missionaries. The article ends with an appeal to close the holy places and to hunt
down the charlatans who attended them.
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